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ABSTRACT 
The global fisheries crisis of the 1990s has heightened concerns about 
ecologically sustainable management of fisheries. There is nothing new about 
the recent failures of particular fisheries. They fit a pattern often repeated 
through history. But the scale of the current crisis makes it more dramatic, and 
virgin stocks are no longer available to provide opportunities for expansion. To 
achieve sustainable fisheries in the future we need to identify and address the 
causes of fisheries failures. These causes may be far reaching and be integral to 
the social, political and economic structures of society. Meaningful solutions 
therefore, may only be achieved by successfully challenging established social, 
political and economic structures and interests. Ultimately the ecological 
sustainability of fisheries may depend more on the nature of the societies who 
use them than on particular biological considerations. Fisheries management 
with holistic goals that contribute to the development of a sustainable society 
may have greater relevance than management that focuses on biological and 
economic issues in isolation and without regard to wider social and political 
implications. Holistic management might also achieve better biological and 
economic outcomes in the short term. Sustainable societies are those that can 
contain the selfish aspirations of vested interests that would seek advantage at 
the expense of the well-being of present and future generations of society as a 
whole. Egalitarian democracy with an ability to protect the common good is 
therefore a prime requirement for a sustainable society. Use of fisheries 
resources in ways that contribute to the equalisation of wealth and power in 
society, therefore contributes to the development of sustainable societies. 
Fisheries management based on enclosure and privileged access, including many 
strategies using tradable quota, contributes to the consolidation of wealth and 
power in few hands, and regardless of short term outcomes, may undermine the 
long term prospects for sustainability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE GLOBAL FISHERY CRISIS 
In the 1990s there was widespread recognition that global fisheries were in a state of 
crisis. Statistics gathered by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO 1995) showed that total landings from the world's fisheries, which had 
increased annually since the second world war, had leveled off. In 1990, there was no 
growth in fisheries production, the total catch for the year fell below the reported catch 
for 1989, in spite of the fact that more resources were being devoted to fishing effort 
than ever before. Following 1990 annual landings stagnated at about 100 million tonnes 
for several years. Ecological "limits to growth" of the world's capture fisheries have 
apparently been reached. Realisation that it was no longer possible to increase the yield 
from fisheries, a significant part of the global economy, had serious implications for a 
global society committed to and structurally dependent on sustaining economic growth. 
The fisheries crisis of the 1990s did not come as a complete surprise. Garcia and 
Newton (1994) point out that overcapacity and overfishing were recognised at the 
United Nations International Overfishing Conference held in London in 1946. McVay 
(1966) and others gave warning of the inevitability of resource collapse as a 
consequence of unsustainable fishing practices. Their warnings were not based on 
sophisticated predictive modeling techniques, but on observation of the decline and 
collapse of many of the world's component fisheries. As one fishery after another was 
harvested to economic extinction, the world's expanding fleets turned their attention to 
new species, stocks or regions that were being 'discovered' as a result of oceanographic 
or scientific research, or made economically viable as a result of the development of 
new technologies. The global catch continued to increase in the decades following 
World War II, not as a result of the implementation of sustainable fishery practices, but 
of the expansionist, sequential "mining" of newly discovered stocks. In a world of 
ecological limits this situation could not continue indefinitely. Eventually there would 
be no new stocks to exploit. Nevertheless, against the logic of the common good, the 
global fishing fleet continued to expand as nations and individual_s competed in an effort 
to gain for their own use a greater share of the wealth of the global fishery commons 
while it lasted. 
Concerns raised by the global fisheries crisis are providing a stimulus to develop 
ecologically sustainable fisheries management. There is increasing pressure on fishery 
manag~rs to do a better job. Public awareness and concern about fishery issues has been 
heightened, and this has increased political interest in promoting sustainability. 
International agreements to preserve biodiversity have implications for fisheries 
management, and other multinational treaties to promote sustainable practices are being 
developed (Crean and Symes 1996: 202-203; Holmes 1995). Market pressures to 
promote sustainable management are also being encouraged. The World Wide Fund For 
Nature for example, is developing a program of consumer education and promotion of 
products from sustainably managed fisheries. 
While the pressure to promote ecologically sustainable development (ESD) of fisheries 
has intensified, there is not a clear and universally accepted understanding of what this 
means. There is often disagreement about the definition of ESD as discussed by 
Diesendorf (1997: 64-97). Values that some consider essential, are rejected by others, 
particularly where vested interests are threatened. There are also grey areas in the 
interpretation of generally accepted principles, and areas of conflict between apparently 
contradictory values. Given the obvious failures of many of the established practices of 
fishing and fishery management to achieve biologically sustainable outcomes, 
significant changes will be required. These changes will challenge powerful interest 
groups involved in fishing, and will have wider implications for the structu~es of power 
in society. The way fishery resources have been used has been a consequence of the 
structures and values of the societies that have used them. To change the way they are 
used from unsustainable to sustainable practices may ultimately be achievable only by 
changing the structures and values of those societies. 
Total global catch statistics can convey a misleading picture of the fishery crisis. The 
concept of the "global fishery" is an artificial construct. It is comprised of thousands of 
distinct fisheries of great diversity. They may be distinguished from each other by 
reference to geographical location such as an ocean, lake or stream; or according to 
particular fish species that are targeted; or they may be distinguished according to 
technologies employed, or cultural identities of the people involved in the fishery. Not 
all fisheries are in decline. Some are sustainably managed and have continued to 
provide benefits to users for thousands of years. Many examples of these are inshore 
artisanal fisheries and traditional devolved management systems have contributed to 
their success (Pinkerton 1989; Crean and Symes 1996: 200). Finding ways to extend 
these sustainable management strategies to offshore fisheries remains a challange. 
FAO catch statistics also fail to reflect some of the deeper issues involved; social issues 
that embody the real meaning of the fisheries crisis and which may provide greater 
insight into its causes and provide a more meaningful basis upon which to build 
solutions, than do the numeric biological and economic models that are used as the basis 
for much resource management decision making. 
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Fisheries in crisis in the 1990s is not a new experience. In 1376 traditional fishermen of 
the Thames estuary felt threateµed by the introduction of a new method of fishing with a 
three meter beam trawl referred to as a wondyrchoun. They petitioned Edward ill to 
prohibit its use on the grounds that it was a threat to traditional methods of fishing on 
the river and caused a decline in fish (Dyson 1977: 37). The petition reads: 
The great and long iron of the wondyrchoun runs so heavily and hardly over 
the ground when fishing that it destroys the flowers of the land below the 
water, and also the spat of oysters, mussels and other fish upon which the 
great fish are accustomed to be fed and nourished. By which instrument in 
many places the fishermen take such quantity of small fish that they know 
not what to do with them; and they feed and fat their pigs with them, to the 
great damage of the Commons of the Realm and the destruction of the 
fisheries. 
Dyson (1977: 38) tells us that the petitioners were unsuccessful and the interests of 
"efficiency" won the day. Six hundred years later we can readily identify with this 
petition. It raises social issues relating to the threat that new, powerful and more 
"efficient" technologies can pose to the livelihoods of traditional fishermen. It also 
addresses the issues of abuse of the commons, overfishing, the wasteful use of fisheries 
products for stock feeds, and the impact that environmental damage caused by industrial 
fishing technologies can have on fisheries productivity. These are essentially the same 
issues confronting fisheries managers today. 
Current fishing practices are extremely wasteful. Mace (1997: 3) cites FAO estimates 
that the commercial marine fisheries account for 28. 7 million tonnes of bycatch and 27 
million tonnes of discards each year,· which amounts to about a third of landings from 
marine capture fisheries. McCully (1991) reports an estimated 25 million tonnes of fish 
is converted to fishmeal and oil primarily for use in animal feeds. Reaching the limits to 
growth in the global fishery does not necessarily herald global famine. There is room to 
greatly improve the ecological efficiency of the way fishery resources are used, and it is 
possible that these improvements may be achieved by practices that involve positive 
social outcomes, rather than the negative ones associated with contemporary practices 
reminiscent of those that were so damaging to the fishers of the Thames in 1376. 
It is possible to use fisheries resources sustainably. There are many examples world 
wide of sustainably managed fisheries, and of fisheries that have been brought back 
from the brink of collapse, or even re-established following virtual extinction. These 
fisheries offer hope that solutions can be found to reverse the "persistent trend toward 
depletion" that besets many of the component fisheries that make up the global total. 
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Study of factors that contribute to these successes, particularly of the values and 
structure of the societies involved, may contribute to the development of models for 
sustainable management that may be applied more widely. 
Baines (1995) points out that many su9cessful traditional fisheries resource management 
systems have a social base, in contrast to "modem" systems which tend to be technically 
based. In recent years there has been a trend in some fisheries to use management 
strategies essentially based on "enclosure" to achieve conservation and economic 
objectives. Many management systems using individual transferable quota (ITQ) fall 
into this category. An ideology of conservation through the application of "property 
rights" is the basis of this approach, but it may be that the social consequences of 
enclosure undermine the social values and structures that are essential to the 
development of an ecologically sustainable society. Social issues have been 
undervalued in fisheries management which has traditionally focused on biological, and 
more recently, economic matters. But if there is a link between the social characteristics 
of a society, and how it interacts with the environment, then social issues need to receive 
greater emphasis if sustainable practices are to be achieved. 
1.2 SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
Biologically oriented fishery managers are well acquainted with the concept of stock 
collapse or biological fishery failure, and they generally acknowledge that biological 
failure can have devastating social consequences, for example the severe unemployment 
and economic disruption in Canada's Atlantic maritime provinces discussed by Schrank 
(1995) in relation to the collapse of the Canadian cod fishery in the early 1990s. They 
may not so readily recognise that a fishery that is apparently biologically healthy and 
economically productive, can nevertheless represent a failure of fishery management, 
with equally severe consequences for communities that rely on it for material and 
spiritual values. Social values are essential components of the concept of ecologically 
sustainable development. Management regimes that compromise these values might 
therefore be considered failures, regardless of biological outcomes. However the 
importance of social values goes beyond merely satisfying them for their own sake 
because there is arguably a causative link between social failure and biolqgical failure. 
Fishery management that fails to contribute to the development within a society of 
structures and values committed to an ecologically sustainable existence may progress 
inevitably to biological failure. 
There is growing recognition of the need to adopt a more holistic approach to resource 
management that looks at underlying socio-cultural conditions (Pinkerton 1989; Symes 
1996: 5), and to see that there is a two way interaction between society and the 
environment (Clay and McGoodwin 1995). Just as a healthy productive environment is 
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necessary to sustain a healthy society, a "healthy" social organisation is needed to 
promote the values essential to maintaining a healthy and productive environment. 
There is the need to generate within society, social and political forces with a vested 
interest in conservation if ecological sustainability is to be achieved. 
A holistic view of a fishery as a complex relationship between society and the 
environment, the two components being inseparable, is a difficult concept for many 
fishery managers to come to terms with. Social values are often foreign to fishery 
managers who have traditionally considered them to be in the pr()vince of other 
disciplines. The purely scientific approach has tended to concentrate on mathematical 
models of biological and economic components of fisheries. The social sciences have 
been marginalised, perhaps because their acknowledgment of intangible and 
unquantifiable values makes it difficult to eliminate value judgement, and therefore 
political implications, from decision making. Because fishery management is so largely 
a political matter, in that it involves the allocation of resources, the political element is 
often obscured to protect vested interests from public discussion of the real issues 
involved. Economic and biological models often serve vested interests by allocating 
resources through mechanisms that pretend to be based on objective values such as 
conservation needs and economic efficiency imperatives. 
1.2.1 FISHERIES VALUES 
There are a great many values involved in fisheries. These include material values 
based on obtaining fish for trade or subsistence. They also include many non-material 
and spiritual values that may be associated with maintaining cultural traditions or an 
involvement with nature. Often different groups motivated by different values share 
the same resource. fudividuals may also obtain a combination of values from their 
involvement with a fishery. For example, a fishery may be shared between aboriginal 
people, recreational anglers and commercial fishermen. Aboriginal people may value 
their involvement as a means of obtaining subsistence and of maintaining cultural 
traditions which hold deep spiritual significance. Recreational anglers may be 
maintaining their own traditions and spiritual values. Commercial fishermen may be 
motivated primarily by material values, however there are often non-material values 
relating to tradition and lifestyle attached to their involvement with the fishery as well. 
Other groups also have an interest in the fishery. Consumers who purchase 
commercially caught fish benefit from the fishery. Financial institutions and 
shareholders may have invested in commercial fishing vessels and equipment and 
benefit from financial returns. Expenses incurred in relation to the fishery have benefits 
to other sectors of the economy. Government too has an interest. Taxes are levied on 
the expenses related to recreational fishing and on the financial throughput of the many 
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stages of the commercial fishery. Future generations have an interest as they will inherit 
the fishery in whatever state it is left to them. There is also the interest of those who 
may have no direct involvement in a fishery but have a general concern for maintaining 
environmental health and biodiversity. 
With so many interested parties it is not surprising that the collapse of local fisheries can 
have severe social consequences. However not all groups have the same level of 
concern with maintaining the ecological integrity, cultural connectedness and other 
social components of the fishery. If the fishery collapses, the losses of those whose 
ongoing existence depends on it, and those with a spiritual connection to it, may be 
irreplaceable. Financial stakeholders on the other hand, may lose little. From their 
perspective, short term economic gains may be preferable to lower level, long term 
sustainable returns. If capital is returned quickly and profits made, little is lost if the 
fishery collapses through overfishing. Capital can be re-deployed and profits invested 
elsewhere. Indeed the failure of many managed fisheries may be explained by the fact 
that short term financial objectives took precedence over future productivity in 
management decision-making. Lip service may be paid to sustaining biolog~cal 
processes, but there is often a clear conflict of interest between environmental and 
financial interests. The political influence of financial stakeholders has often ensured 
that their short term interests are furthered at the expense of sustainable practices. This 
tendency is strengthened by the fact that the "state's" interest in the fishery is often 
primarily a financial one, and the "state" has often had significant influence and 
authority in fishery management issues. 
1.2.2 POUT/CS AND SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES 
Leftwich (1983) defines politics as the way resources are used, produced and distributed 
in society. In this context fishery management has always been highly political in 
nature. Given the state of many of the world's fisheries, where overcapacity due to too 
many fishermen and too many boats, is meeting the constraints of biological limits, 
increasing competition between interest groups is inevitable. In this environment 
fishery management becomes increasingly distributional in nature and therefore it 
becomes increasingly political. 
One thing is clear. Access to fishery resources has to be restricted if overexploitation is 
to be avoided. Competition over access can involve conflict between capital and labour, 
different ethnic groups, citizens, communities and corporate entities, and between 
regional interests and those of the centres of power. These conflicts of interest are 
seldom made explicit (Hersoug 1996: 21). Choices over how resources are distributed 
are the fundamentals of politics. The choices made will affect the future distribution of 
wealth and power. Those with the power to make these decisions can be expected to 
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make choices that will favour their own interests. In societies characterised by 
inequality in the distribution of wealth and power, which includes western capitalist 
societies and those in the model of the formerly totalitarian, communist states in which 
the state held monopoly control of capital, there will be a tendency for choices to 
perpetuate inequality (Leftwich 1983). However, if inequality is incompatible with a 
socially sustainable society, then choices that promote inequality will not contribute to 
sustainable outcomes in the long run, even if the immediate, localised problem of 
avoiding overexploitation appears to be addressed. 
Achieving sustainable fisheries will require changes in the technology, the science and 
the politics of fisheries. Politics is fundamental to problems and solutions of sustainable 
fisheries because it dictates the way societies use and distribute resources. Making 
changes is difficult because powerful vested interests are involved. The politics of 
society are self perpetuating. The structures and values of societies are both cause and 
consequence of how resources are used and distributed. 
In forming a new fishery management paradigm, one based on the values of ESD, there 
are 1many resources that societies can draw from. There are many examples of fisheries 
that are sustainably managed. Much may be learned from some of these, in particular 
the potential for non-financial objectives to generate valuable social returns and 
significant secondary economic benefits while sustaining the biological components of 
the fishery. As discussed by Pinkerton (1989) and others, there is also potential for 
'commons regimes' or resource 'co-management' to provide practical ·structures to 
promote sustainable practices and to provide a widely dispersed vested interest in 
ecosystem and resource conservation. This approach may offer more hope of success in 
achieving beneficial social outcomes and ecological sustainability than the alternative of 
enclosure of fishery resources. Enclosure is widely practised and promoted as a solution 
to overfishing but it does not guarantee incentives to promote conservation values in 
management objectives. It leads rather to increasing social inequality and this may 
undermine social cohesion and the sense of community interest that may be critical to 
achieving sustainability. 
1.3 A DEFINITION OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY FOR FISHERIES 
The Commonwealth Working Group on Ecologically Sustainable Development of 
Fisheries (Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 8-9) listed a number of values or 
principles that contribute to the concept of ecologically sustainable development. These 
were derived from the definition of sustainable development provided in the report of 
the World Commission on Environment and Development entitled Our Common Future 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 8). They include social values that represent well-
being goals for society in respect to the use of community resources. These values also 
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include internationally recognised obligations to the global community as formalised in 
treaties aimed at preserving the environment and conserving biodiversity. The 
principles listed in the draft report as both comprising and defining BSD are: 
• improvement in material and non-material well-being; 
• intergenerational equity; 
• intragenerational equity; 
• maintenance of ecological systems and protection of bio-diversity; 
• global ramifications, including international spillovers, international trade 
and international cooperation; and 
• dealing cautiously with risk, uncertainty and irreversibility. 
Improvement in material and non-material well-being of present and future generations 
is what BSD is really all about. The draft report (Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 9) 
states: 
The achievement of ecologically sustainable development is dependent upon 
improvements in material and non material well-being. In regard to 
material well-being the thrust of economic policy should be directed at 
achieving basic social justice objectives, in particular full and meaningful 
employment, whilst ensuring that the nature and scale of economic activity 
is constrained within limits that conserve and protect biodiversity and 
maintain the integrity of ecological systems and processes. 
There is recognition that the stock of natural assets such as productive soils, mineral 
deposits, plants and animals, clean air and pure water comprise "natural capital". 
Activities that deplete natural capital cannot be continuously sustained. There is 
therefore the implication of the need to restrict resource use to the "sustainable income" 
that natural capital generates. Where natural capital is converted as a result of 
development into other forms of capital such as human-made assets, future generations 
could be compensated for the loss of natural capital by increased stocks of man-made 
assets such as infrastructure and increased intellectual knowledge (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1991: 10). However this should not include irreversible losses such as the 
extinction of species. 
The report notes the inadequacy of Gross National Product as an indicator of well-being. 
It emphasises the need to give greater weight and recognition to qualitative 
improvements in community welfare and to develop better ways to measure them. 
The values of intergenerational equity, maintenance of ecological systems and 
biodiversity and dealing cautiously with risk, uncertainty and irreversibility are closely 
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linked and interdependent. If future generations are to inherit a complete stock of 
natural assets, then the ecological systems and biodiversity that comprise that stock must 
be maintained, and a precaut~onary approach is needed to avoid risk of permanent loss 
where uncertainty and irreversibility are possible. Application of this principle to 
fisheries might, for example, require reasonable margins for error to be built into total 
allowable catch calculations to allow for uncertainty in the models being used. 
Intragenerational equity is a key component of ecologically sustainable development. 
Diesendorf (1997: 71) defines ESD as "types of economic and social development 
which sustain the natural environment and promote social equity". Diesendorf 
discussed the issue of intragenerational equity in some detail and pointed out its 
interconnection with other ESD values, particularly the issue of community well-being. 
While intragenerational equity is a key value in its own right, an important theme of this 
study is the importance of intragenerational equity as a structural characteristic of 
society essential to achieving other aspects of BSD. 
The global environment is a commons of sorts shared by all earth bound life. No matter 
what arrangements are made to share its use, the earth remains a commons to some 
degree, and for the well-being of all to be protected it is necessary to curb the self-
interested actions of individuals. Equity means that some ind~viduals do not have a 
disproportionate share of wealth and power to enable them to appropriate community 
resources to selfish ends while imposing greater costs on society as a whole. Equity 
means that other members of the community, by retaining a stake in and share of the 
wealth of the commons, have the incentive, and jointly the power to prevent abuse of 
their common property by individuals seeking selfish advantage. If, for example, a 
particular type of economic development entailed greater costs, as a result of 
environmental degradation, than its net economic benefits, then society would be better 
off if it did not go ahead. In a situation of equity where the benefits and costs were 
dispersed among the community this would be the likely outcome, even if only a few 
people understood the implications. However, if the benefits were to accrue to an 
individual with the political and economic means to influence the decision, and the costs 
were dispersed among an ignorant or impotent community, then the development might 
well go ahead. 
The necessity for maintenance of intragenerational equity, both as a measure of the 
success of ESD in providing for community well-being, and as a social mechanism to 
support achievement of other ESD goals, is often overlooked. Justification for ignoring 
the issue of equity is provided by economic arguments that propose privatization as the 
solution to the tragedy of the commons. The concentration of wealth and interest in 
environmental resources resulting from privatization or enclosure is claimed to provide 
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a position where the consequences of development are borne by the developer. There 
are major flaws with this approach beyond the obvious questions of social ethics. We 
cannot solve the problems of abuse of commons simply by declaring that the community 
has no rights over those commons. If they have no rights they have no legitimate 
interests to be compromised. Since abuse by an individual who has been granted 
exclusive rights are presumed only to affect that individual and nobody else, such abuse 
may cease to be viewed as a problem and opposed by the community. This approach 
legitimises socially detrimental developments and is not compatible with the values or 
the necessary mechanisms for achieving ecologically sustainable development. 
' 
Olver, Schuter and Minns (1995) see a distinction between ecological objectives which 
stress conservation, and economic and social objectives which concentrate on issues of 
efficiency and allocation. This distinction may need to be reconsidered if a link can be 
made between the effect of social issues involving allocation, and the effectiveness of 
achieving conservation goals. Achieving ecological conservation objectives may be 
dependent on the social outcomes resulting from allocation. Achieving ecologically 
sustainable fisheries may have ·more to do with the holistic integration of appropriate 
social and conservation goals than with the "trading off' of biological against social and 
economic objectives. 
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2. BIOLOGICAL FISHERY FAILURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Aquatic ecosystems can be extremely complex and are generally less stable than land 
based systems. Wilson et al. (1994) suggest that fisheries biosystems are characterised 
by chaotic population behavior and that patterns of abundance vary unpredictably within 
limits. Sharp (1995) argues that random climatic conditions and other unpredictable 
factors cause dynamic changes in fish populations that cannot be effectively modeled, 
but which invalidate the traditional management basis. Dramatic changes often occur in 
the abundance of species from one season to another. There is usually a high level of 
uncertainty when dealing with the population ecology of fish, even of those species with 
comparatively predictable patterns of population ecology. Changes can be difficult to 
explain due to the complexity of interacting factors that may be involved, and it is often 
impossible to make accurate predictions. Populations may change in response to 
' 
climatic influences such as the El Nino effect and complex ecological interactions which 
can include the involvement of human activities. Effective fishery management has to 
be able to accommodate and be responsive to the unpredictability of aquatic ecosystems 
as well as finding appropriate ways to manage the impacts of human activities on fishery 
ecosystems. 
2.1.1 ENVIRONMENTALFAILURE 
Human activities and developments on land can have tremendous impacts on aquatic 
systems and fisheries. Hydro-electric developments, irrigation projects, pollution with 
fertilizers, pesticides, heavy metals and other toxic substances, coastal and riparian 
development and other factors can all cause severe damage to ecosystems and associated 
fisheries. 
There are numerous examples of destruction of fisheries as a consequence of land-based 
developments. Pearce (1995), for example, describes how industrial and agricultural 
pollution, and the consequences of massive irrigation projects, are largely implicated in 
the collapse of 'the former Soviet Union fisheries of the Arai, the Black and the Caspian 
Seas. The collapse of these fisheries contributed significantly to the decline of the 
global fisheries harvest in the early 1990s. Thompson (1995) further illustrates the 
impact land based developments can have on offshore fisheries with the example of the 
profound effect of the Aswan High Dam on marine life in the Eastern Mediterranean 
due to a consequent withholding of the flow of nutrient rich alluviums into the sea. 
Fishery managers have often had little ability to influence decisions regarding land 
based developments and activities. They have received the impacts of these 
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developments and tried to mitigate the effects using the limited tools available to them. 
This is discussed by Ward and Weeks (1994). They studied an oyster fishery affected 
by stress from upstream pollution inputs. Fishery managers responded to the declining 
population by imposing greater restrictions on fishermen in an effort to reduce their 
impact on the affected population. This is a classic example of treating the symptoms 
and not addressing the cause of the problem. The study highlighted the inadequacies of 
fisheries management based on a limited view of a fishery as a simple predator/prey 
interaction, a view that is often misplaced (Smith 1995). The authors suggest that the 
reason for the narrow approach taken by the agency professionals was their limited 
control over factors other than fishing effort (Ward and Weeks 1994: 106). Sustaining 
fisheries is first and foremost dependent on sustaining the environment that supports 
them. This needs to be seen as the priority in achieving ecologically sustainable 
fisheries, yet it is often considered to be outside the sphere of fisheries managers' 
influence. 
The way fisheries are managed can have an indirect influence on these matters if it 
contributes to the development of institutions and a society better able to incorporate 
fisheries habitat protection more effectively into development decision making. If 
societies need to curb vested, short-term interests and promote wider well-being gains 
so that developments with environmental spill-overs that destroy fisheries are prevented; 
and if civic values and functional democratic institutions are required characteristics if a 
society is to be structurally capable of curbing vested interests and promoting the wider 
well-being; and if civic values and functional democratic institutions are dependent on 
some degree of equalisation of wealth and power in society; then fisheries management 
that contributes to equalisation of wealth and power contributes to sustainability, while 
fishery management that contributes to inequality in the distribution of wealth and 
power in society, contributes to the causes of unsustainability which may ultimately be 
expressed as fishery collapse due to a failure to protect the fishery environment. 
2.1.2 FISHING RELATED IMPACTS 
Fishing causes ecosystem impacts beyond the direct effect on target species. Non-target 
species are also caught and often discarded. This by-catch may include endangered 
species and comprise a significant amount of the total catch. Prawn trawling for 
example may have a by-catch component of up to 90 percent of the total catch and may 
include endangered species of sea turtles. These unwanted organisms are usually 
discarded but are often badly damaged and unlikely to survive. 
Destructive fishing practice is also an issue that has been widely reported. The 
destruction of marine benthic habitats by trawling is a major concern. McCully (1991) 
demonstrates that these problems of resource waste and destruction are generally more 
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closely associated with capital intensive industrial fisheries. Mace (1997) points out 
that destructive fishing is not limited to capital intensive fisheries but includes the use of 
dynamite and cyanide poison which has decimated some coastal fisheries. If 
ecologically sustainable fisheries development requires that more ecologically efficient 
use be made of limited fisheries resources, then destructive fishing practices need to be 
replaced by practices that are more in sympathy with ecological processes. 
2.1.3 OVERFISHING 
Overfishing is a major contributor to the global fisheries crisis. Fishery managers have 
sometimes been criticised for overemphasising the role of fishing pressure and paying 
insufficient attention to other factors that affect fish stocks. Their focus is 
understandable given their limited management options. Overfishing is clearly the 
cause of many fisheries failures and is often the factor most easy to rationalise. Fishing 
effort and catch can be quantified and can often be seen to relate directly to impact on 
fish populations. It is also a factor that seems to be controllable through management of 
fishing activity. Of course recognising the need for restraint is not the same thing as 
actually achieving it, and attempting to regulate fishing effort is the perpetual 
preoccupation of fisheries management. 
Defining overfishing is not as straightforward as it may seem. Obviously the term 
implies a level of fishing pressure that exceeds that which is desirable, but the threshold 
between what is acceptable and what is considered overfishing is not an absolute. It is 
value-dependent; a matter of perspective. In particular there is a distinction between 
biological overfishing and economic overfishing. Economic overfishing may be used to 
describe a fishery that is not producing the optimum level of economic rent because of 
overcapacity. Too man~ boats and fisherm~n competing for a share of the allowable 
catch can be economically inefficient in relation to a particular economic goal. 
Biological overfishing may refer to a situation where excessive fishing pressure 
compromises the productivity of the fishery in biological terms, or threatens the survival 
of species. Aiken and Sinclair (1995) describe recruitment overfishing as referring to 
the situation where too many fish are harvested, leaving too few to breed and produce 
desirable numbers of fish in future generations. Growth overfishing refers to the 
situation where fish are harvested too early in their life cycle, before growing to the size 
that would maximise their productive potential. 
A level of fishing effort appropriate to achieving maximum sustainable yield from a 
fishery would usually be considered overfishing according to rent maximising models 
(this will be discussed further in chapter 5). The levels of fishing pressure appropriate 
to achieving both of these management objectives might be interpreted as overfishing 
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from the environmental perspective of minimising disturbance to ecosystem function 
and avoiding risk and uncertainty according to the precautionary principle. If a fishery 
is viewed from a social and economic perspective, one may see overfishing in other 
terms. For example, market oversupply due to overfishing could lower prices and affect 
fishing communities by shifting rent from fishers to consumers. 
2.2 CAUSES OF OVERFISHING 
2.2.1 POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGY - AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In many ecosystems there is some balance in the relationship between predators and 
prey. Species that have co-evolved over a long period of time have developed 
sustainable patterns of interaction and often have a high degree of interdependence. 
Unstable predator/prey interactions often occur where a naive prey population is 
exposed to predation from a new predator, a species recently introduced into the system 
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with which it has not had the time or opportunity to evolve defenses (Flannery 1994: 
142). 
There are many examples of introduced predators causing extinction of native flora and 
fauna, and many examples of human colonisation of new territories causing mass 
extinctions of native species. In The Future Eaters, Flannery (1994: 136-187) suggests 
that the arrival of human predators caused the mass extinction of the mega-fauna of 
New Zealand and Australia. In the case of New Zealand this occurred in recent times, 
and there is a good record of the events that occurred and the social ·consequences 
(Flannery 1994: 242). Early arrivals found an abundant food supply in the,native fauna, 
especially the Moa, a giant flightless bird (Flannery 1994: 243). These creatures were 
easy prey as they lacked any instinct to avoid humans or any means of defence against 
them. The human population increased unconstrained by ecological mechanisms until 
the last Moa had been consumed. Other food resources, including fisheries, were also 
depleted (Flannery 1994: 244). Overharvesting large fauna to the point of extinction left 
the Maori inhabitants with an impoverished ecosystem that could not sustain their 
population. Social collapse was the inevitable consequence, marked by the development 
of a culture characterised by cannibalism and perpetual intertribal warfare (Flannery 
1994: 247-253). 
Humans are a new predator in many fishery ecosystems. Like naive island fauna, many 
fish have not evolved defences against human predation. The aquatic world they inhabit 
is a foreign environment to which we are poorly adapted. It is only through technology 
that we have gained access to these environments and their resources. Development of 
the sophisticated technology required to fish offshore and at great depth is a very recent 
phenomenon. Certainly there has been no time for affected species to evolve defensive 
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adaptations. As a consequence, these species are vulnerable to overfishing and the risk 
of extinction. 
Other fisheries, particularly in coastal and littoral environments, have been targeted by 
humans for many thousands of years. One might expect selective pressures over such a 
long period of time to have brought about some stability and resilience in these systems. 
In many cases this has occurred, but the equilibrium is threatened by recent 
technological developments, particularly in the use of fossil fuels. 
Use of fossil fuels has had a major impact on the equilibrium point of the predator/prey 
relationship between fishermen and fish. The reasons for this relate to efficiency 
constraints and the difference between ecological, energy based systems and financially 
based ones. Energy budgets are the fundamental constraint shaping ecological systems. 
It is a universal rule of predator/prey interactions that more energy must be obtained by 
consuming prey than is expended in capturing it. If this were not the case the predator 
would become energy deficient and starve. 
This law imposes discipline on predators and through ecological feedback mechanisms 
helps to maintain some sort of balance between predator and prey populations. From 
this simple model it follows that, should prey populations decline due to excessive 
levels of predation, perhaps because predator populations have grown too large, they 
become harder to find and catch. Once the scarcity of prey is such that it requires more 
energy to find and capture them than is gained by doing so, the predators begin to starve 
and decline in numbers until some balance is re-established. This constraint of 
ecological efficiency is observed in some fisheries where there is limited access to 
technology, such as Stoffle et al. (1994) observed in a study of a fishing community in 
Buen Hombre in the Dominican Republic. 
Use of vessels powered by fossil fuels, and economic incentives provided by insatiable 
commodity markets, enables fishermen to evade these ecological constraints. They 
operate according to the constraints of financial budgets rather than energy based ones. 
While it may be economically viable to use 10 litres of fuel costing 50c per litre (total 
cost: $5) to catch 1 kilogram of fish with a value of $10. The energy diseconomy of this 
exchange would probably exceed a factor of a hundred. 
This anomaly between financial and energy economies, and the power that use of fossil 
fuels gives to fishermen to evade ecological constraints on fishing effort, makes possible 
much more intensive fishing than would otherwise be viable and can threaten the 
biological sustainability of fisheries. 
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2.2.2 OPEN ACCESS - TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
The belief that free or open access to fisheries is the fundamental cause of all fishery 
management problems is almost universal among fishery managers (Rothschild 1983: 
160). Waugh (1984: 4) discusses the economic rationale which suggests that open 
access leads inevitably to overfishing. McVay (1966) claimed that the freedom of the 
seas was bringing about the extinction of species after species of fish and whales, and 
Hardin (1968) explored the issue more generally in his essay "The Tragedy of the 
Commons". 
Hardin identified the conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of 
the wider community. He argued that a rational individual would pursue actions of 
benefit to that individual even though they imposed greater total costs on the wider 
community. If the individual's benefit from an action exceeded his or her share of the 
total cost imposed on the community, then he or she would, in the absence of other 
influences, pursue that action. The effect of a society of individuals each behaving in 
this way is ultimate ruin for all. It is an irrational and unsustainable course for a society 
to follow if viewed from a holistic perspective, but it is the inevitable result of allowing 
individuals to pursue rational self interest at the expense of the community in a 
commons. 
It is important here to emphasise the distinction between what Hardin referred to as the 
commons, which was in effect property owned by nobody, and the concept of commons 
that refers to property that is held in common ownership, that is owned by a community 
or group and that may be managed according to rigorous controls. 
The problems of open access in regard to fisheries are discussed by Waugh (1984 :4) in 
relation to specific fishery case studies. Waugh notes "the persistent trend toward 
depletion" that occurs, and suggests that open access always leads to overfishing as 
more and more resources of labour and capital are drawn into the fishery, resulting in 
the dissipation of resource rent. Hodge's (1995: 38) analysis of the economics of 
overfishing concurs with that of Waugh - open access generally leads to economic 
overfishing, however Hodge notes that ·this does not necessarily cause biological 
overfishing or lead to extinction. This is an important point. Extra effort is only exerted 
in the fishery to the point that the extra costs involved are exceeded by the value of the 
extra fish caught. As increased fishing effort depletes the stock it raises the marginal 
cost of capture. An equilibrium point is eventually reached, and economic models and 
experience demonstrate that this inevitably exceeds the desirable level of effort to 
maximise economic returns, i.e. economic overfishing. Whether economic overfishing 
or biological overfishing, and possible extinction, occurs first is dependent on many 
factors, including target species ecology, fishing costs and market value for the fish. 
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Generally reduced efficiency of capture technology reduces the risk of biological 
overfishing as economic factors curb fishing effort at lower levels. This explains the 
wide application of efficiency constraints to promote fishery conservation. The 
drawback of efficiency constraints is that they undermine the potential to generate rent 
from the fishery. (This issue is discussed further in chapter 5.) 
The only answer to the problem of open access is some form of control to limit fishing 
effort. While this is generally accepted, there is room to debate the form and extent of 
restriction that would be most desirable. There are a number of options for limiting 
effort and all impose some restriction on the freedoms of individuals. Objections may 
be found for all of them, but as Hardin points out we have to choose or allow the 
commons to be ruined. Options for limiting effort usually entail an implicit allocation 
mechanism. Restraint could be achieved by limiting the amount that any individual · 
could take. This might promote social leveling and community sharing of the resource. 
Alternatively restraint could be achieved by restricting which individuals have access to 
the resource. This would tend to promote inequality, because the privilged would gain 
exclusive access. 
Traditional fishery management has experimented with many input controls to limit 
fishing effort. The effectiveness of controls is often undermined by the responses of 
fishermen to counter them and by concern that they introduce economic distortions and 
inefficiency into the conduct of the fisheries; that they fail to generate the maximum 
potential resource rent. Economic rationalists argue that the solution to problems of 
fishery management is privatisation. They argue that individuals should be granted 
exclusive ownership of a fishery in the form of exclusive, tninsferable property rights 
which would provide the incentive and ability to manage them properly. This in theory 
would internalise all the costs as well as the benefits of fishery practices. The economic 
waste and inability to promote sustainable practices in the open access regime would be 
overcome. In short they propose enclosure and privatisation as a solution to the tragedy 
of the commons. (This is discussed further in chapter 3.) 
2.2.3 THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE USE 
While much of the blame for overfishing is often attributed to the greed of fishermen, 
scientists and politicians are also criticised for failing to restrain them. Sharp (1995) 
argues that the underlying science that is the basis of "sustainable" fisheries decision-
making has been responsible for a great portion of the deterioration of fishery resources. 
Government, after all, generally assumes responsibility for managing fisheries on behalf 
of the community. When fisheries fail, politicians often lay the blame on the 
inadequacies of their scientific advice. Fishery managers, on the other hand, are often 
frustrated in their attempts to conserve stocks because politicians are reluctant to 
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confront vested interests. In a detailed analysis of the decline and collapse of Canada's 
east coast ground fishery, Schrank (1995) highlights the lack of political will to make 
tough but necessary decisions as the chief factor leading to failure. Mace (1997) and 
Pearce (1996) note that a report on the fishery crisis to the British House of Commons 
(House of Lords 1996) criticised decision makers for lacking political will, and also 
castigated scientists for failing to give firm and bold advice. Ambiguity provides 
decision makers with an excuse for political compromise, and while the resources 
devoted to fishery research are inadequate, even if better information were available, 
political considerations would probably carry more weight with decision makers. 
Unfortunately it is seldom possible or practical to obtain a sufficient scientific 
understanding of any fishery to eliminate uncertainty. There are generally vast areas of 
imprecision. The problem occurs when decision makers take an unduly optimistic 
approach to this uncertainty, rather than a suitably precautionary one. Leftwich's (1983) 
analysis of politics provides a framework for understanding why they invariably do so, a 
tendency which is fundamental to the problem of sustainability. Leftwich defines 
politics in terms of how a society uses and distributes resources: He asserts that: 
Control over resources is the essence of power in any society ( 1983: 219); 
and that: 
To separate the question of the use, production and distribution of resources 
from the question of the use and distribution of power is to empty politics of 
its real content (1983: 21). 
According to this analysis, since the global fishery crisis is a consequence of the way 
society uses fishery resources, it is a consequence of politics in terms of the distribution 
of power in society. But what are the elements of politics that contribute to 
unsustainable patterns of resource use? 
In many societies, including all industrial societies, power and the ability to make 
decisions over how resources are used is concentrated in the hands of small groups who 
control resources through private ownership or through control over the public sector. 
The private sector is not in any way democratically accountable to the community, and 
as Leftwich (1983: 220) demonstrates, the public sector is "far less subject to wide, 
regular or effectively popular or democratic control than is sometimes claimed in the 
official ideology of parliamentary democracy". 
Decision-making procedures within the institutions of government that control the use 
and distribution of public resources are, as in the private sector, characterised by 
hierarchy, restraints on wide and popular participation, and secrecy (Leftwich 1983: 
224). Individuals compete for top decision-making positions, and the benefits that go 
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with them, within the hierarchies of both private and public sectors. Appointments to 
these positions tend not to be made by open or democratic processes but are carefully 
selected from an "establishment" of trusted elites. Politicians and agency scientists are 
part of the structured hierarchies of social power. They rarely make decisions that go 
against the interests of the power structures of which they are a part, because this would 
also be against their own interests and against the values and political orientation to 
which they will have become conditioned during the development of their careers. 
This explains why decision-makers avoid confronting vested interests. There is no need 
to posit conspiracy. As long as decision-makers are steeped in the ideology of market 
capitalism and believe that pursuit of economic efficiency, and the generation of 
employment through investment, development and growth are the necessary steps to 
improved civic life, they can act in good conscience. But Saul (1997: 155) points out 
that they are deluding themselves. They cannot see the larger picture of the public good 
beyond the limits of their own defined interests. 
Control of resources by a relatively small minority with, little accountability to the wider 
community results in patterns of resource use that favour the vested interests of those 
with power, rather than the best interests of the wider community or society as a whole. 
This provides circumstances for a tragedy of the commons to occur. The prime interest 
of the power elites is to maintain the status quo. To maintain control they need to use 
their decision-making power to ensure that resources are used in ways that perpetuate 
the conditions of inequality in society. Maintaining their relative advantage in power 
and wealth is the critical concern, irrespective of whether outcomes improve or detract 
from the overall well-being of society. In capitalist societies, inequality is maintained 
by managing resources in ways that maintain the value of capital assets and favour the 
concentration and distribution of economic benefits to capital, of which elites own a 
disproportionate share, rather than dispersing it among the wider population. 
Fisheries that may nominally belong to the community are exploited by vested interests 
at the expense of the community and are in fact treated as if they were the private 
property of elites, being enclosed by restrictive licensing laws limiting access to the 
resource, or by mechanisms of capital efficiency by which capital is the means of 
enclosure. The interests of elites may be furthered by emphasising returns to capital and 
resource mining, whereas the interests of the community might be favoured by returns to 
l~bour, the generation of employment, and resource sustainability. 
This view of the politics of resource use gives a different perspective to the fishery 
crisis. Perhaps it is not due to the failure of fishery management, but to a failure of the 
political forces that direct that management to reflect the values of sustainability and the 
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wider interests of the community. The values that are emphasised in actual management 
are not the same as those that are expressed for public consumption. The rhetoric may 
emphasize sustainability but the practice may emphasize the service of capital and these 
two may be incompatible. The fishery crisis may not be a crisis at all from the 
perspective of elites. Their prime objective is to use fisheries in ways that sustain or 
increase their positions of relative advantage and power in society. If they profit from 
unsustainable practices then this objective is furthered. Furthermore, the decline of 
fisheries on a global scale may create a situation of economic scarcity that can 
paradoxically increase the value of enclosed fisheries. This can obviously be to the 
benefit of those who control them. The crisis also can be used to justify privatisation 
and other means of enclosure of fishery resources which enable elites to further 
consolidate control over them. 
Democratic participation and public scrutiny and accountability are resisted and 
decision-making is shrouded in secrecy and obscured by the processes of bureaucratic 
government. Meaningful democratic involvement is practically non-existent. This view 
is supported by Saul's (1997: 77-116) analysis of modem society and the trend toward 
increasing corporatism. The concept of democracy is maintained, according to Leftwich 
(1983: 234) as .a myth and an ideology that helps to distract the public from· concerns 
over the real administration of power in society. 
Leftwich demonstrates that democracy is incompatible with the competitive and 
inegalitarian nature of market capitalism while other writers including Drummond and 
Symes (1996) demonstrate the incompatibility of capitalism with ecological 
sustainability. It seems likely that achieving ecologically sustainable fisheries, and 
societies in general, is dependent on containing the socially and environmentally 
destructive expansionist tendencies of capitalism. Eventually environmental constraints 
curb capitalism. It is the understanding that the well-being of society would be 
furthered if capitalist expansion could be limited by social measures, thereby avoiding 
the unpleasant implications of environmental constraints, that motivates desires for 
ecological sustainability. Participatory democratic decision-making offers the best hope 
of achieving this, and participatory democratic decision making is dependent on the 
equalisation of wealth and power. 
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3. CORPORA TE RESPONSE TO THE FISHERY CRISIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The growth imperatives of capitalism embodied in corporate entities can be met in two 
ways; by outward expansion and growth accompanied by increasing exploitation of the 
environment until constrained by ecological limits, or by inward expansion and 
increasing exploitation of people until constrained by social limits. In fisheries, the 
expression of these expansionist growth imperatives drives the development of intensive 
industrialised aquaculture and the enclosure of fishery resources. Science is used to 
support these developments that serve to protect capitalist interests and maintain the 
status quo (Symes 1996: 11). 
3.2 ENCLOSURE 
Territorial exclusion is one way to limit access to fisheries. Many traditional fishing 
communities practice it, and the concept has been extended by nation states which, since 
ratification of the Third Law of the Sea in 1976, have claimed jurisdiction over the 
waters up to 200 nautical miles from their coastline. 
This had tremendous implications for global fisheries as the "freedom of the seas" 
became a thing of the past and most of the world's productive fishing grounds were 
enclosed by nation states. The 200 mile limit did not, however, solve the problem of 
overfishing. Schrank (1995) suggests that it contributed to the problem by stimulating 
growth in capacity, and Rothschild (1983: 153) points out that the optimistic projections 
that extended jurisdiction would increase the absolute wealth generated from fisheries 
and provide for more equitable and efficient distribution of that wealth were not 
realized. Many fish migrate around the oceans and thus do not remain anyone's 
exclusive property within a single national jurisdiction. There may still be an incentive 
for a state to encourage its fishermen to catch as much as they can before fish swim 
across the border into someone else's territory; and there still remains the problem of the 
commons. The fish in territorial waters became the common property of a country's 
citizens. Protecting their interests by sustainably managing the fisheries became the 
responsibility of government. Yet many governments have failed to protect their 
fisheries. They have lacked either the will or the ability to restrain fishermen. They 
have been unwilling to confront the power of capital by imposing economic restraints, 
or to confront the power of the electorate by imposing social restraints on fisheries 
exploitation. Sustainability has therefore been compromised. 
They have often failed in this responsibility because the requirements for sustainable 
management are often at odds with the interests of the fishing industry to achieve short 
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term economic gain, and of politicians susceptible to lobbying by industry, and with 
their own short term interest in generating maximum economic throughput. Fishery 
science is fraught with inaccuracy and imprecision and this, along with the inherent 
difficulties of enforcing compliance with rules and regulations on fishermen, has given 
politicians and management agencies a useful excuse for their failures. 
3.2.J PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS TO FISHERY RESOURCES 
Economists argue that property rights will resolve the conflict between the objectives of 
sustainability and short term profit. Cotgrove (1997) defined the economics perspective 
of sustainable resource management in the following way: 
Unrestricted open access will ensure the decline of a species until the cost of 
catching the diminishing resource exceeds the revenue to be gained from 
selling it; 
and that: 
Conservation can only work if there are clear and enforced ownership rules, 
either private or communal, to protect future values ("scarcity rents") of the 
resource; 
and that conservation depended on the establishment of: 
Well defined and protected property rights. 
The qualifications of these principles are often overlooked. If access is restricted by 
natural or management imposed efficiency constraints, as discussed in chapter 5, then 
there is no need for property rights to promote conservation. And where property 
rights are required, communal property rights are an option to private property rights. 
These qualifications are essential to the validity of these economic principles of 
sustainable resource management, but they are often ignored by those seeking to 
establish or maintain privileged access to resources by perpetuating the myth that 
"private property rights ar.e essential to resource conservation". 
The economic rationale suggests that issues of sustainability verses short term profits 
would be internalised and there would no longer be the need to impose restrictions on 
fishermen, if they instead of the public owned the fish. Kesteven (1997: 81) argues that: 
Fishers must be given rights in their fishery and accord_ingly must accept 
responsibility for it. The incentive must be double: positive in the direct 
benefit of the opportunity to participate and the security provided by the 
property right: and negative in the threat of loss of that opportunity if 
responsibility is neglected. 
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Competition between fishermen that leads to economic overfishing could be countered 
by giving each fisherman a fixed share of the fishery, allowing each to catch a specified 
share of the total catch, the level of which would be agreed each year with the help of 
fishery scientists. Economic efficiency would be encouraged by making the shares 
tradable (Clark 1993). The public property of the fishery would thus be converted to 
private property, in other words enclosed. 
As discussed in chapter 5, private property rights may not be required to serve 
conservation objectives, but they are essential to the political-economic objective of 
producing an economic surplus from the resource (Clark 1993). These arguments for 
particular economic outcomes are not value or perspective free, nor independent of 
political bias. They serve the interests of capital, and thereby advance the interests of 
one group in society, the capital rich, over those of the capital poor. 
Brubaker (1996) advocates the establishment of private property rights as the key to 
fisheries conservation, because only private property rights receive legal protection. A 
number of case studies are used to illustrate the argument in respect to fisheries 
damaged by pollution produced as a result of industrial developments or sewage 
discharges. Under common law in both Canada and the Britain, individuals may only 
bring legal actions against polluting activities that affect their private property rights, 
and not against activities that affect fisheries to which the wider public have common 
rights of access. These actions can only be brought by the Crown and, as Brubaker 
points out, the Crown is not generally inclined to take action against activities for which 
it is responsible or in which it may be a participant. 
The institutionalised bias in the legal system contributes to the maintenance of the status 
quo by protecting the interests of a capital rich elite, who disproportionately own most 
of the private property, against the interests of the general public, who may have access 
to no other resources than those that are accessible to all. Brubaker has illustrated the 
failure of legal institutions to protect the common-good against the depredations of 
profit seeking private interests. Accepting this state of affairs, it may be logical to argue 
that the way to achieve resource conservation is to give ownership and therefore the 
incentive to preserve resources to those with the power to do so. 
This logic may appear effective in the short term, but it does not address the underlying 
problem. The failure of the law to protect the public interest against the private interests 
of those with power is a consequence of the consolidation of power in too few hands. It 
is the consequence of inequality, and the privatisation of additional public resources will 
not remedy this fundamental problem, but exacerbate it. 
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Brubaker (1996: 227) notes the ineffectiveness of government bureaucracy in promoting 
resource conservation and environmental protection and points out that bureaucrats are 
seldom sanctioned for irresponsible decisions. On the contrary, they often enjoy 
professional rewards while presiding over declining water quality and threatened fish 
habitats. But she also notes that governments are more likely to act to protect fisheries 
if there is a political need to do so. "If the effects of permitting pollution are 
concentrated on a limited number of fishers, the political costs are low". This could 
support an argument for maintaining widespread rights of access. It would also support 
an argument to strengthen the effectiveness of democratic processes by promoting 
greater political equality. Even in imperfectly functioning democracies there is a 
political price to be paid for allowing polluting activities to compromise public resource 
values. No government can fool all of the people all of the time. And when widespread 
rights of access through public ownership exist, it becomes difficult to arrange 
compensation to buy off opposition to polluting developments. With private ownership 
on the other hand, there may be a managable number of 'stakeholders', and it may be 
easier to compromise ecological values that do not have clear commercial value by 
paying nominal compensation to allow polluting developments to occur. 
3.2.2 THE TRAGEDY OF ENCLOSURE 
Tragedies of the commons often tum out to be tragedies of enclosure. and it is often 
enclosers rather than commoners who bring about environmental destruction (Anon. 
1992: 128). Enclosure of fisheries has a number of implications for society. The 
granting of exclusiv~ rights means denial of those rights to all others. Enclosure entails 
dispossession and exclusion. Enclo~ure of fisheries as a means to achieve increased 
efficiency and raise rents is often accompanied by the need to rationalise the industry by 
persuading some fishermen to leave the fishery. Sometimes this is achieved by force 
and sometimes fishermen are compensated for their cooperation. However the effects of 
enclosure are not limited to those with a history of engagement in the industry. They 
extend to the wider community and to future generations as a result of lost 
opportunities, and these people are not usually compensated, although opportunity cost 
is generally recognised by economists. A person may live in a fishing community and 
never fish for a living, but gain a great sense of security from the belief that he has 
access to the resource and could resort to fishing should other economic options fail. 
The availability of alternative economic options, and particularly access to natural 
resources such as land or fisheries, provides people with a means to resist exploitation. 
Loss of such options weakens- their power to bargain over wages and conditions of 
employment. Enclosure of land, forests and fisheries has often been used to force 
people from self sufficiency to dependence on employment for a living and to create 
circumstances that do not favour their position to bargain over wages and conditions. 
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Enclosure perpetuates the trend towards greater inequality of wealth in two ways. The 
powerful appropriate valuable resources and in so doing they directly enrich themselves. 
Dispossession further impoverishes the weak, reducing their options and bargaining 
power and the return they can get in exchange for their labour. The cheapening of 
labour benefits those in a position to exploit it. If the global trend toward increasing 
inequality of wealth is a serious social problem then enclosure is not likely to contribute 
to a solution. It is also unlikely to result in better protection for the environment. In a 
society of rich and poor, the poor are often too desperate to protect the ~nvironment and 
the rich have no incentive to do so if they can profit from its degradation and use their 
wealth to escape the adverse consequences. There are often direct financial benefits to 
be gained from using resources in unsustainable ways. Economic advantage may be 
gained by the owner of a fishery from mining it to extinction and reinvesting the profits 
elsewhere. Given the uncertainty over biological, market, political and economic 
components of most fisheries, it is likely that short term reward will often be favoured at 
the expense of sustainability and long term returns. In situations such as these the 
privatisation of fisheries does not solve the problem of overfishing. For these reasons, 
as well as for reasons of social ethics, it is necessary to "manage" fisheries. As 
Mackenzie (1993: 343) notes: 
The alternative to letting the strong take what they want regardless of those 
less strong, regardless of need, regardless of alternative opportunity for 
those displaced, regardless of traditions and ways of life, is to manage the 
resource base. 
In some ways the option of privatisation is an abdication of this management 
responsibility. Palsson and Helgason (1996: 58) note that growing inequality has been 
observed in fisheries where management based on an individual transferable quota 
system has been implemented and Pinkerton (1989: 18) notes the tendency under 
limited entry management systems for the emergence of an elite group who speculate in 
licences and cause their value to become capitalised beyond the means of ordinary 
fishermen. 
3.3 AQUACULTURE 
While privatisation is widely promoted as the solution to the problem of overfishing, 
aquaculture is promoted as the solution to meeting the world's growing demand for 
seafood products. In 1992 global aquaculture industries produced about 12 million 
tonnes of product compared to the 60 million tonnes of product suitable for direct 
human consumption that is harvested from the capture fisheries (Aiken and Sinclair 
1995). Acknowledgment that capture fisheries are being exploited to their limits, leaves 
growth in aquaculture as the obvious direction to look for solutions to maintaining 
growth in fisheries production to meet the growing demand for fish products. But if 
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aquaculture is to provide long term solutions, the question of sustainability must be 
addressed. Gowen (1991: 24) notes that consideration must be given to the broader 
implications of the social, economic and environmental impacts of aquaculture 
development which is more often motivated by profit than food production, whilst Cross 
(1991) notes that many aquaculture developments promoted by agencies such as the 
F AO have been inappropriate and have served the interests of bureaucrats and 
politicians rather than the rural poor that they are intended to help. 
Aquaculture has a very long history. Fish have been kept and grown in freshwater 
ponds for thousands of years and socially and environmentally sustainable methods of 
production have evolved. Sustainable, small-scale methods of fish culture are widely 
practiced (Cross 1991; O'Riordan 1996). Asia leads in the production of freshwater 
fish, primarily to meet local subsistence needs, and annual production is estimated at 8 
million tonnes (Csavas 1994). This is a significant proportion of global fisheries 
production. 
Aquaculture can contribute to improvements in the productivity of wild capture 
fisheries. Juvenile fish may be released into the environment, supplementing natural 
recruitment. This is often a means of enhancing fisheries limited by inadequate 
recruitment as a consequence of loss or degradation of spawning and juvenile nursery 
areas. It has been widely used for over a century to enhance fisheries for salmonids and 
other diadromous species where up-river spawning migrations have been interfered with 
by hydro-electric dams or other barriers. 
In contrast to the relatively benign practices of traditional, subsistence aquaculture, 
recent developments have focused on the rapid growth of industrial marine farming of 
high value seafood products for global markets. Aikens and Sinclair (1995: 26) note that 
there are significant social and environmental impacts associated with these 
developments: 
Export aquaculture has a different relationship to the local ecology and the 
social fabric of coastal communities; it has often been associated with 
unrestrained development in the coastal zone, exploitation of natural 
resources and negative social and environmental impacts. Thus the public 
often perceives marine aquaculture to be an aggressive competitor for 
limited coastal resources, one that is driven by poweiful economic and 
political forces and which is capable of doing serious damage to our coastal 
environments and our traditional fisheries. 
A number of species are produced by intensive industrial methods but salmon and 
marine shrimp production represent the largest export oriented industries. These 
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industries demonstrate most of the issues and concerns associated with industrial 
aquaculture in coastal zones (Aiken and Sinclair 1995). 
3.3.J ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF AQUACULTURE 
Shrimp farming has been associated with severe environmental degradation. 
Destruction of mangrove wetlands has been widespread. Holmes (1996) reported that 
17 percent of Thailand's mangroves were destroyed between 1987 and 1993. Land 
subsidence and salination of freshwater aquifers has also occurred (Holmes 1996; Aiken 
and Sinclair 1995). Mangrove wetlands are key habitats in tropical marine systems. 
They are the nursery areas for many coastal marine fisheries and their loss can 
significantly impact on the health and productivity of marine ecosystems extending far 
beyond the immediately affected locality. Some researchers suggest that total 
productivity of mangroves is reduced by farming over them (Macintosh and Phillips, 
cited in Aiken and Sinclair 1995). Patel (1996) reported that a Supreme Court in India 
ordered the closure of industrial-scale shrimp farms because of the severe environmental 
damage they caused. 
Salmon farming also has severe environmental impacts. Organic wastes from faeces 
and uneaten food accumulate on the sea floor under the cages (Gowen 1991: 25-29). 
Sediments can become anoxic and produce and release methane and hydrogen sulfide 
into the environment. Dissolved nutrients are added to the water column in large 
quantities and can stimulate algae growth including blooms of toxic dinoflagellates. 
These impacts can extend far beyond the source of pollution and affect the- viability of 
the farming industries that produce them as well as affecting the wider ecosystem. 
Folke, Kautsky and Troell's analysis (1994) of the effects of eutrophication from salmon 
farming leads them to conclude that industrial salmon farming as currently practiced is 
not only ecologically unsustainable but economically unsustainable as well. Society, 
they argue, bears the huge cost of subsidising industry to the extent of the environmental 
damage it causes. 
Other concerns associated with intensive aquaculture include the use of antibiotics and 
other chemicals to control diseases (Gowen 1991: 31), and the impact farming can have 
on wild fish populations (Gowen 1991: 29). Culture operations may increase the 
incidence of disease in wild populations as a result of the transfer of pathogens in stock 
or feeds, and farmed stock may escape and interbreed with local populations, impacting 
on the genetic integrity of wild stocks. 
Ecological efficiency is another issue, particularly for fish culture that relies on fish 
based feeds. It requires the use of between 5 and 10 tonnes of fish to produce the 
fishmeal to manufacture the feed required to grow 1 tonne of salmon or shrimp by 
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intensive aquaculture (O'Riordan 1996). Many of the fish species harvested for use in 
animal feeds can be used for direct human consumption if appropriate capture and 
processing methods are employed. Marine farming of species dependent on fishmeal 
diets does not therefore contribute to the global supply of seafood. On the contrary, 
ecologically speaking, it is a reduction process because it converts more fish into less. 
Holmes (1996) asserts that one of the enduring myths of aquaculture - that it will reduce 
the burden on wild harvest fisheries - is false. Industrial fish farming is also heavily 
dependent on energy and the use of fossil fuels which also have associated 
environmental impacts. 
Production of filter feeding molluscs such as mussels and oysters can also be 
detrimental to marine and estuary ecosystems and affect wild fisheries. Fishing down 
the food chain, targeting lower trophic levels in fishery ecosystems, is of concern in 
relation to harvest fisheries. Phytoplankton are the lowest trophic level in most aquatic 
food chains. They are harvested from the water in oyster and mussel farming operations 
which are in effect, fishing operations using dense concentrations of filter feeding 
shellfish as a biological fishing gear. Shellfish farms are usually sited in areas of high 
productivity, such as estuaries, where nutrient inputs sustain high phytoplankton 
concentrations which support good growth rates. These areas are also important 
nurseries for many other species of fish precisely because of the high concentrations of 
phytoplankton upon which the survival of the fry of many fish depends in the critical 
phase of development following absorption of the eggsac. If phytoplankton 
concentrations are reduced below threshold levels, the fry will not survive, and it is 
conceivable that shellfish farms in estuaries could significantly reduce survival of fry of 
particular species in particular situations. 
3.3.2 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AQUACULTURE 
There are social and political implications of industrial fish farming that impact on 
coastal communities and have a bearing on the wider issues associated with sustaining 
fishing communities and the ecological components of fisheries. Aiken and Sinclair 
(1995: 31) note that: 
The sociological impact of modern aquaculture on coastal communities 
has, by and large, been a disappointment to politicians and others who 
hoped aquaculture would improve the standard of living in coastal 
communities and provide alternative employment for fishers and their 
families displaced from the traditional harvest fisheries. 
The individuals who invest heavily in the development of the industry are 
usually entrepreneurs, not farmers. They tend to be from outside the coastal 
communities in which the development occurs and their objective is to make 
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a return on their investment, not solve local social problems. In many of the 
less developed countries, small fishers have lost their rich local fishing 
grounds and coastal landowners have lost their rural subsistence, often 
ending up in the slums of urban centers. 
Establishment of marine farming industries in coastal areas has often come into conflict 
with established interests. Visual amenity, environmental quality and property values 
are affected, and fishing and navigation may be restricted (Gowen 1991: 39). These 
conflicts of interest are usually decided at the political level where the concentrated, 
capital rich marine farming interests often have sufficient influence to prevail over 
opponents who are often dispersed, divided and disorganised. There is the potential for 
politically influential marine farming interests to 'capture' government agencies 
responsible for regulating them. Agency capture results in an agency favouring the 
interests of a client group over the interests of the wider community. With regard to 
marine farming it may see a regulating agency devote its resources to protecting industry 
from the environmental and social concerns of the public instead of protecting the 
public interest from environmental abuses by industry. The dangers of agency capture 
and the conflict of interest between marine farming and coastal environment issues 
provide a strong argument to separate the government functions of regulation of the 
aquaculture industry, and protection of wild fisheries and the marine environment. 
There can be competition between culture and capture fisheries for markets. This can be 
detrimental to traditional coastal fishing communities. An article in The Economist 
(Anon. 1996a) described the plight of Alaskan salmon fishermen who were being forced 
into bankruptcy because of a depressed market brought about by the global oversupply 
of farmed salmon. This was occurring despite abundant catches and healthy stocks of 
wild fish. 
It is difficult for traditional fisheries to compete in many markets against cultured 
products. Industrial methods can provide regular, predictable supplies of a reliable 
quality to match market demands, while capture fisheries are less predictable and supply 
may be affected by the vagaries of weather and other factors. This makes farmed 
product more attractive to the mass marketing and distribution methods of the global 
trade in fish products. Even environmentally concerned consumers may believe that 
farmed salmon represents a better environmental choice. 
These factors may undermine public, political and economic concerns for the 
conservation of wild fisheries and the environments and ecosystems that sustain them. 
If farmed salmon can replace the wild fishery in the market, it may no longer seem so 
important to protect the rivers and streams upon which wild salmon depend, and the 
commercial interests of those who 'own' the production processes of farmed salmon 
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would be served if potential competition from the wild fishery was permanently 
precluded. 
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4. CASE STUDIES OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains brief descriptions of three fisheries which have demonstrated 
ecologically sustainable characteristics. In each case this success has been in notable 
contrast to the failure of comparable fisheries within each region. The three fisheries 
appear to have little in common. They include a small Caribbean village and 
surrounding reef and mangrove system, an oyster fishery in an estuary in southern 
England, and the coastal fisheries of Norway. Despite the differences, there are 
common characteristics of management that have contributed to sustaining ecological 
health and productivity. The success of these characteristics across a broad range of 
fisheries and in contrast to the failure of comparable fisheries that lack them, suggests 
that they may play an important role in achieving ecological sustainability. 
4.2 BUEN HOMBRE 
The first case study is of Buen Hombre, an isolated village on the north coast of the 
Dominican Republic which was the subject of a study by Stoffle et al. ('1994). The 
village has a population of 800 which includes 45 adult fishermen. Villagers engage in 
multiple occupations including fishing and farming, and produce a diversity of 
commodities including a wide variety of seafoods and crops for personal use and for 
sale. Advantages of this pattern of economic and occupational pluralism, a term which 
Stoffle et al. (1994: 118) attribute to McGoodwin (1990: 116-118), include a reduced 
risk of total economic failure, and a reduced risk of the environmental degradation that 
could be caused by more intensive exploitation of particular environmental resources 
that would necessarily accompany a greater economic dependence on the production of 
fewer commodities. 
The Buen Hombre fishery is based on a reef and mangrove ecosystem that Stoffle et al. 
(1994: 115) describe as "one of the most vital and biologically diverse in the Caribbean, 
even though it has been intensively fished for 100 years by local villagers". This is in 
stark contrast to the neighbouring reefs to the east which have been degraded as a result 
of overfishing and tourism, and those across the border to the west in Haiti which are 
described as biologically dead. 
4.2.1 FISHING PRACTICES 
.The principal method employed by the Buen H;ombre fishers is spear fishing while free 
diving. Crab pots and traps are also used. The use of nets referred to as chinchoro nets 
is prohibited, as is the use of underwater breathing apparatus using compressed air 
(Stoffle et al. 1994: 126). 
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Fishers harvest a diversity of species including parrot fish, grouper, snapper, crab, 
lobster, conch, shark and barracuda (Stoffle et al. 1994: 117). By deliberately targeting 
multiple species they reduce the risk of overfishing any particular species and this helps 
to maintain ecological balance and stability. The total sustainable yield from a fishery is 
also greater if many species are exploited rather than just a few. If fishers notice that a 
particular species is becoming scarce they observe informal agreements to avoid 
targeting that species, and this allows populations to recover (Stoffle et al. 1994: 132). 
The fishers of Buen Hombre are part of a close-knit community. They co-operate and 
usually fish in teams, sharing the costs of boat rental and fuel, and dividing the catch. 
This promotes equality and reduces the risk of jealousy and conflict that could 
undermine group unity if some fishers were able to become wealthier than others from 
the resource. They have formed an association which promotes unity and mutual 
support and fosters the development of a sense of community responsibility and 
obligation (Stoffle et al. 1994: 119). This is an important contribution to the 
development of a conservation ethic and the sense of social responsibility that provides 
a values basis for an ethical or moral imperative to support observation and enforcement 
of the rules that preserve the marine resources for the benefit of all. 
4.2.2 THREATS TO THE BUEN HOMBRE FISHERY 
There are a number of potential threats to the ecology of the Buen Hombre fishery. 
They include habitat loss as a consequence of tourism development, deforestation of the 
mountains inland from the coast, and overfishing by local fishers or by the ecologically 
destructive fishing practices of outsiders (Stoffle et al. 1994: 116). Removal or 
destruction of mangroves and coral would directly reduce fishery habitat, while 
increasing nutrient runoff from tourist resorts, or as a consequence of unsuitable land 
use practices, could affect the nutrient dynamics of the system resulting in dieback of 
coral reefs and reducing the productivity of the system as a whole. 
The isolation of Buen Hombre has contributed to protection of the system in the past, 
but tourism is an increasing threat as holiday-makers seek more remote wilderness 
locations. If habitat degradation is to be prevented, the fishers may have to counter 
conflicting development interests. They are more likely to be able to resist adverse 
developments if they have unity and cohesion and enjoy a sympathy of interest and the 
support of the wider Buen Hombre community. Fishing is a respected occupation in the 
village and has a high level of participation; 45 adult fishers from a total population of 
about 800 persons (Stoffle et al. 1994: 116), an opportunity provided in part as a 
consequence of the technological inefficiency of the fishery. While fewer fishers using 
compressors could catch as much as the Buen Hombre fishers do by free diving, there 
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would be less people with a direct involvement in the fishery. Another consequence of 
"inefficiency" is its tendency to promote social leveling which reduces tensions that 
could undermine the unity and "common interest" that occurs as a consequence of the 
benefits and wealth of the fishery being widely dispersed among the fishers and 
throughout the community. 
4.2.2.1 Overfishing 
The fishers of Buen Hombre are well aware of the dangers of overfishing and they have 
developed a number of strategies to guard against it. Social strategies have been 
developed to reduce the resident population during times of drought and scarcity to 
avoid stress to the carrying capacity of the system (Stoffle et al. 1994: 116). There is a 
strong conservation ethic and fishers do not cut coral or mangrove and they avoid 
capturing smaller fish to allow them to grow to maturity (Stoffle et al. 1994: 120-121). 
Possibly the most important single factor contributing to the avoidance of overfishing by 
the Buen Hombre fishers is their use of technologically "inefficient" fishing gear. This 
allows natural feedback mechanisms to function that have the effect of limiting fishing 
effort to sustainable levels. Limiting technology makes the marginal cost of fishing 
more costly in terms of energy expended, that is in terms of the ecological cost of 
fishing to the fisherman. There is little potential to profit from the fishery. Thus fishing 
is a fairly marginal activity and hence it is sensitive to changes in fish populations that 
effect catch rates. If a particular reef area is overfished - causing fish to become scarcer 
and harder to catch - it soon becomes uneconomic to fish there any longer and the 
fishers concentrate their attentions elsewhere, or even cease fishing altogether and shift 
their efforts to other activities such as farming (Stoffle et al. 1994: 123). This allows 
the reef system's fish stocks to recover. The many species available to fishermen and 
their ability to be selective with the equipment they employ also provides a balancing 
mechanism. If the population of any species is reduced by overfishing or other causes -
fishers consciously avoid targeting that species to allow the population to recover - thus 
helping to maintain a balance of species diversity. The inefficiency of fishing also 
provides protection to small fish. Stoffle et al. (1994: 121) explain that fishe~s have to 
target larger fish because they "provide higher returns in terms of the amount of protein-
rich food compared to the amount of energy expended to catch them". 
There are social gains from efficiency restraint in addition to the ecological benefits. 
Restriction on the use of technology provides greater opportunity and demand for the 
use of manpower in the fishery. It therefore provides more opportunities for 
employment and for increased participation and resource sharing by members of the 
community. Efficiency constraints also limit the potential for the fishery to produce an 
economic surplus that might stimulate competition and rivalry and thus threaten social 
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cohesion among fishers and between them and the rest of the community. Unity and 
cohesion among Buen Hombre fishers has contributed to their ability to resist 
encroachment on their fishery by outsiders. 
4.2.2.2 Destructive Fishing by Outsiders 
Encroachment by outsiders, especially commercial fishers from the nearby urban 
settlement of Monte Cristi, is a threat to the Buen Hombre fishery. The Buen Hombre 
fishers tolerate outsiders fishing in what they see as their territorial waters, as long as 
they fish by the same non-destructive methods employed by the fishermen of Buen 
Hombre (Stoffle et al. 1994: 129). It is the use of illegal technology such as chinchorro 
nets and compressors to which they object (Stoffle et al. 1994: 129). Use of 
compressors and underwater breathing apparatus greatly increases a diver's effectiveness 
and fishing power and in the Buen Hombre fishery this could lead to overfishing. Use 
of chinchorro nets causes indiscriminate overfishing of both juvenile and adult fish and 
may cause damage to benthic habitat such as sea grasses (Stoffle et al. 1994: 133). 
In 1989 the fishers of Buen Hombre faced a crisis. They were finding it difficult to 
prevent encroachment by fishers froJll Monte Cristi using chinchorro nets: Appeals to 
officials in Monte Cristi had no_ effect in curbing encroachment and use of illegal 
methods. It is likely that these officials were politically unable or unwilling to act 
against the interests of the Monte Cristi commercial fishers. In response they suggested 
that overfishing by Buen Hombre fishers was the cause of the problem, and that the 
Buen Hombre fishers needed to be educated in conservation (Stoffle et al. 1994: 132). 
It seems likely that the situation was only saved as a result of the involvement of an 
interdisciplinary team of American scientists who gathered evidence using sophisticated 
satellite monitoring equipment and underwater photography. Their evidence, the 
involvement of the Dominican Djrector of a natural resource conservation foundation, 
and widespread publicity of the situation in the media, convinced national-level 
government officials to assist the Buen Hombre community to enforce the existing laws 
against chinchoro nets (Stoffle et al. 1994: 133). 
Official recognition of the rights of the Buen Hombre fishers may have given them the 
confidence to confront chinchorro fishers from Monte Cristi. In March 1991, after a 
standoff between the two groups, the fishers from Buen Hombre persuaded a group of 
Monte Cristi chinchorro fishers to remove their nets from the water and leave the area. 
Subsequently the Dominican government granted formal legal authority to the Buen 
Hombre fishers to enforce sanctions against illegal fishing and arrest violators (Stoffle et 
al. 1994: 135). 
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4.3 THE FALMOUTH OYSTER FISHERY 
The estuary of the River Fal in Cornwall on the south west coast of England is home to 
a unique fishery. The Truro oyster fishery is the sole survivor of many inshore and 
deep-water natural oyster fisheries that thrived around the British coast in the early years 
of the twentieth century (Davies 1995: 173). Overfishing made a significant 
contribution to the destruction of most of these fisheries. This occurred as a 
consequence of the shift from sail to motor propulsion in fishing vessels. The increased 
efficiency of motor powered fishing boats made it profitable to persist in fishing until 
oyster populations had been depleted to very low levels from which they could not 
recover and could no longer maintain viable populations. 
Many of the oyster fisheries were "free-fisheries", unmanaged and unregulated, and 
there were no provisions to counter the increased fishing power of modem vessels. 
Davies (1995: 6) explains that the Truro fishery escaped extinction from overfishing by 
virtue of bylaws made in 1868: "Forbidding the removal of oysters from the Truro 
Oyster Fishery by means of mechanically propelled craft". As a result of this bylaw, 
vessels engaged in the Truro fishery were restricted to the use of sail. This greatly 
limited their fishing efficiency and conservation of oyster stocks occurred because it was 
not profitable to overfish. Today the Truro fishery is home to the world's last fleet of 
oyster dredgers still working under sail alone, and Davies (1995: 6) suggests it is no 
coincidence that it is also the single surviving natural or wild oyster fishery on the 
British coast. 
4.3.1 FISHING PRACTICES 
Conservation is achieved by limiting the efficiency of technology employed in the 
fishery. The vessels operating in the fishery are typically 22 to 30 feet in length, of 
heavy displacement, and with a long keel (Davies 1995: 8). The gaff-rig is favoured 
because it is suited to the sail-management requirements of dredging. Motors are fitted 
to some boats but are not allowed to be used while fishing. The crew is generally from 
one to three persons and the oyster dredges used measure about a metre across. 
A number of regulations apply to the fishery in addition to the no motor rule. There is a 
size limit with a ring 2 5/8 inches in diameter used as a measure. A bailiff employed by 
the local government authority ensures compliance by going on board to check the catch 
at the end of each day (Davies 1995: 11). Fishing is limited to the hours 9am - 3pm on 
weekdays and 9am - lpm Saturdays (Davies 1995: 10). However it is the no motor rule 
that is the key to conservation of the fishery because it limits fishers to the use of very 
inefficient sailing vessels. In Davies (1995: 173-175) words: 
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A sailing smack is a very inefficient tool for catching oyster for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly the dredges themselves ... pick up only 15 out of every 100 
oysters. Secondly ... if there is no wind they cannot work... Thirdly, oysters 
are not evenly spread over the sea bed, but lie in patches. As a sailboat has 
to drift it can only pass over a patch once and then has to sail back upwind 
of it for another drift before it can catch from the same patch... A motor 
boat once having found the patch can go round and round on it fishing it 
until it's gone. 
Davies points out that as the beds are thinned out and fishing becomes less rewarding, 
boats drop out as fishers tum to other more lucrative employment. But there is still a 
large stock of oysters left on the beds when it is no longer profitable to fish them, and 
this provides a breeding stock for replenishment. If motor vessels were permitted they 
would likely deplete the beds beyond the point from which they could recover. Davies 
( 1995: 17 4) suggests that: "Once the stock drops below a certain level, the oyster seems 
to lose the will to propagate and then no spatfall can be big enough to save the fishery". 
It may be that limiting the disturbance of the benthic sediments by preventing large, 
heavy, fast dredging maintains an environment that is suitable for spat settlement. The 
restricted efficiency of vessels ensures that fishing is a marginal activity. When oyster 
numbers are high the catches make fishing worthwhile, but when they are low and in 
need of protection, catches fall. When catches are no longer a fair compensation for the 
trouble of fishing, boats drop out of the fishery before biological overfishing occurs. 
The size of the active fleet fluctuates according to the health of the stocks and has varied 
between 50 sailboats in 1925 and 7 in 1935 (Davies 1995: 175). In the 1994-5 season 
there were 10 boats working (Davies 1995: 1). Fleet flexibility - the ability to respond 
to fluctuations in the productivity of the fishery - allows an ecological feedback system 
to operate which contributes to a sustainable fishery. This flexibility is ~nhanced by a 
situation of low sunk costs and high marginal costs associated with fishing. This relates 
to a low level of capitalisation as capital costs are often fixed whether the boat fishes or 
not, while labour costs are more closely tied to fishing activity. 
It is important to note that this is not a recreational fishery. The work is hard and the 
weather often makes for unpleasant conditions. The fishers do it for money and while 
they may gain other values from a sense of tradition and pride in the skill in their work, 
it is essentially a job (Davies 1995: 210). The Truro fishery is not profitable in the sense 
of being an attractive opportunity for investment; indeed even the local authority cannot 
extract rent due to a bylaw providing that all profits be put back into the fishery (Davies 
1995: 175). It is nevertheless a means to a living for fishers and a source of indirect 
economic benefits to the local community who would fight any move to change the "no 
motor rule" that keeps the fishery "inefficient and prosperous" (Davies 1995: 230). 
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4.3.2 THREATS TO THE FISHERY 
The fishery has been threatened in the past by outsiders. East coast oyster fishermen 
invaded the fishery in the 1840s to the detriment of the local inhabitants and fishers. 
They ignored rules intended to protect the fishery and fished through the summer closed 
season, protected from the wrath of local fishers by three of Her Majesty's cutters and 40 
marines (Davies 1995: 172). The risk of invasion has since declined and Davies (1995: 
172) states that: 
As long as the rule of 'sail only' applies on the Truro fishery, we are surely 
safe from the predatory attentions of the East Coast men for all time, whose 
sailing smacks are only museum pieces, unlike the Fa/mouth Working Boats 
which are still earning their keep in the manner for which they were built. 
A more recent threat to the fishery came in the form of ~ European Union rule requiring 
the registration of all fishing boats 10 metres in length or less. Compliance would have 
involved considerable expense and fitting of unnecessary equipment. Possibly the intent 
of such rules is to force "inefficient" small-scale fishers out of business to protect the 
viability of more highly capitalised operators from competition. Fortunately for the 
Truro fishery the rule was overturned after the British Prime Minister intervened 
(Davies 1995: 3-4). 
Other threats to the fishery include pollution, disease, weed growth, siltation of the 
oyster beds and adverse effects as a result of developments within the port or catchment 
(Davies 1995: 3-4). The dredgers are few in number and are aware that their fishery is 
vulnerable and that they have very little real political influence to protect it should 
conflicting vested interests eventuate. The destruction by industrial fishing of the 
Cornish mackerel fishery in the early 1980s was a stark reminder of the power of 
commercial interests. Despite the protests of thousands of local Cornish mackerel 
fishers a fleet of factory vessels from many nations was allowed access to the stocks. It 
was not until the fleets had made their profits and moved on, leaving behind a severely 
depleted fishery, that the government belatedly banned fishing for mackerel by methods 
other than handlining (Davies 1995: 229). Vessels with a crew of 15 and capable of 
catching in a day as much as a fleet of handliners employing 40 fishers would catch in 
10 weeks, had been allowed to damage the fishery and jeopardise the means to a living 
of thousands of small-scale fishers (Davies 1995: 229). One could argue that the factory 
vessels were a more efficient way to harvest the resource. But their use did not 
contribute to sustaining it, or to the social and economic well-being of the Comish 
community. 
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4.4 NORWAY'S COASTAL FISHERIES 
The European Union's (EU) fishing grounds are seriously depleted following decades of 
overfishing by overcapitalised fleets. This is a legacy of generous subsidies to 
shipbuilding without regard to the ecological capacity of fisheries to sustain the fishing 
effort. Addressing the problem of overcapacity requires that the EU fleet be reduced by 
40 percent (Anon. 1996b; Holmes 1996) and catches cut significantly over six years to 
allow stocks to rebuild. A proposal to this effect confronted the immediate interests of 
the fishing industry and met strident opposition from fisheries ministers from the 
various EU fishing countries (Anon. 1996b; Holmes 1996). Achieving the adjustments 
needed to rehabilitate EU fisheries will not be easy. 
The coastal fisheries of Norway are in a far better state than those of the EU and are 
better managed (Anon. 1996b). Many Norwegian communities depend heavily on 
fisheries for their economic well-being and have a long cultural heritage associated with 
fishing. Fear of losing control of their fisheries to th,e EU was a significant reason why 
Norway voted against joining the EU in 1994 (Anon. 1996b; Wise 1996: 143). 
Norwegian fisheries have faced crises in the past. In the 1980s cod stocks were depleted 
but they have since been rebuilt. This was possible because the political, social, 
technical and economic conditions conducive to conservation and sustainable 
management were attributes of Norwegian society and its fishing indust~. Mariussen 
(1996: 27) points out that the Norwegian fishing industry is dispersed among family 
firms embedded in small rural communities, in contrast to the fishing industries of most 
EU countries which are organised in urban centred, capital intensive, agro-industri~ 
type operations. 
Norway has an extensive and rugged fjord coastline, and many communities have a 
tradition of combining small-scale fishing with agriculture (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 
290). Most Norwegian fishing boats are small, are operated by one or two fishers, and 
have a limited capacity to impact on fish stocks. Of Norway's fleet of 17 OOO fishing 
vessels only 500-600 are ocean-going ships (Anon. 1996b). Jentoft and Mikalsen 
(1994: 290) note that: "Historically, the fjord fisheries for cod have been the exclusive 
domain of the local population, which uses traditional gear such as hand lines, longlines, 
and gill-nets." 
The advent of new technology, particularly trawls and purse seines, has been seen as a 
threat to traditional fjord fisheries (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 292). Since the mid-
1950s fjord communities have continuously sought to protect their local fisheries by 
calling for restrictions oh the use of trawls and purse seines by "intruders". These calls 
have been resisted by the national administration which favours "open access" to fjord 
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fisheries and maintaining fjord fisheries as "common property" rather than "exclusive 
assets of the local population" (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 294). But gear restrictions 
are enforced where necessary for conservation of the fishery resource (Jen to ft and 
Mikalsen 1994: 292-293). 
While "open access" has been the official position, it has only applied to Norwegian 
vessels. Norway's fishers have not seen their coastal waters invaded by huge, foreign 
owned, factory vessels such as those that depleted the Comish mackerel fishery. The 
ability to exclude these vessels is one of the advantages of non-membership of the EU 
(Anon. 1996b). Norway has some large fishing vessels of its own but they have not 
been allowed to fish indiscriminately in Norway's coastal waters, an approach similar to 
Kalland's (1996: 77) observation that in the fisheries of coastal Japan, inshore waters are 
reserved for "low efficiency" small-scale fishing vessels. Large vessels have been 
controlled by the Norwegian management system which has included local fishing 
interest representation and is characterised by wide participation of user groups and a 
regional focus (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 289). Jentoft and Mikalsen (1994: 309) note 
that local non-fishing interests are underrepresented in decision making, but generally 
the Norwegian system affords greater opportunities for participation and_ for regional 
interests to have some influence than is the case in the more centralised EU fisheries 
(Phillipson 1996; Symes 1996: 11). Symes (1996: 11) notes that: 
The 'negotiation economies' of Denmark and particularly Norway have 
provided opportunities for the strong representation of the resource users' 
views in the consultation procedures which precede policy decisions -
somewhat in contrast to the centrally managed policy formulation in the 
UK. 
Almost all of Norway's fishers are members of one national union (Anon. 1996b). The 
majority of these are small-scale fishers, but they are many in number and this, along 
with the strength of the union, ensures that their interests have the political weight to be 
represented in the management of coastal fisheries. Local branches of the union have 
influence in protecting the interests of small-scale fishers at the regional management 
!eve~ (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 292-293), and at the national level the union has the 
strength to influence policy. The strength of the decentralised coastal fishers' influence 
was instrumental in their effective resistence to an attempt by the Norwegian 
Government to impose a quota management system that might have favoured the 
interests of the industrial fleet (Hersoug 1996: 23). 
Participation by fishers in the management process enhances legitimacy and there is 
close cooperation between Norway's authorities and fishermen. As a result agreements 
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tend to be honoured and there is a high level of compliance with regulations (Anon. 
1996b). 
Norway's fisheries and its small-scale fishers have been protected from excessive capital 
involvement in the industry by a number of regulatory measures that were felt necessary 
to protect Norway's regionalised social and economic development (Wise 1996: 144). A 
Norwegian may not own a fishing boat unless he or Jshe has been an active fisher for 
three of the past ten years (Anon. 1996b) and there are restrictions on the vertical 
integration of ownership of fishing vessels and processing plants. 
4.5 DISCUSSION - EQUAL ACCESS AND INEFFICIENCY 
Pinkerton (1989: 3-33) discusses the benefits of user participation and a local 
orientation in fisheries management decision making. Local involvement and fisher 
participation in management decision-making is an attribute of the three fisheries. fu 
the case of the Truro oyster fishery the local government corporation is the management 
authority. fu Buen Hombre the local fishermen's association makes rules to conserve 
and manage the fishery and has been granted legal authority to enforce them. fu the case 
of Norway's coastal fisheries, management decision-making involves national, regional 
and local government, and the involvement of regional branches of the national 
fishermens' union with representatives from the different user groups. Widespread 
participation in decision-making is instrumental in establishing the legitimacy of 
regulations in the eyes of fishermen and this results in widespread voluntary 
compliance, supported by unified social pressure to encourage observation of the rules. 
The localised focus of management allows the establishment of management regulations 
and practices that are appropriate to the specific environmental conditions and social 
needs of fishing communities. This may lead to better outcomes than situations where 
decision-making is highly centralised and a uniform set of regulations is applied over 
vast and diverse areas, regardless of localised differences and specific needs and 
problems. 
,' 
While local and participatory decision-making is of prime importance there is still an 
important and quite complex role for central authority. The higher authority of the 
national governments can provide an important source of legitimacy and empowerment 
j 
to locally derived management solutions by backing up enforcement of local 
regulations. This was clearly instrumental in the successful expulsion of fishers using 
illegal chinchoro nets by the fishers of Buen Hombre. 
However central government is often reluctant to cede too much power or control over 
the use and distribution of resources to local communities. Doing so goes against the 
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fundamental instincts, interests and imperatives of the state as an institution of 
centralised power. To maintain sovereignty, the state has to resist the desire of local 
regions or communities to gain rights of exclusive access, use and control over local 
fisheries. There is evidence for this in Norway's national level policy of maintaining 
"open access" to coastal fisheries in opposition to pressure from local communities who 
would prefer exclusive rights. In the 1840s the British navy enforced "open access" to 
the Falmouth oyster fishery and a navy cutter protected fishermen from distant ports 
while they plundered the resource under the noses of the outraged local community. 
This happened after the local fishers had in effect "gone out on strike" in response to the 
low prices that London merchants were offering to pay for their oysters. In the case of 
Buen Hombre, while the local fishers would probably prefer exclusive rights to the 
fishery, this seems not to be an option. Stoffle et al. do not mention whether national 
policy provides for open access, but a local fisher named Tuba is quoted (Stoffle et al. 
1994: 129) as saying: "We accept people coming in and fishing in our territory, but we 
do not want people who will come in and hurt the marine environment. They need to 
fish in the same way as the fishermen of Buen Hombre". 
This implies ~cknowledgment by the fishers of the legitimacy of open access to the 
resource. This common feature of the three fisheries may be a key factor in their 
sustainable management. It is significant because it seems to be a direct contradiction of 
that widely accepted tenet of resource management, that "open access" must inevitably 
lead to ruin and that "open access" is the essential cause of many fisheries' failures. To 
argue that defending a policy of "open access" contributes to achieving ecologically 
sustainable resource use invites controversy to say the least. 
The fishers of Buen Hombre, the River Fal and the inshore coastal fisheries of Norway 
have been unable to exercise proprietary rights over their local fisheries. They all are 
threatened, or have been threatened, with competition for access to their local resources 
by the invasion of fishers from outside the community or local region. Unable to · 
exclude other people from sharing access to the resource, they have responded by 
imposing restrictions on the technology that may be used in order to protect their local 
fisheries from overfishing. Jentoft and Mikalsen (1994: 292) point out that coastal fjord 
fishers have persistently called for ever tighter restrictions to limit the use of more 
powerful fishing technologies in their coastal waters. The local Buen Hombre fishers 
deny themselves the use of more effective fishing technologies such as nets and 
compressors and crusade against their use by others (Stoffle et al. 1994: 131); and in the 
Truro oyster fishery, the validity of the no-motor rule rests on a local by-law, and the 
"inefficiency" it imposes on all is staunchly defended by the local fishers (Davies 1995: 
230). 
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The restriction on gear efficiency may be the most important single factor contributing 
to the sustainable management of these fisheries. The policy of "open access" is the key 
to promoting acceptance and enforcement of gear efficiency constraints by fishers with 
no other means to limit depredation of their local resources by outsiders. This, and the 
need to maintain the integrity of the rules as protection against outsiders, protects the 
resource from depredation by local fishers. External pressures may provide the 
cohesion and social responsibility that prevents local fishermen from cheating, or the 
locally powerful from monopolising the resource for their individual benefit. Where a 
policy of "open access" to fisheries provides the essential motivating force for the 
imposition of technology constraint in a fishery, then it may be a vital, albeit indirect 
key, to the sustainable management of those fisheries. 
Restricting the gear and technology that may be used means that these fisheries cannot 
strictly be conside,red "open access". While people may freely access the resource, they 
may only do so subject to the constraints that are imposed equally on all. This may 
enhance the legitimacy of regulation; Vestergaard (1996: 89) observes that there is less 
resistance to technical regulations_ than to those that are distributional, such as licences 
and quotas. The restrictions apply to technology and by extension to capital. Instead of 
"open access", a better description for these fisheries might be "equal access". 
Equal access efficiency-restricted fisheries do not strictly provide equal opportunities for 
all. They favour local fishers over outsiders because they are likely to have better 
knowledge of local fishing grounds. The intellectual property of knowing how, when, 
and where to fish may be "owned" by the local fishing community, thus giving them an 
advantage over outsiders who might be able to use capitalised technological fishing 
inputs more competitively, but who are not permitted to do so. This can also promote 
wealth equalisation among fishers and more widely in the local community by 
emphasising human inputs rather than capital inputs in the production process, thus 
providing for wider community involvement and interest in the well-being of the 
fisheries. 
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5. CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
5.1 CONSERVATION AND INEFFICIENCY 
5.1.1 FISHERIES EQUILIBRIUM YIEW 
The basic economic model for fisheries is the open-access equilibrium yield model 
(Anderson 1977: 30-31; Roberts 1997). The model is a theoretical construct combining 
the biological response of a fish population to increasing levels of predation or fishing 
effort, and the response of fishing effort to the economic effects of different levels of 
abundance of the target fish species. The economic foundations of the model were 
described by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) and it is commonly used to illustrate the 
inevitability (in theory) of over-fishing in an open-access fishery (Anderson 1977; 
Amason 1993; Roberts 1997). Despite practical limitations as a predictive tool in 
fisheries management due to its inability to account for the complexity and inherent 
instability of the oceanic environment (Kesteven 1997; Wilson et al. 1994; Symes 
1996:6), the equilibrium yield model is nevertheless a useful tool to explore 
conceptually, issues relating to economic efficiency and their biological consequences to 
a fishery. 
The biological component of the model is the surplus yield curve that illustrates the 
yield from a fishery subjected to different levels of fishing effort (Figure 5.1). Amason 
(1993) describes the theory of the model. At low levels of fishing effort the population 
is not being harvested to its full biological potential and increasing effort will result in a 
higher catch. Incremental increases in the amount of effort result in a larger catch until 
the point of maximum sustainable yield is reached. Beyond this point further increase in 
effort yields a reduced catch because it depletes the population below the level of 
maximum productivity. If fishing effort is further increased it could eventually reach a 
point where it causes population extinction. 
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Figure 5.1 Standard surplus yield model: relationship between yield and effort. 
The standard equilibrium yield model is developed by adding an economic dimension. 
The value of fish is assumed to be proportional to the amount caught and the cost of 
increasing amounts of fishing effort is added to produce a cost dimension to the model. 
This is generally illustrated as a straight line assuming a proportional increase in the cost 
of incremental amounts of fishing effort (Figure 5.2). 
Cost/ 
yield($) 
Figure 5.2 Standard equilibrium yield model. 
Effort 
The total profit being produced from the fishery is the difference between the value of 
fish caught and the cost of fishing effort required to make that catch. In an "open 
access" fishery there will be a tendency for effort to increase to the equilibrium point. 
More capital and more labour will have an incentive to enter the fishery as long as it is 
profitable for it to do so, that is until the equilibrium point is reached where the cost of a 
unit of fishing effort is equal to the value of the fish captured by that unit. An additional 
unit of effort would cost more than the value of the fish it would harvest so there would 
be no profit incentive to motivate that extra unit of effort to enter the fishery. At the 
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equilibrium point there is no surplus, profit or resource rent generated from the fishery. 
This would be considered as economic over-fishing if maximising profit or resource rent 
was a management objective. 
5.1.2 CHANGES TO THE EFFICIENCY OF FISHING EFFORT 
If the efficiency of fishing effort is increased, that is its effectiveness relative to cost, 
perhaps as a result of the introduction of more efficient harvesting technology, then the 
cost curve will be lowered as the cost per unit effort is reduced, and the equilibrium 
point on the model will shift to the right in the direction of over fishing (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 Effect of lowering the cost of fishing effort. 
If maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is the desired outcome, lowering the cost per unit 
effort will not necessarily lead to over fishing. It could result in an increased yield from 
the fishery if the previous equilibrium point was to the left of the point of MSY (Figure 
5 .4) and the improved efficiency might be seen as beneficial. 
$ Cl C2 
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Figure 5.4 Effect on yield of lowering cost of fishing effort in underexploited fishery. 
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5.1.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR EFFICIENCY CONSTRAINT 
If the fishery was already over-exploited with regard to MSY, however, then the effect 
of an increase in the efficiency of fishing effort would be a reduction in the yield from 
the fishery. fu such a situation, if efficiency was constrained, perhaps by management 
imposed regulation, the cost curve would be raised and the equilibrium point pushed to 
the left towards the point of MSY, thus the yield from the fishery could be increased 
(Figure 5.5). This is the theory that provides justification for the use of efficiency 
constraining input controls in fishery management. This illustrates the benefits of what 
Davies (1995: 230) describes as managing by inefficiency, the key to the sustainable 
management of the Truro oyster and the Buen Hombre fisheries and an important 
component in the sustainable way that many fisheries around the world, including 
traditional, artisanal, commercial and recreational fisheries, have been used or managed 
since the beginning of time. This efficiency constraint has often been achieved as a 
result of maintaining traditional practices by fishing communities who recognise its 
value to maintaining resource security. It can be the consequence of the lack of 
technology with the power to achieve greater harvesting efficiency, but is often brought 
about by formal management decision making to serve conservation and social 
objectives, including provision of employment opportunities and wealth equalisation in 
the community. 
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Figure 5.5 Effect of efficiency constraint on yield in overexploited fishery. 
In addition to the possibility of raising the yield from the fishery in an "open access" 
equilibrium situation, efficiency constraint also tends to reduce the risk of biological 
fishery collapse through overfishing because it tends to reduce effective fishing effort 
overall. fu addition, because the cost curve of an efficiency constrained fishery is 
steeper, it is likely to be more sensitive to changes in catch per unit effort that may occur 
as a result of fluctuating fish populations. If, for example, the population of the target 
species were to fall to below the "normal" level, perhaps in response to environmental 
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conditions or some other factor, and the catch per unit effort was consequently reduced, 
the proportional reduction in catch is greater in the efficiency constrained fishery with 
the steeper cost curve as illustrated in Figure 5.6. _ 
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Figure 5.6 Sensitivity of effort to stock fluctuations. 
The greater sensitivity of the efficiency constrained fishery to a reduced fish population 
is likely to cause a more effective response in reducing fishing effort and allowing the 
population to recover. This negative feedback mechanism promotes biological 
equilibrium and stability, with its function similar to the ecological feedback 
mechanisms that regulate many predator prey relationships in nature, unlike the 
financial budgets that usually take the place of energy budgets in fisheries with human 
predators. 
According to this model of an open-access fishery, regardless of the level of efficiency, 
there is no potential to generate resource rent or profit on a sustained basis. Fishers on 
average will earn sufficient to compensate them for their costs, their labours and their 
skills, but no more. If they made more than a moderate profit, then, according to the 
rationale of the theory, fishing effort would increase in response to the opportunity, as 
the profit potential would attract new participants into the fishery. This would reduce 
the population of fish and lower catch per unit effort until there was no longer any profit 
and the equilibrium was restored. 
Fishermen earn a reasonable return on their labours relative to other options that may be 
available to them, but no profit beyond this. If efficiency-constraining input controls are 
used in order to raise the cost curve and thereby achieve an increased level of 
sustainable yield, individual fishers may gain little direct benefit in the long run, as they 
still only earn wages, but if the community is small and the fishery is a significant part 
of the local economy, then the increased productivity may raise the wages of the entire 
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community, including the fishers. There may also be benefits in terms of resource 
security. If there is reduced overall fishing effort this may mean less risk of resource 
collapse from overfishing. 
The communities to which fishers belong may benefit from raising the yield of the 
fishery and from increased employment opportunities if the increased costs of fishing 
effort were due to constraints that made the industry more labour intensive. This may 
provide more jobs in regions lacking other employment opportunities or non-wage 
benefits to those fishers who enjoy fishing as a lifestyle but who would be forced into 
other occupations if less labour intensive fishing methods were employed. Because 
there is no substantial profit in the fishery there is no need for barriers to entry. Equal 
opportunity of access to the fishery has a wage equalising effect within the community. 
If the fishery is productive the benefits flow and contribute to the prosperity of the entire 
community. If the harvest is bad, all are affected. This creates a community-wide 
shared incentive to protect and conserve the fishery. 
In an equal access fishery where the potential exists as a consequence of the availability 
of efficient harvesting technology for biological overfishing to occur, efficiency 
constraint may be seen, not as an impediment to achieving prosperity, but as an aid to 
achieving maximum sustainable well-being yield from the resource and maximising the 
sum well-being of individuals within the community. This benefit to the wider 
community can encourage and legitimise the observance and enforcement of input 
controls that limit harvesting efficiency. It establishes a moral imperative for individual 
fishers to observe the rules for the good of their fellow fishers and the good of the rest of 
the community. This moral imperative is important for there is still the possibility for 
individuals to obtain profit by cheating, by fishing in ways that circumvent the rules that 
serve to constrain efficiency. Imposing equal restrictions on all is also likely to be 
important in order that restrictions are seen as fair. Management regimes that allow 
some fishers to use more gear than others may undermine this source of moral 
legitimacy for the rules. 
If the benefits of observing efficiency constraints are recognised in a particular fishery, 
there is the opportunity to devise constraints that contribute furth~r to the productivity 
and well being of ,the fishery. Efficiency constraint in itself contributes to resource 
conservation by removing the profit incentive that often causes overfishing, but the 
benefit to sustainability can be compounded when the constraint is achieved in ways that 
minimise disruption to the productivity of fish populations and the wider ecosystem 
processes that sustain them. 
48 
Most management imposed input controls are intended to work in this way, limiting the 
use of wasteful or damaging gears, protecting stocks during critical periods such as 
breeding seasons, or by imposing size- and sex-related harvesting selectivity where 
appropriate. It is also possible for governments to raise revenue from a fishery in such a 
way as to act as an efficiency constraint. Taxes on fuels used in fishing vessels would 
impose a cost that related closely to effort, and fees or a royalty charge based on the 
amount of fish caught would indirectly have the same effect. 
The important point from all this is that if access to the fishery resource is open to all, 
conservation through restraint on the efficiency of fishing effort does not necessarily 
impose economic sacrifice on the fishing community, but can contribute to greater total 
productivity and community prosperity. 
5.1.4 FAILURE TO PRODUCE RENT 
Efficiency constraint in an "equal access" fishery may overcome the problem of 
biological overfishing and resource depletion that could otherwise occur, but the 
obvious economic failing of this model is that it does not produce resource rent. All the 
potential rent or profit from the fishery is dissipated in fishing costs, including income 
to fishers. Amason (1993) notes that this "economic inefficiency" of competitive, free 
access fisheries was not a matter of concern until the 1950s when it was pointed out by 
Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955). If more "efficient" fishing methods were used, and 
overfishing prevented by limiting catch and effort below the equilibrium point, then the 
sustainable yield from the fishery could be maintained, and this yield could be achieved 
at less cost than if the same effect were produced by efficiency constraint. Thus an 
economic surplus can be produced. This surplus would in theory be maximised by 
constraining the catch somewhat to the left of the point of maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) where the difference between the cost and yield curve is greatest (Figure 5.7.). 
The maximum rent is produced at the point where a line parallel to the cost curve 
intersects on a tangent with the yield curve. An economic incentive to reduce catch 
below MSY is arguably a conservation plus. 
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Figure 5.7 Maximising Resource Rent 
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Managing a fishery to maximise rent production requires regulation to limit catch and 
effort. This can be achieved by management strategies involving the allocation of catch 
quotas. Policing is generally necessary to prevent fishers from responding to the 
economic incentive to increase effort. Enclosure, essentially privatising fisheries that 
might otherwise be community resources, is often a component of management for 
economic efficiency in terms of rent production. 
In managing to maximise rent the functioning of ecological feedback mechanisms is 
reduced. Efficient and potentially damaging technologies may be used to harvest the 
resource at the lowest possible cost. This may have more severe impacts on marine 
environments and create a situation of greater risk of overfishing. Conservation is 
reliant on managers setting and effectively policing appropriate levels of catch and 
effort. There is no longer a natural balancing mechanism to reduce the risk of biological 
collapse of the fishery, and as Anderson (1977: 41) points out, economic discounting 
provides an incentive, even for a single resource owner with certainty of property rights, 
to harvest at higher levels than would appear optimal. At a very high discount rate, this 
optimum level approaches the open access equilibrium levels of catch and effort. If 
efficiency constraints have been removed this equilibrium level may represent 
overfishing and pose a threat to the biological sustainability of the fishery, and if, in the 
interests of efficiency, the use of potentially destructive and wasteful technologies has 
become established, the risk of environmental damage is increased. Doubts about the 
security of property rights, perhaps due to social tensions resulting from unemployment, 
would have the effect of increasing the discount rate because of the risk of loss of 
control of the resource. 
5.2 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY - A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE 
One cannot advocate managing fisheries by equal access and efficiency constraint, 
rather than by enclosure for rent production, without addressing the issue of economic 
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efficiency. Is rent production necessary for a fishery to be economically efficient? It all 
depends on one's perspective. Some economic assessments of fisheries consider the 
economic surplus, or resource rent produced after subtracting total fishing costs from the 
value of the catch, to be the only net economic benefit of a fishery. Fishing costs, 
including wages to fish workers, are seen to detract from economic performance. This 
view is not a value-free assessment of economic performance. It measures economic 
performance from the very narrow perspective of those who stand to appropriate the 
rent. It often has nothing in common with a more holistic understanding of the 
economic benefits of a fishery to a society or to other social well-being benefits 
associated with the fishery. 
5.2.J ECONOMICS OF RECREATIONAL FISHERIES 
Recreational fisheries provide a good argument against the position that fisheries should 
produce rent in order to make a positive economic contribution to a society. 
Recreational fishing is usually managed to ensure that it is extremely inefficient. Gear 
restrictions are generally quite severe. Fishers may be limited to the use of rod and line, 
or if other gear such as nets, traps or pots is permitted, the quantity is generally limited 
to prevent its use contributing to an economically viable operation. Bag limits further 
restrict economic opportunities for recreational fishers and often it is illegal to sell fish 
taken by recreational fishing. This prevents any legal economic use being made of the 
catch other than its use for personal consumption, and even this is often discouraged and 
"catch-and-release" promoted in the interests of conservation. All of these measures, 
these constraints on the economic efficiency of recreational fishing, mean that in terms 
of commodity production, there is no economic rationale for people to engage in it. 
Nevertheless, many people obviously gain something from recreational fishing other 
than the commodity value of the catch and are prepared to spend a great deal of money 
and other resources in this pursuit. They purchase licences and equipment, 'including 
tackle, boats and vehicles to tow them. They buy fuel and pay for accommodation, 
guides and other services related to fishing activities; and all of these costs are lauded as 
the economic benefits that recreational fishing contributes to society. Unckles' study 
(1997) into the economics of recreational fishing in Victoria estimated that $1.037 
billion was spent annually on these pursuits, amounting to $200 per kilogram of fish 
caught. This was believed to generate 27 OOO jobs and contribute $830 million in 
income to Victorian households. 
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Figure 5.8 Recreational fishing costs: the economic benefit to society. 
It is the costs associated with fishing that are seen as the economic benefits of the 
activity (Figure 5.8). The commodity value of the fish that are taken may be counted as 
an additional economic benefit, or alternatively as an ~nvironmental cost, something that 
is better kept to a minimum. This view of costs and benefits is exactly opposite to that 
which is generally applied to commercial fishing operations. If the costs associated with 
recreational fishing provide the economic benefit of the fishery to the community, then 
surely the corresponding costs associated with commercial fishing should yield 
corresponding economic benefits; and of course they do. Indeed many commercial 
fisheries have been managed primarily to generate economic activity associated with 
fishing costs, especially capital costs associated with vessel construction to support 
shipbuilding industries, and this has often led to overcapitalisation ancf been to the 
detriment of the fisheries. Just as excessive efficiency can lead to overfishing, so can 
subsidised inefficiency. 
5.2.2 A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
There is an apparent contradiction between the objectives of management of a 
commercial fishery to maximise economic efficiency in terms of resource rent, and the 
objective of management of a recreational fishery for maximum inefficiency in order to 
maximise the generation of secondary economic benefits. This contradiction is most 
evident when both fisheries operate side by side in the same location, using a similar 
type of gear and targeting the same species, as is the case with Tasmania's rock lobster 
pot fishery. In this fishery, management has allowed increased efficiency in the 
commercial sector while restrictions on the recreational sector have been tightened. 
Understanding this apparent contradiction in efficiency-related management objectives 
reveals a social/political function of management. 
Efficiency is a matter of perspective. One person's costs are another person's benefits. 
There are a lot of conflicting interests in the economy of a fishery. While fish workers 
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may benefit from the costs associated with paying their wages, these costs detract from 
the production of profits or rents for resource owners (some of which may be shared 
with the state through taxation). A local community may benefit from fishing-related 
costs spent on the services it provides, but gain no benefit from resource rents that can 
be taken out of the locality. Benefit from the production of resource rent goes to those 
who can appropriate a share of it. Governments generally maintain themselves on the 
surplus of economic activity that they can appropriate through taxes or other means, and 
government and capital-based "owners" are generally joint beneficiaries of resource 
rents produced. 
Managing a commercial fishery for rent production helps to maintain the value of 
capital assets, such as the "property" value associated with fishing entitlements. This 
contributes to maintaining the social order where capital is the basis of power and status 
in society. Managing an "open access" recreational fishery to be inefficient serves the 
same purpose. While the fishery may serve as a resource to provide for various 
recreational, cultural and spiritual needs, it does not serve as a direct economic resource. 
Common people cannot gain economically through the avenues of access to the resource 
that the regulations allow. Instead they are encouraged to dissipate their personal wealth 
on consumer products such as boats, motors, electronics, fishing tackle and the use of 
fossil fuels, thereby contributing to sustaining the value of capital involved in producing 
these goods, and to the state that obtains taxes and revenues from their production and 
consumption. By dissipating the wealth and therefore also the power of ordinary 
citizens, recreational fisheries that are managed to maximise inefficiency may also 
contribute to maintaining the social order. 
Managing fishery resources for economic efficiency measured as the production of 
resource rent can therefore be seen as having a political purpose. Maximising the value 
of capital assets associated with the fishery, including the property rights attached to 
fishing entitlements, does not necessarily serve the values associated with ecological 
sustainability and it has nothing to do with ecological efficiency. Indeed it is often 
incompatible with a holistic consideration of economic efficiency from the wider 
perspective of the entire community rather than the more narrow perspective of serving 
the vested interests of a particular group of stakeholders. Economic efficiency that 
merely serves to maintain inequality in society is not compatible with the values 
associated with ecologically sustainable development discussed in chapter 1. It is 
important to recognise that economic efficiency defined in terms of production of 
resource rents and profits, is a political objective. It is about competition for power 
within a society, and is often at odds with the objective of maximising the economic 
benefit of the resource to the wider community. Understanding this brings into question 
the principle economic argument against efficiency-constrained, equal access fisheries. 
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5.2.3 A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON EFFICIENCY 
That does not mean that efficiency has no place in the discussion of ecological 
sustainability, but a different view of efficiency is needed, a more holistic approach, 
based not on maximising the benefits of resource use to favour the interests of one 
group over another, but on maximising social well-being benefits and the values 
inherent in the concept of ESD. This view of efficiency might focus on minimising the 
costs of resource inputs, including the use of fossil fuels, and consider environmental 
spillovers. It should also consider non-economic well-being issues related to quality of 
life and include consideration of the value of providing increased choices and 
opportunities for employment. It should recognise as a benefit to the community, the 
socio-economic equalising effects of providing equal access to economic resources. 
And it should consider the well-being benefit to individuals and communities of 
freedom from economic dependency and the burden of debt due to overcapitalisation of 
local production processes. 
This approach to efficiency might be furthered by reducing the distinction between 
commercial and recreational fisheries. If the principle of equal access were applied, 
efficiency constraint would be needed to reduce the fishing power of the commercial 
sector to prevent over-fishing. The profligate wasting of resources in both the 
commercial and recreational fisheries could be discouraged. Many environmental costs 
such as spill-overs associated with the use of fossil fuels and other inputs might be 
addressed by taxation. Imposition of appropriate efficiency constraints might cause the 
fishery to resemble a traditional operation such as the Truro oyster fishery and the 
artisanal fisheries still common in many less affluent societies constrained by poverty 
from the profligate wasting of resources that occurs in those industrialised fisheries 
where political goals have precedence over ecologically efficient production of material 
and well-being needs. 
5.2.3.1 Artisanal Fisheries 
McCully (1991) compares characteristics of industrialised and artisanal f~sheries in a 
critique of policies of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO) that promote the "modernisation" of fisheries. He also highlights the 
contradictions between expressed policy goals of providing help to further the well-
being of poor fisher folk, and the outcomes of "modernisation" which include increasing 
income disparities in fishing communities, overfishing and the "marginalization and 
impoverishment of traditional fishing communities around the world" (1991: 77). 
McCully presents some statistics on artisanal and industrialised fisheries from Food 
Matters Worldwide 8, October 1990, that provide an opportunity to reflect on the issue 
of efficiency (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 Comparison between industrial and artisanal fisheries. 
Industrial Artis anal 
Number of fishers employed c.450,000 c.15,000,000 
Catch for human c.25mtp.a. c.20mtp.a. 
consumption 
Capital per fishworker $10-100,000 $100- $1000 
Catch for fish by-products c.19mt p.a. virtually nill 
Fuel consumption 10-14mt p.a. 1-2mt p.a. 
Catch per tonne of fuel - 2- 5 tonnes 10 - 20 tonnes 
Jobs per $million invested 10- 100 1000 - 10,000 
(Source: Food Matters Worldwide 8, October 1990, cited in McCully 1991: 79) 
If one thinks of efficiency in terms of the values of ecologically sustainable development 
for fisheries, efficiency in terms of maximising opportunities for employment from a 
limited resource base, of Ininimising the use of fossil fuels, and reducing the diversion 
of fish to low value uses such as for reduction for stock feeds, then the artisanal sector is 
more efficient. McCully also points out that there is virtually no waste of discarded by-
catch in artisanal fisheries and the fishing technologies employed cause less habitat 
damage. 
However, artisanal fisheries afford less opportunity for the involvement of capital and 
for the small percentage of the global community who own most of it to appropriate a 
share of the wealth of the fishery resource. Artisanal fisheries are inefficient from the 
perspective of capital and of capital-rich elites wishing to promote the use and 
involvement of capital over that of labour in the production process. 
5.2.3.2 Overcapitalisation 
Overcapacity is perhaps the greatest threat to the sustainability of global fisheries (Mace 
1997: 4). Overcapacity means too many boats and too many fishers, and 
overcapitalisation focuses on the aspect of too many boats and too much capital 
investment. Figure 5.9 illustrates the effect of overcapitalisation and capital subsidy in 
commercial fisheries, using a modification of the equilibrium yield model. It also 
demonstrates the problem associated with capital intensive fisheries where, although 
fixed costs are high, marginal fishing costs are relatively low, resulting in a cost curve 
with a low gradient. This is compared to a low capital cost/high marginal cost fishery 
with a steep cost curve which is more sensitive to efficiency-related ecological feedback 
(Figure 5.10). 
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Figure 5.10 A comparison of a high capital/low marginal cost fishing operation with a 
low capital/high marginal cost fishing operation. 
Overfishing by capital intensive industrial fisheries is a particular problem because the 
decision on when to stop fishing is often based on marginal costs of fishing which may 
be relatively low. Capital costs, the value of vessels and equipment, and licences where 
access to the fishery is based on tradabl_e property rights, are usually sunk costs and once 
incurred have little influence on day by day surplus-maximising decision making. This 
can mean that fishing operations continue even though they make a net loss if capital 
costs are taken into account. Mace (1997) cites FAO (1993) estimates that income from 
global fisheries of US$70 OOO million in 1989 were offset by total costs in excess of 
US$124 OOO million. In other words global fisheries made a net financial loss of US$54 
OOO million. Mace (1997: 6) argues that economically marginal fishing operations are 
less likely to conserve stocks because they cannot afford to forego income today in order 
to provide for the unguaranteed possibility of future profits. They cannot afford to 
sacrifice earnings by fishing in ways that minimise environmental damage and reduce 
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bycatch and discarding. This may be so in highly capitalised fisheries; but where fishing 
costs are predominantly marginal costs rather than sunk capital costs, such as in the 
Buen Hombre fishery and in the Truro oyster fishery, this is not the case, and economic 
marginality is the mechanism for effective conservation. 
Overcapacity may develop in recreational fisheries if fishers are encouraged, in the 
interests of greater economic throughput, to purchase vessels equipped with powerful 
motors and sophisticated electronic fishing aids. This can lead to over-fishing where the 
efficiency of fishing activity becomes divorced from ecological feedback mechanisms. 
However recreational fishers may be more responsive than the commercial sector to 
calls for restraint in the interests of conservation, because, perhaps, they are largely 
motivated by other than material values. It is also likely that the "equal access" nature 
of most recreational fisheries establishes a moral legitimacy for conservation measures 
that will be of benefit to all and will not merely serve to enrich and empower a less 
inhibited competitor for the resource. 
5.2.4 A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
There is also a regional dimension to the issue of efficiency. Arrangements that favour 
the consolidation and removal of resource wealth from a region may seem favourable 
and efficient to those who live elsewhere and stand to benefit, but would be inefficient 
from the perspective of those who live locally and would benefit more from the 
dispersal of resource wealth in their region. Efficiency-constrained artisanal fisheries 
may be more efficient from a regional perspective for several reasons. Local fishers 
may have an advantage over "outsiders" due to better knowledge of local fishing 
grounds and reduced costs of travel to access the fishery. If the fishery is economically 
marginal it may only be viable for local fishers to work it. Regional fishing 
communities often benefit if fishing inputs emphasise local content, especially labour, 
rather than capital intensive technologies financed and manufactured elsewhere. From 
the perspective of a global economy, the concept of local may include not just small 
fishing communities, but be extended to include more extensive regions such as the 
state of Tasmania, or states such as the nation of Australia. The prosperity of people in 
these regions may be enhanced by inefficient practices that dissipate resource wealth 
within the region rather than allowing it to be consolidated and exported. There will 
nevertheless always be individuals and occupations at each level of community, local, 
regional and state, who will gain advantage relative to others in their community, from 
participating in the consolidation and export of wealth through every step of the 
progression from local, to regional, to state and ultimately into the sink of the global 
economy. These individuals will promote an efficiency agenda that suits their interests. 
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In conclusion, managing fisheries by efficiency constraint can be an effective and 
environmentally responsive way to conserve fishery resources. It can also promote 
regional prosperity and progressive, wealth equalising distributional effects in fishing 
communities. 
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6. TASMANIA'S FISHERIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Fishing is important to Tasmania's economy. The abalone fishery, which in 1996/97 
was worth in excess of $63 million (Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries 
(DPIF), Tasmania 1997b: 1), is the most valuable of Tasmania's fisheries in terms of 
landed value of the catch. Tasmania's abalone fishery emerged in the 1960s with the 
advent of compressed air diving technology and lucrative Asian markets. Entry was 
limited in 1969, quota based management was introduced in 1985, quota holding was 
separated from the fishing entitlement in 1991, and formal property rights to quota were 
introduced with a "Deed of Agreement" in 1994 (DPIF 1997b: 73-75). The fishery 
generates a significant rent for quota holders. There has been a trend towards investor 
ownership of quota, which is harvested increasingly by contract divers (DPIF 1997b: 
13). Of the total value of the catch, contract divers earn about 10 percent, the 
Tasmanian Government gains a royalty of about 10 percent, and most of the remainder 
goes as rent to the quota owners. The conversion of what may once have been a 
community resource to one that is effectively privately "owned" has seen the 
consolidation of considerable wealth into relatively few hands. 
Tasmania's rock lobster fishery is second in total value and is the principal subject of 
this chapter. There is also a diversified scalefish fishery which has had few restrictions 
on entry in the past but is now being managed more intensively. The number of 
licences, the methods, and the amounts of gear that may be used are becoming more 
restricted. 
6.2 THE ROCK LOBSTER FISHERY 
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) has traditionally supported one of 
Tasmania's most important wild harvest fisheries. Annual catch from the commercial 
rock lobster fishery was worth approximately $40 million in 1995 (DPIF 1997a: 13). 
The industry directly employs about 761 people in Tasmania (Williamson, Wood and 
Bradshaw, 1998: x) and contributes significant socio-economic benefits to many of 
Tasmania's coastal regions. Recreational fishing for rock lobster is also an important 
cultural tradition for many. Approximately 6153 recreational pot licences and 3465 
recreational dive licences were issued for the 1996/97 season (DPIF 1~97a: 24). 
The Tasmania rock lobster fishery has survived numerous "crises" and been the subject 
of several inquires relating to its management over the last century (Winstanley 1973: 2-
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7). In 1883 a Royal Commission of Inquiry (Seal et. al. 1883) preceded the introduction 
of a number of regulations. Significant changes occurred in the management of the 
fishery with the introduction of the use of pots in the 1920s (Winstanley 1973: 3-5; 
Wilson 1987: 5) and the move to a limited entry fishery in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (Winstanley 1973: 7). For several years leading up to 1997, concerns about the 
fishery and different views on the direction its future management should take were the 
cause of conflict and division within the industry. Three reports were published in 1997 
advocating different prescriptions. Tasmania's Department of Primary Industry and 
Fisheries (DPIF), the agency responsible for managing the fishery, released for public 
comment, a draft management plan for the fishery (DPIF 1997a), the central feature of 
which was the proposal to introduce a management system for the fishery based on 
transferable quota. Industry was divided about this central issue of the draft plan. There 
was strong opposition to quota-based management from some sectors. In response to 
these concerns, Tasmania's Legislative Council conducted a Select Committee Inquiry 
into the Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery and published a report (Parliament of 
Tasmania 1997) that was critical of some aspects of the draft management plan. The 
Select Committee's report opposed the introduction of a quota management system 
(QMS) at this time and recommended a gradual rationalisation of the industry, prior to 
the eventual introduction of quota based management in the future. A third report 
which had some bearing on the matter was the Nixon Report (Nixon 1997). 
Commissioned to provide advice to government on matters of economic policy, it 
devoted some attention to fisheries management. It recommended removing many of 
the input controls that have historically been the foundation of conservation and 
management of the fishery in order to promote economic efficiency and profitability. It 
also recommended that the Government buy out existing "stakeholding" in the fishery 
and allocate the total allowable catch by tender. 
The eventual outcome of management deliberations was a Management Plan for the 
fishery implemented in March 1998 (DPIF 1997c) and (Fisheries (Rock Lobster) Rules 
1997), which essentially followed the intentions of the Draft Management Plan but 
included some concessions to the historically big catchers in the fleet by including an 
element of catch history in the initial allocation of quota (Living Marine Resources 
Management Amendment (Rock Lobster Quota) Act 1997). 
Past and present management of Tasmania's rock lobster fishery contains elements that 
are illustrative of some of the issues of allocation and efficiency that relate to the 
concept of ecologically sustainable fisheries management. The fishery serves as a useful 
case study to consider the interests served by management trends, and provides an 
opportunity to speculate on the possible socio-economic outcomes that may have 
occurred if different management policies had been implemented. 
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6.2.2 HISTORY OF THE TASMANIAN ROCK LOBSTER FISHERY 
Tasmania's Aboriginal inhabitants have fished for lobster for tens of thousands of years. 
The commercial fishery of today has its origins in the early years of European settlement 
when the industry was established using sail and oar powered vessels in the nineteenth 
century (Seal et al. 1883). Since that time, developments in the fishery have been 
characterised by continuing technological advances which have affected the harvesting, 
transport and marketing of rock lobster. Management policy over the years has also 
demonstrated a trend of progressively relieving efficiency constraints and increasing 
restrictions on access (Winstanley 1973: 2-7; Parliament of Tasmania 1997). 
Early in the twentieth century, petrol auxiliary motors improved the efficiency of vessels 
and refrigerated cargo holds permitted year round access for Tasmanian lobsters to 
markets in Melbourne and Sydney (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 4). Following World 
War II there were many technological advances. Sail power virtually disappeared, 
replaced by diesel engines. Mechanical pot haulers, refrigeration units and pumps for 
circulating water in holding tanks were added to many vessels. By the mid 1950s echo 
sounders were in general use. Together with pot haulers they made it possible to locate 
and effectively fish the reefs in deeper waters and more easily locate and deploy pots 
over productive "hard-bottom" in shallow and inshore waters (Smith and Fergusson 
1969: 5). On-board refrigeration increased fishing efficiency by allowing sufficient bait 
to be stored for extended trips, thus relieving fishers of the need to divert attention from 
lobster fishing in order to fish for bait. The introduction of synthetic ropes and buoys 
also increased fishing efficiency (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 5). 
In recent years, satellite based navigation systems, generally known as global 
positioning systems or GPS, have had a tremendous impact on the rock lobster fishery 
(DPIF 1997a: 12). Almost every fishing boat is now equipped with GPS and they allow 
accurate navigation without the need for fixed, land based reference points. The use of 
GPS thus makes it possible to navigate with exceptional ease and accuracy and greatly 
facilitates fishing offshore reefs because search time needed to return to productive areas 
or to recover pots is greatly reduced. GPS also makes it easier for fishers to cheat on the 
efficiency constraint provided by the input control limiting the number of pots that may 
be used (DPIF 1997d: 17). With the aid of GPS it is easier and safer to illegally fish 
strings of extra pots because there is no need to mark their position with a surface buoy 
in order to recover them. Extra pots on longlines, fished out of sight of land, can be 
recovered using a grapple after navigating to the approximate locality using GPS. In the 
public consultation process relating to the draft management plan, over-potting was 
raised as a significant concern by many in the industry (DPIF 1997d). 
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Technology has also provided an expanding market for Tasmania's rock lobster which 
has resulted in significant price rises for the commodity (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 
55). The technology to ship frozen tails- to overseas markets after World War II was 
partially responsible for the post war boom in the industry (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 
4) and in recent years the greatly improved efficiency and reduced cost of air transport 
has facilitated development of the live export trade to interstate and overseas markets. 
The increased value of the catch has a similar effect to increased catching efficiency in 
supporting a trend toward biological overfishing in the equilibrium yield model. 
6.2.3 REGULATION AND MANAGEMENT 
The rock lobster fishery has been formally managed since at least the early 1880s when, 
following a Royal Commission of Inquiry, William Saville-Kent, the Superintendent 
and Inspector of Fisheries, introduced the first set of laws to regulate it (Parliament of 
Tasmania 1997: 34). Regulations included the establishment of a minimum size limit of 
12 inches (Winstanley 1973: 3). This regulation, with slight variation over the years, 
has effectively been retained to the present day, and the current size limit is a carapace 
length of l lOmm for male and 105mm for female lobster. This size limit has proven to 
be a very effective conservation measure, protecting the fishery from biological 
overfishing (Harrison 1987b: 11; Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 34). Seasonal closures 
have also been used to manage the fishery since the 1880s (Winstanley 1973: 3,6). The 
periods of closure have altered from time to time in the intervening years. 
Regulations pertaining to efficiency and access have shown a directional trend over the 
past century. In 1883 Tasmanian fishers used hoops or rings to catch lobster (Seal et al. 
1883: xii). Winstanley (1973: 3) notes that pots had been tried in the 1880s, but were 
not used by local fishers who considered them to be destructive and the cause of 
depletion of the beds. It is unclear whether pots were expressly prohibited at this time 
or their use discouraged by informal community sanctions, but their use by fishers from 
Victoria was a cause for some concern (Seal et al. 1883: xv) because it was believed 
that lost pots would continue to trap lobsters or "ghost fish" (Storey 1998). Seal et al. 
( 1883: 5) recommended that the potential to increase catches by the use of pots be 
investigated. In 1902 the use of pots in Tasmanian waters was expressly prohibited 
(Winstanley 1973: 3). Fishers from Victoria continued to fish with pots and defy the 
regulations, and extended their activities down the east coast as northern waters were 
depleted (Winstanley 1973: 3). The authorities appear to have had little success in 
preventing them. In 1905 regulated use of pots was permitted down to 40°38' south. In. 
1913 this was extended to 42°21' south and in 1925 pot use was extended to all 
Tasmanian waters with the exception of the Derwent Estuary, the D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel and Storm Bay (Winstanley 1973: 3-5). 
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During the early 1920s the introduction of pots had been strongly opposed by many 
fishers who believed that their use would deplete local fishing grounds and jeopardise 
their means of livelihood (Winstanley 1973: 5; Wilson 1988: 5). The regulations in 
1925 regulated the use of pots according to vessel size, with larger vessels permitted to 
use more pots (Winstanley 1973: 6). Many of the artisanal fishers accustomed to using 
rings from small vessels close to shore would have been disadvantaged. They may not 
have had access to the necessary capital to obtain a vessel suited to the pot fishery and 
their viability would likely have been affected by competition from the more efficient 
technology on the fishing grounds and the depletion of the beds. The use of pots across 
the fleet increased fairly slowly from 15 percent of vessels in 1925 to 37 percent in 
1939, due to the restricted size of some vessels, the cost of the pot licence fee, and the 
preference of many fishers for the traditional method (Winstanley 1973: 10). 
In 1925 the maximum number of pots permitted for use by the largest vessels in the fleet 
was 30 (Winstanley 1973: 6). This was increased to 40 in 1960 (Winstanley 1973: 7) 
and 50 in 1998 (DPIF 1997a: 44). The Select Committee Report recommended it be 
raised to 60 (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 10) and the Nixon report recommended 
removing the limit altogether (Nixon 1997: 186). Over this time the scale was adjusted 
several times, allowing increasing numbers of pots to be used by smaller vessels in the 
fleet as well. 
Prior to the 1960s access to the fishery was really only limited by the requirement for 
sufficient capital to provide a vessel of adequate size to qualify for the use of pots. The 
move to a limited entry fishery occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the 
number of licences and the total number of pots in use by the fleet were capped in order 
to control the growth in effort and maintain profitability for operators (Winstanley 1973: 
7; Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 19). The number of licences was initially capped at 
420. This number was gradually reduced in the following years as some operators 
retired and pots were amalgamated into fewer though larger holdings. Limiting entry 
had a significant effect on the ongoing development of the industry. It was the first 
major step toward enclosure of the resource and the establishment of a property rights 
based fishery. Within a few years the limited number of rock lobster fishing licences 
and pot entitlements were allowed to be transferred and thus became tractable property. 
Limiting entry did not however prevent the growth of effort in the industry. Licence 
holders invested in bigger boats and better equipment (DPIF 1997a: 77), and the 
increasing price of lobster encouraged fishers to work longer and harder than before as 
they competed with each other for larger shares of the resource to which they jointly 
enjoyed privileged access. 
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6.2.4 CATCH STATISTICS 
In spite of the significant growth of fishing effort over the past century, the available 
catch statistics demonstrate a remarkable consistency in the annual production from the 
fishery. Winstanley (1973: 16) noted stability as a characteristic of the rock lobster 
fishery in spite of a tremendous increase in fishing effort. In 1930, after the introduction 
of pots in the industry, the average catch for the fleet of nearly 50 vessels in the industry 
was 48 OOO pounds (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 4) which equates to a total catch of 
about 1090 metric tonnes. In 1938/39 87 vessels captured approximately 1590 metric 
tonnes (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 4). Catch data from the years between 1948/49 and 
1963/64 show that the catch varied between a low of 993 tonnes (1951/52) and a high 
of 1 805 tonnes (1960/61) with no readily discernible trend (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 
53). A similar pattern of fluctuati,on in the total annual catch within a fairly stable range 
of 1442 tonnes (1994/95) and 2288 tonnes (1984/85) is also reflected in cafch data for 
the seasons between 1979/80 and 1995/96 (DPIF 1997a: 20). 
While the significantly increased effort in past decades has not corresponded with an 
increase in the total annual catch, nor has there been a biological collapse of the fishery. 
This suggests that the rock lobster population is ecologically resilient to the sorts of 
pressures produced by fishing. Harrison (1987: 11) stated that: "So far as co~serving the 
stock is concerned fishing effort need not be controlled". Conservation of the breeding 
stock was provided by the minimum size limit. Recruitment was not affected by fishing 
effort. In a fishery where there is little risk of biological stock collapse due to 
recruitment failure as a result of fishing impacts, management does not need to be 
overly preoccupied with the issue of biological sustainability in the sense of preventing 
extinction, and can focus on socio-economic questions of allocation and efficiency. 
However, concern over ensuring that recruitment is not jeopardised provides 
management with a powerful source of legitimacy to control access and allocation of 
stocks. The rhetoric of conservation is often used to justify measures, the effects of 
which serve primarily to allocate resources to, and further the interests of, particular 
stakeholders. 
In contradiction to the long held belief that fishing effort need not be controlled in order 
to maintain adequate spawning and recruitment, was the concern expressed in the Draft 
Management Plan (DPIF 1997a: 25) that due to the fishing down of adult biomass, egg 
production particularly in the north of Tasmania, may no longer be adequate. Stock 
rebuilding was recommended. It could be argued that the establishment of marine 
reserves would be a more effective way to protect biomass for egg-producti~:m in 
Tasmania's north, than the introduction of a state-wide quota. However, stock 
rebuilding across the entire fishery is a prime economic objective of the management 
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plan, as it is the key to raising catch per effort and thereby reducing fishing costs and 
increasing rent production or profit from the fishery. 
6.2.5 ROCK LOBSTER BIOLOGY 
In the Tasmanian lobster fishery, the size limit protects most female lobsters from legal 
harvest until they have matured and spawned at least once. The size limit provides 
effective protection for lobsters in the south of Tasmania where, due to the cooler water 
temperatures, growth is slower and many fish mature, reproduce and may live out their 
natural life span without growing to the legal minimum size (Winstanley 1973: 22). In 
the south of Tasmania the size limit may be too high and limiting productivity from the 
fishery. In the north of Tasmania, where lobsters grow faster, the size limit may not be 
providing adequate protection. There is thus a recognised problem with the application 
of a uniform size limit in Tasmanian waters and managing the entire state as one fishery 
(DPIF 1997a: 36). 
Female lobsters produce 22 OOO to 500 OOO eggs depending on their size (Winstanley 
1973: 19) which, after hatching, undergo a planktonic larval stage in their life-cycle 
during which they are carried offshore by ocean currents. The larvae may spend one to 
two years in this planktonic phase and undergo several moults, finally developing a 
recognisable lobster form at a length of about 25mm. At this stage the juvenile lobster, 
referred to as Puerulis, swim or are carried by wind and ocean currents toward the shore 
and settle where they find suitable substrate. Over the next few years they grow and the 
females achieve sexual maturity at 4 to 5 years (Winstanley 1973: 19). Lobster recruit 
to the fishery (achieve the legal size limit) after about 6 to 8 years (Winstanley 1973: 19) 
though this is variable and appears to depend on factors such as water temperature and 
food supply. 
Detailed knowledge of the population dynamics of the southern rock lobster in 
Tasmanian waters is quite limited and a great deal more research is needed to obtain a 
better understanding of many of the factors that effect lobster population ecology. 
However, experience suggests that as long as an adequate breeding population is 
maintained, the actual abundance of lobsters has little direct correlation with future 
recruitment to the fishery. It appears that recruitment is influenced by environmental 
factors. 
Consideration of past catch and effort statistics does demonstrate that the fishery has a 
very flat yield curve under the current management system where spawning and 
recruitment are maintained and the stock adequately protected by the minimum size 
limit (figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 Sustainable yield curve.for Tasmania's rock lobster fishery. 
In theory, with a flat yield curve like this, significantly different levels of effort do not 
greatly effect the sustainable yield. Increasing fishing effort will not increase the 
sustainable yield nor will it greatly reduce it (assuming an appropriate size limit 
provides for adequate egg production and recruitment). In reality there would likely be 
some effect due to undersized fish being more frequently trapped and killed by octopus 
in pots, or exposed to damage from handling during release from pots, or to growth 
overfishing depending on growth and survival rates. The catch per unit effort will 
however be reduced as a consequence of increasing effort. This affects the economics 
and profitability of the fishery. 
The catch per unit effort relates to the abundance of fish that are over the minimum size 
limit. Under heavy fishing pressure the abundance of "size" fish will be reduced as.this 
part of the population is fished down and fish are caught soon after recruiting to the 
fishery, instead of having several years worth of recruits forming a larger residual 
population (DPIF 1997a). 
If management were to significantly reduce fishing effort, the sustainable yield could 
still be maintained at a comparable level. The catch per unit effort would be increased 
because of the increased abundance of "size" fish in the population. This could have 
environmental benefits as the population might have a more natural structure without 
the distortion that heavier fishing pressure could produce by reducing the relative 
abundance. of fish above the size limit. Other environmental benefits might also occur 
due to a reduction in the secondary impacts of fishing pressure. Less bait would be 
needed, less fuel used and there would be less disturbance to marine habitats and less 
disturbance of undersize lobster. 
There are a number of ways that effort could be reduced. Efficiency could be 
constrained by input controls, the economic incentive to fish could be reduced by a 
\ 
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royalty attached to the amount of fish taken, or a total allowable caJch could be 
introduced and allocated in some way so as to preclude competitive racing and all 
fishing effort curtailed once it had been reached. 
Management prescriptions for the industry contained in the Draft Management Plan and 
the Nixon Report are based on an assumption of an allocated total allowable catch 
(TAC). The Select Committee recommended reducing efficiency constraints prior to an 
eventual adoption of a TAC (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 10). The option of 
imposing additional efficiency constraint was not promoted. Only those options 
favouring "efficiency" in the production of profit or revenue from the fishery were put 
forward. 
6.2.6 STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL ROCK LOBSTER INDUSTRY 
Prior to introduction of the quota management system in March 1998 there were 321 
vessels in Tasmania's commercial rock lobster fleet, ranging in length from .6 metres to 
26 metres. The number of pots each vessel could use varied between a minimum of 15 
and a maximum of 40, depending on the size of the vessel and the number of pots 
attached to the licence. There was a total of 10 507 pots in the fleet (D~IF 1997a: 12). 
Pots and licences were transferable and could be bought, sold or leased. The market 
value of licences has related almost entirely to the number of pots attached and it is the 
pots that have really represented the tractable "property" in the industry. In recent years 
the number of licences has declined as pot holdings were consolidated onto fewer 
licences. This trend led to a gradual increase in the average number of pots per vessel 
across the fleet. The market value of a pot was about $4000 in 1987 (Campbell 1988: 
30 ), $6000 in 1991 (Morrow 1991: 12) and in March 1998 was reported to have 
reached $13 500 (Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 1998: 34). This made the capital 
value of a 40 pot licence more than $500 OOO in 1997/1998. Williamson, Wood and 
Bradshaw (1998: 54) estimated the total market value of licences in the industry at $142 
million in 1998, up from $50 million three years previously. 
Most licences have been owned in Tasmania and many licence holders have run owner 
operated family businesses. About 16 percent of licences were owned interstate and 
about a third of all licences were leased (DPIF 1997a: 13). In recent years there has 
been a trend toward investor ownership of licences (Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 
1998: x). Leasing arrangements have varied, but a typical seasonal lease for a 40 pot 
licence would have cost about $50 OOO in 1996/97. Approximately one third of the fleet 
had 40 pot licences and the rest were distributed between 15 and 39 pots (DPIF 
1997a:15). 
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There has been considerable diversity in the fleet's operations. The west coast of 
Tasmania has generally been fished by larger vessels able to cope with rough conditions 
and capable of extended trips lasting several weeks (DPIF 1997a: 36). These vessels 
have needed to make large catches to cover their high capital costs, and catch rates on 
the west coast are usually higher than on the more heavily fished north and east coasts 
where stocks have been depleted. The calmer conditions of the east coast are more 
favourable for the smaller vessels in the fleet, many of which operate on a daily basis 
from port. Catches across the fleet have also been affected by a number of other factors, 
including the skill and experience of skipper and crew and personal choices about how 
hard they wished to work, the level of risk they were prepared to take to fish in adverse 
conditions, and lifestyle and income aspirations. 
6.2. 7 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Adam Smith (1776: 203) observed in relation to fishing as a profession that: 
They are all very poor people that follow as a trade what other people 
pursue as a pastime. Fishermen have been so since the time of Theocritus. 
\ 
The natural taste for those employments makes more people follow them · 
than can live comfortably by them. 
In other words, people are prepared to accept lower monetary rewards from a fishing 
career than they might earn in other occupations. They accept a lower return than their 
opportunity cost of labour because they ;ire being subsidised by the pleasure and 
satisfaction, the non material well-being benefits, that they obtain additional to their 
financial earnings. Where fishermen invest in equipment or entitlements to fish,, they 
might seem to be prepared to accept a lower return on their investment than would 
appear to be reasonable according to market rates of interest. Their capital could earn 
more interest elsewhere. The opportunity cost of capital might not be met in financial 
terms because of the life-style benefits or satisfaction subsidy that fishers obtain in 
addition to financial returns. Rock lobster fishing in Tasmania is a recreational activity 
for thousands, and commercial fishers obviously obtain satisfaction and well-being 
benefits from their profession in addition to financial rewards. Economic assessment of 
the industry might therefore be expected to demonstrate poor or marginal performance if 
well-being benefits are not measured. 
The economic "viability" of the fleet has frequently been a cause of management 
concern. In the mid 1960s, prior to the introduction of limited entry, Smith and 
Fergusson (1969: 45-47) found that the fishery was "marginal"; producing only a small 
economic surplus. This surplus, due to technological efficiency gains and the increased 
market value of lobster, would be eroded in the long run as more effort would be 
attracted into the fishery until the equilibrium point was reached. The move to limited 
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entry and a gradual reduction in the number of licences did not curb the growth of effort. 
Approximately the same number of pots remained in the fleet and they were worked 
longer and harder from increasingly larger, more capable and more costly vessels. 
In 1987 Campbell (1988: 29) suggested that the best indicator of the economic 
performance of the industry was whether there was an incentive to enter. At this time 
Campbell (1988: 33) found that the market value of licences, at $4000 per pot, was 
justified by the economics of the industry, that is, new entrants paying this price of entry 
would be economically marginal. For their operations tq become profitable, the 
profitability of the fleet would need to increase. This would also result in the cost of 
licences increasing for new entrants and would result in capital gain to those already 
established. Rent from the fishery and the capital value of licences was due to the 
surplus produced because the fishery was not at equilibrium. This situation had been 
maintained by efficiency creep brought about by technological innovations over 
preceding years and by a rising market price for lobster. Given time one would expect 
this surplus to be eroded by increased effort and stock depletion until equilibrium was 
established. This would eventually reduce the capital value of licences to zero· at the 
equilibrium point. Maintenance of the capital value of licences depends largely on 
maintaining the level of catch per unit effort and this requires that effort be constrained 
below the equilibrium level. For the fishery to be profitable the economic return has to 
exceed costs including the rent on licence value. This is difficult to maintain in the long 
run as the licence value immediately appreciates to absorb any increase in profitability. 
Sustaining the production of rent requires that total effort be constrained, whilst 
producing profit over and above rent requires continual efficiency creep and/or a 
continual increase in the price of the product. Obviously it is not possible to continue to 
reduce the cost of harvesting lobster indefinately. There are constraints on efficiency 
which is affected by the law of diminishing returns. The price is set by the global 
market and is outside management control. It is clear then, that profitability in the 
fishery over and above the production of rent cannot be maintained indefinitely, and it 
may be misleading to judge the economic performance of the industry on the basis of 
measures of profitability. 
In 1991 Morrow (1991) completed an economic analysis of the industry based on 
calculations of the internal rate of return, a measure of the performance of investment 
capital. Morrow found the industry a marginal prospect for investment. This is not 
surprising since surplus or rent produced would be reflected in the capital value of pot~ 
that investors would have to pay to get into the industry. As long as pots have a positive 
value we can assume that the fishery is producing resource rent or economic surplus. As 
in every business, some individual operators may be more or less successful than others. 
If profitability of fishing operations increases due to improved- fishing technology or a 
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significant increase in the market value of the catch then we would expect the value of 
pots to appreciate to accommodate this gain. An economic assessment that includes the 
capital value of pots as a cost or opportunity cost would not be expected to demonstrate 
a profitable industry. If it did so, it would indicate a failure by licence holders to 
appreciate the value of their assets when they leased or sold them. Nor would one 
expect an analysis that did not measure non-financial well-being returns, the satisfaction 
subsidy that nevertheless affects the market value of pots, to find the industry performed 
well in terms of return on financial investment. 
In 1991 Morrow found that, with the market price of pots at $6000, the industry was not 
an attractive opportunity for investment according to an economic analysis based on the 
internal rate of return. By 1997 the market value of pots had risen to about $12000, 
largely due to an increase in the market price of lobster from about $17 per kilogram in 
1991 (Morrow 1991: 5) to approximately $28 per kilogram in 1997 (DPIF 1997a: 18). 
However, if an economic analysis based on internal rate of return were applied to the 
fleet today, it is likely to reach a similar finding to Morrow's in 1991. The fleet would 
be found to be economically marginal because the increased economic surplus from the 
fishery is countered by the increased capital cost of licences, the value of pots reflecting 
the resource rent being produced. 
Morrow (1991: 16) pointed out that Tasmania could choose to have a large and 
inefficient fleet or a smaller efficient one. He suggested that the fishery and coastal 
communities associated with it would continue on a course of gradual decline unless 
management action was taken to rationalise the industry in order to make it more 
efficient by reducing operational costs: 
and: 
To survive in the longer term the fleet must be efficient and be allowed to 
harvest the available stocks at the lowest possible cost. 
If input controls continue to be the basis of the management then the socio-
economic structure of the fishing villages around Tasmania is unlikely to 
change rapidly but gradually slip backwards as the economic climate of the 
fishery declines. 
To increase industry efficiency, Morrow (1991: 16) advocated replacing efficiency~ 
limiting input controls with output controls such as a quota based management system. 
However it may be that the principal economic benefits of the industry to coastal 
communities are more closely associated with the operational costs of the fishery, such 
as wages and supplies, than with the surplus revenue it generates. The decline in these 
regional economies may have more to do with reduced employment due to gains in 
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efficiency in previous years and a reduction in the size of the fleet. Further gains in 
fishing efficiency, far from reversing this trend, might be expected to exacerbate it. 
6.2.8 MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS 
6.2.8.1 The Draft Management Plan 
The management proposals put forward by the Tasmanian Government in the Draft 
Management Plan (DPIF 1997a) were for the introduction of a quota management 
system (QMS) for the fishery to limit effort and allow a relaxation of some input 
controls to increase efficiency. The decision to adopt a QMS was supported by a ballot 
of licence holders in 1995, in which 53 percent of primary votes favoured quota (DPIF 
1997a: 21). Only licence holders, the owners of property rights relating directly to the 
resource, were included as "stakeholders" in the ballot. Other fishers, skippers, deck 
hands and licence leasees were not consulted. Quota management represented a 
significant change from the established limited entry, input controlled regulations that 
were failing to contain the expansion of effort. A total allowable catch (TAC) for the 
fishery would be set, based on annual assessment of the stock, and this TAC would be 
allocated on an equal per pot basis among the licence holders. 
For the first years of the management plan a TAC of about 1500 tons was proposed 
(DPIF 1997a: 41). This, divided by the 10 507 pots in the industry, amounted to a quota 
allocation of 143 kg per pot. The TAC was determined on the basis of a stock 
assessment involving independent sampling and analysis of industry catch returns. It 
reflected the management goal of reducing the annual catch to below the levels of recent 
years in order to allow stocks to rebuild, which in itself should improve the future catch 
per unit effort in the fishery, reducing overall fishing costs and increasing profitability. 
This would also perhaps improve the population structure of the stock with benefits to 
biological sustainability and recruitment (DPIF 1997a: 27-30). 
The preference for per pot allocation acknowledged pots as the traditional unit of 
tradable property in the fishery, and the basis of past investment and current 
'stakeholding' in the industry. Quota would be tradable and the number of pots allowed 
per vessel would increase by 25 percent to allow for amalgamation of holdings and 
restructuring of the industry toward fewer, more efficient vessels. The maximum 
, number of pots that could be fished from the larger vessels would increase from 40 to 50 
(DPIF 1997a: 44). These additional pots would have to be bought from other licence 
holders out of the limited number of 10 507 pots in the fleet. 
It was recognised that there would be winners and losers from the implementation of 
this management plan. There would be an apparent gain to about two thirds of licence 
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holders, those who had been catching less than 143kg per pot (Parliament of Tasmania 
1997: 69-70). They would be able to sell the proportion of their quota that they did not 
catch themselves. Licence holders generally should gain financially due to a likely 
increase in the capital value of entitlements in response to a greater definition of the 
property rights assigned to each pot by the quota system, and the likelihood of increased 
rents accruing to that property as a result of efficiency gains due to the relaxing of some 
input controls and anticipated stock rebuilding. 
The move to limited entry to the fishery in the late 1960's established de facto "property 
rights" in the fishery and paved the way toward enclosure of the resource. Licence 
holders shared the privilege of commercial access to the fishery. However there was 
still the problem of competition between licence holders for a larger share of the 
common resource. The nature of property rights based on a right to fish does not lend 
itself to quantification. The value of the right to fish, in terms of the rent it generates, 
depends to some extent on the skill of the fisher. A skilled and experienced skipper 
would therefore be in a position to capture some of the resource rent and thus share it 
with a non-fishing licence owner; one would expect the market price of leasing a licence 
to reflet the surplus that the least efficient skipper in the fleet was able to pay. The 
move to a quota based management system would define those property rights in a 
manner more suited to the interests of an investor. One would expect the market price 
of buying quota to reflect its value to the most efficient operator in the fleet. Rights that 
are quantifiable, in this case based on the weight of lobster that may be caught, can be 
more easily managed, counted and traded. The quota management system itself, 
through the compliance reporting requirements, puts in place a system of accounting 
which maintain~ and adds to the value of the property rights associated with fishing 
entitlements by enhancing their definition and making them a more market-friendly 
commodity. It also provides a mechanism that aids enforcement. Under the quota 
system, licence holders effectively become share holders in a monopoly. 
Other potential winners who might be expected to benefit from the move to a quota 
management system include agencies with a role in research, management and policing 
of the fishery who would gain increased funding to allow them to manage the increased 
complexity of a quota management system. The Draft Management Plan indicates an 
increase in the budget for these management functions (DPIF 1997a: 73). 
Small owner-operator fishers were seen as likely to benefit from the QMS as they would 
receive a quota allocation proportional to their pot holdings, which in many cases 
exceeded their past levels of catch (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 69). They would also 
be likely to benefit from reduced competition on the fishing grounds and increased catch 
rates if stocks are rebuilt. They would however have to contend with the onerous 
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reporting procedures associated with administration of the QMS. This might be 
expected to impact on enjoyment and reduce the vocational satisfaction of fishing as a 
profession. Those fishers who are also licence holders may find that the costs on one 
hand are compensated by the gains on the other. 
Losers from the proposed management changes are those fishers who have leased 
licences and those who have worked as skippers. They were not considered as 
"stakeholders" in the decision making process and did not have a vote on the issue of 
adopting a QMS. They would be subject to more onerous accounting procedures and 
reduced opportunities to gain a share of the resource rent. With stock rebuilding and 
improved catch rates there is likely to be a shift toward contract harvesting of investor 
controlled quota. There will be less demand for the specialised skills and knowledge of 
experienced fishers (Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 1998: 118). 
Future generations of fishers and 'would be' fishers would also be losers from the move 
to quota as the allocation of quota represents a one-off transfer of the wealth of the 
fishery into the hands of existing licence holders. Future entrants will have to buy into 
the industry (Campbell and Haynes 1990: 2) and the cost is likely to. increase and 
continue to be prohibitive (Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 1998: 134). Much of this 
transfer occurred 30 years ago with the move to limited entry, but the move to greater 
definition of property rights under a quota system is likely to raise the cost of entry. 
Other losers are those fishers or deck-hands squeezed out of employment by the 
anticipated restructuring of the fleet for improved efficiency. The gains in efficiency 
would largely be achieved by reducing the costs associated with paying wages and the 
anticipated reduction in total effort would reduce the amount of labour employed in the 
fishery by up to half (Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 1998: xii). The communities 
where redundant fishers might otherwise have lived and spent their wages would also 
lose economically from the restructure of the industry for greater efficiency. 
Because they were acknowledged "stakeholders", the group of losers from the proposed 
changes of most concern in the decision making process were the traditionally "big 
catchers" in the fleet. These were the licence holders, about a third of the fleet, who had 
been catching in excess of 143kg per pot. They would have to buy up extra quota to 
maintain their catch levels and their accustomed incomes. It was primarily the interests 
of this group that were championed by the recommendations in the Select Committee 
Report. 
6.2.8.2 The Select Committee Report 
The Select Committee found that the fishery was not in danger of imminent collapse but 
that a reduction in effort and catch was necessary to avoid a gradual decline (Parliament 
73 
of Tasmania 1997: 6).--'The report contained a detailed history of the development and 
management of the fishery. Efficiency gains as a result of technological improvements 
over past decades were clearly identified as the major causes leading to overfishing and 
overcapacity (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 47-57). The link between the progressive 
increase in the market price of lobster over past decades, and overfishing, was also 
made. But the recommendations contained nothing to address these causes of the 
problem. On the contrary, the report recommended further reduction in efficiency 
constraints by raising the maximum number of pots that can be used on a vessel from 40 
to 60 (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 10). 
The report was opposed to the introduction of a quota management system until the 
industry had been restructured. By first reducing the number of vessels and people 
employed in the fishery, when a quota system was eventually introduced, individual 
allocations would be larger as there would be fewer to share the total allowable catch 
(Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 10). The report also suggested that allocation of quota 
should recognise catch history. Those operators with a history of larger catches, should 
it argued, be allocated proportionately more quota (Parliament of Tasmania 1997.: 78). 
This method of allocation, while clearly in the interests of the big catchers in the fishery, 
challenged the established position of the pot as the unit of "property" in the fishery. 
This emphasised the difficulty of finding a mechanism to equitably translate the pot 
entitlement into a unit weight allocation of lobster under a quota management system. 
Many of the big catchers had more capital intensive operations that fished off the west 
coast and wide offshore for large quantities of lower value product from deeper waters. 
They operated with high overheads and small margins and needed to catch larger 
quantities of lobster than many east coast fishers in order to remain viable and their 
concerns with per pot allocation were understandable. 
6.2.8.3 The Nixon Report 
The Nixon Report assumed the introduction of a quota management system for the 
fishery in accord with the government's intentions as outlined in the Draft Management 
Plan. However it recommended that existing investment in pots be bought out, paid for 
by allocation of quota by tender, and that in the interests of efficiency, the remaining 
input controls regulating the fishery be abolished (Nixon 1997: 186). If this plan were 
implemented there would probably be some capital gain for government which would 
capture the one off gain in value caused by removing efficiency constraints. 
6.2.8.4 Discussion 
In terms of their vision for the future of the industry, these three prescriptions for 
management differed little from each other. They all shared the management goal of 
'increasing efficiency, viewed as the production of profit, rent or surplus revenue, and of 
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achieving this goal primarily by reducing the number of vessels and people employed in 
the industry. If the biomass of "size" fish is rebuilt, the catch per unit effort should 
increase, and less effort would be required to harvest the total allowable catch. Less 
effort translates into less employment in the fishery. The reduction of some input 
controls, notably the limit on the maximum number of pots per vessel, would also result 
in less employment of labour in the fishery. 
Where the three prescriptions differed is in their advocacy for the interests of particular 
groups of stakeholders. The Nixon Report's recommendations might capture a capital 
gain for government. The Draft Management Plan advocated quota allocation on a per 
pot basis whereas the Select Committee Report suggested that quota allocation, if and 
when introduced, should be based on catch history to more fairly represent past patterns 
of access and usage of the resource. Here the argument was primarily about how the 
cake should be divided among licence holders. There are valid arguments in favour of 
each approach, but in the long run, all licence holders stand to benefit financially to 
some extent by the introduction of quota, as efficiency gains should see more resource 
rent generated from the fishery, thus raising the capital value of the property. rights 
attached to their licences. Admittedly in some cases where licence holders are also 
fishers, representing both capital and labour, this gain in property value and rent may be 
offset to some extent by reduced earnings as fishers. 
The benefit to licence holders comes at the cost to society of reduced opportunities of 
access to the resource through employment opportunities due to the high cost of entry 
caused by sustaining the capital value of licences, and of reduced distribution· of the 
economic benefits from the fishery as its wealth is further consolidated in fewer hands. 
The Tasmanian Government frequently proclaims job creation is a high priority yet all 
management proposals will reduce direct employment in the fishery and there is no 
reason to believe that revenue gains will generate additional jobs in Tasmania. The 
productivity of the industry is limited by the biological constraints of rock lobster 
ecology. The total value of the fishery has progressively increased in recent decades as 
the market price for lobster has risen. The industry today could sustainably generate a 
higher income, adjusted for inflation, than it has in recent years. This income could 
support more people in employment than the industry employed in the past. Morrow's 
report (1991:16) presented the options of a large fleet of inefficient vessels or a small 
fleet of efficient vessels. The Select Committee Report also acknowledges that there are 
options. Tasmania could have a large fleet maximising employment and lifestyle 
opportunities, each limited to a low annual catch, or a more "efficient" smaller fleet 
(Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 20) producing more economic surplus . However all 
proposals favour managing the fishery to reduce employment and increase production of 
revenue. 
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It is quite likely that the economic prosperity and the social well-being of Tasmanian 
society is compromised by the way the rock lobster resource is managed to favour 
capital interests and revenue production. It is possible that a different approach, one that 
stressed equal opportunity of access and conservation through efficiency constraint, 
could produce more favourable economic and social well-being outcomes for Tasmania 
if vested interests had not become established and gained so much influence in the 
decision making process. 
Vested interest politics and historical precedent significantly affect how resources are 
used and opportunities of access are distributed in society. Established practices of 
resource distribution and use leave a legacy that persists in society, in the culture of its 
institutions, and in the cultural traditions and expectations of its people (Putnam 1993: 
123-157, Leftwich 1983: 219-261). These practices are maintained by patterns of 
wealth and power distribution and resource managers are bound to a large extent by 
them, a process Randall (1981: 150-151) refers to as conservative reinforcement. 
However it is interesting to venture into academic speculation on possible social and 
economic outcomes of different practices of distribution of access to resources. And if 
/ 
these possibilities promise better outcomes than the continuation of past and present 
trends then they may offer something to work towards against the inertia and within the 
constraints imposed by whatever interests hold power at any given time. 
6.2.9 HYPOTHETICAL-AN EQUALACCES$ FISHERY 
Suppose Tasmania's lobster fishery were to be managed according to the principle of 
"equal access" and overfishing prevented by the use of efficiency constraints. This 
would imply the elimination of private property rights in the fishery, presently 
maintained through limited entry and transferability of individual entitlements, and re-
establishment of the fishery as a commons. 
Tasmania's rock lob_ster fishery is managed as a single unit with uniform regulations 
applying across the state. This is a consequence of the administrative circumstances; of 
a central management authority being vested in the hands of state government. 
Management based on the assumption of a single fishery is not compatible with the 
biological characteristics of rock lobster populations in Tasmania, with the geography of · 
the fishery in terms of the diversity of the physical characteristics of the fishing grounds 
around the state (DPIF 1997a: 36), and it does not allow for much diversity in 
management of the resource to meet the specific needs of individual coastal 
communities for commodity and other economic and social values . 
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The inadequacy of whole of state management is recognised in relation to the uniform 
size limit which is thought to provide inadequate protection for stocks in the north and 
imposes an excessive constraint on productivity in the south. The possibility of zoning 
the state into 2 or more management units is acknowledged as an issue for future 
consideration (DPIF 1997a: 36), but the difficulties of introducing such a plan into the 
property rights based structure of the industry would be considerable. 
Let us nevertheless assume the identification of numerous regional management units, 
each regulated according to the locally specific circumstances of lobster stocks, the local 
community, and physical geography. The state would still be the principal management 
authority but regulations for each region would be made in consultation with the local 
community, local government and local fishermen. For the sake of the exercise the 
principle of "equal access" would apply in recognition of its value in providing the 
necessary pressures and incentives to justify and maintain efficiency constraint as the 
regulatory means of preventing overfishing, and to prevent the establishment of 
exclusivity and privilege which would undermine equality and community ownership. 
"Outsiders" could fish in any waters subject to the particular rules for that management 
unit, and if a community did not want fishers from somewhere down the coast to come 
and clean out their fishing grounds with a 40 pot vessel, they could make rules to 
prevent use of this gear in their waters. If they prohibited the use of pots entirely, or 
limited use to 5 or 15 pots per vessel (for example), or used other controls deemed 
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appropriate, it might not be worthwhile for outsiders to come and fish those waters, 
while locals with less distance to travel and the opportunity to develop knowledge of the 
local grounds would have the advantage. While they would be restricted in the amount 
of gear they could use, their operations would still be viable at some level. 
Hoefnagel (1996: 69) points out the danger of shifting effort to inshore waters that can 
accompany downscaling of fleet vessel size, but this could be managed by segregating 
the fleet by zone-focused management. In some waters, offshore on the west coast for 
example, it may be appropriate for fishers to be allowed to use 40 pots or more from 
large vessels. In other areas conservation needs and the appropriate level of efficiency 
constraint may require that vessels be limited to 15 pots, or 2, or to the use of rings only, 
as was the rule before pots were permitted in the fishery. In some places no motor rules 
might be appropriate. The possibilities are endless but appropriate regulations for each 
unit could be developed to suit the management goals of each fishery. An east coast 
community, for example, might find it could obtain the greatest value from its local 
lobster resource by using it to attract recreational fishers and holiday makers to the 
region. 
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There are all sorts of measures that could be taken to manage the local resource to best 
meet social and economic goals. These measures might differ significantly from the 
established centralised approach, but they would be technically possible. There are 
many examples worldwide of a regional focus in management approaches, including the 
Falmouth oyster fishery, Buen Hqmbre and Norway's coastal fjords. In South America 
many countries reserve coastal waters out to 3 nautical miles for artisanal fishing and 
restrict industrial fishing to offshore waters. A similar approach might be useful in 
Tasmania's rock lobster fishery, limiting industrial pot fishing to the west coast and 
offshore waters and developing artisanal fisheries in other places to generate maximum 
employment and value maximisation of the resource to the local community. While 
some would argue that much of Tasmania's rock lobster fleet does have characteristics 
of an artisanal fishery, the prohibitive capital cost of entry precludes this classification. 
Efficiency would need to be constrained sufficiently to reduce the financial barrier of 
entry to the fishery. This could be achieved in various ways; by gear restrictions, 
application of daily bag limits, or an efficiency constraining royalty levied on the catch. 
There is no reason why a quota system could not also be used in some regions of 
Tasmania, such as offshore waters. There would be difficulties with implementing 
complex rules but so there are with implementing the current quota system where each 
lobster must be accounted for. Indeed there is a precedent for regional or zone-based 
management with the D'Entrecasteaux Channel effectively reserved for recreational 
lobster fishing by diving or by the use of rings and pots not permitted (DPIF 1997: 59). 
Difficulties, then, could be overcome. 
There are ways that some revenue or economic rent could be obtained from the resource 
for the state or community without undermining "equal-access". A royalty could be 
applied - all lobster taken, sold, or exported could be required to be tagged with an 
individually numbered $5 tag, for example. Amason (1993) points out that a tax on 
catch is likely to be an effective control on effort. 
There would be greater opportuni~ies for value adding beyond the commodity 
perspective. While the highest commodity market price for lobster, possibly $50 per kg, 
might be achieved by flying it live to Singapore or Hong Kong, far greater economic 
benefit to some coastal communities might be obtained if sale and direct 
commodification of the resource were discouraged. Instead wealthy lobster lovers 
might be encouraged to visit Tasmania and spend hundreds of dollars on high local 
content services, stay in local bed and breakfast accommodation, and pay to go on a 
tour, perhaps a lobster ring or pot lifting fishing trip to a well stocked reef conserved by 
excluding commodity-centred rather than experience-centred commercial fishing 
activities. They could have their catch cooked for dinner, and it is possible that in 
obtaining a $50 lobster for "free" they would contribute hundreds of dollars into the 
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economy of the local community. This approach has a precedent in Tasmania's inland 
trout fishery, which yields significant economic benefits to the community as a 
recreational resource that attracts tourists to the state. Commercial harvesting is not 
permitted, and if it were, it would result in value reduction down to the commodity 
value of the resource. 
There would likely still be a place for commodity marketing of an appropriate portion of 
the state's lobster resource, but priority could be given to prosperity-maximising options 
for the community. The total value of the resource to the Tasmanian community could 
be greatly increased by a management strategy that allowed greater diversity and 
flexibility in pursuit of maximum value. While a management strategy would benefit 
from a regional focus to provide optimum management according to local circumstances 
and provide for local conservation and socio-economic requirements, there would still 
be an important role for a central management agency. It could provide a body to 
coordinate research around the state and provide a "higher" authority for prosecution of 
offenses, though much of the policing of local regulations might be effectively carried 
out at the local level, either informally by community members with a stake in the 
resource, or more formally by locally employed bailiffs or wardens as in, the Falmouth 
oyster fishery and the Buen Hombre fishery. The central authority could also be an 
important source of power for maintaining equality of access by preventing the locally 
powerful from assuming control. 
6.2.10 COMPARISON WITH THE CRITERIA FOR ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
How would management of Tasmania's rock lobster fishery, either by property rights 
and enclosure for increased economic efficiency, profit and rent, or according to the 
principle of equal access and conservation through economic inefficiency, compare 
against the criteria that contribute to and define ecologically sustainable development of 
fisheries? 
Managing for increased efficiency will lead to a significant reduction in employment in 
the fishery. As a policy it does not measure well against the statement for ESD fisheries 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 9), that: "The thrust of economic policy should be 
directed at achieving social justice objectives, in particular, full and meaningful 
employment." The nature of employment in the industry may also change with less 
opportunity for independent fishers to pursue a lifestyle choice and exercise the skill, 
knowledge, craft and hunting instincts of the traditional owner-operator, to employment 
of a more industrial nature that may provide little satisfaction apart from wages 
(Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 1998: 119-120). It may be far less satisfying than the 
alternative of employment, on either a full time or a part time or seasonal basis, in an 
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artisanal, equal access, efficiency-constrained fishery that affords the . individual 
opportunities for independence. 
The ESD value of intragenerational equity - if the definition of equity is taken to include 
equality of opportunity - is clearly compromised by management for efficiency by 
enclosure and a property rights-based access to the fishery. The consequences of this to 
other values of ESD have been discussed. The spillover effects of enclosure of one 
resource, such as a fishery, on reducing equality much more widely in a society should 
not be underestimated. 
6.2.10.1 Biodiversity 
There are a number of arguments favouring equal access, efficiency-constrained 
management as affording a better framework to preserve biodiversity and minimise the 
impact of fishing on natural ecosystems. Wilson et al. (1994) make a convincing case 
that fishing regulated by how, when and where fishing takes place is more likely to be 
effective because it is more compatible with the dynamics of ecological systems than 
management in which conservation relies on a TAC and quota, based on imperfect stock 
assessment and population modeling. 
Even the argument that under a property rights management regime there will be an 
incentive to allow lobster stocks to increase and to maintain the population at a high 
level, on the grounds that this leads to increased catch efficiency and larger profits, may 
not be ecologically sound. Too many lobster may have as deleterious an effect on the 
ecology of reef habitats as too few. Prior to European settlement, Tasmania's coastal 
waters were inhabited by large numbers of seals, and the Australian fur seal is a predator 
of rock lobster (Strahan 1983: 462). In the past, seals possibly exerted a greater 
predatory pressure on rock lobster stocks. The current seal populations of 20 OOO to 25 
OOO animals (Strahan 1983: 462) could take the equivalent of the total allowable 
commercial catch of approximately 1500 tonnes (DPIF 1997a: 5), which amounts to 
about 2 million lobsters per year, if each seal took only two lobster per week. It is 
possible that a reduction in seal numbers by early European hunters unleashed an 
ecological plague of lobster in Tasmania's coastal habitats, a plague that was 
nevertheless a welcome economic boon to lobster fishers. 
There are many examples of the devastating ecological effects of removing high level 
predators from ecosystems. Savory (1988: 42-43, 247-266) links the disappearance of 
top level predators from many of the world's rangeland habitats to changes in the 
behaviour of grazing animals, that disrupt plant succession and change water cycles, 
eventually leading to desertification. He argues that the "behavioural response" of 
grazing animals to predators is critical to maintaining healthy systems. Current lobster 
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populations may not be "normal" or depressed by overfishing, but may in fact be far 
greater than the populations that existed prior to European arrival, when high levels of 
predation by seals may have been a limiting factor. 
Rock lobster biology may include factors that lend credence to this theory. The 
suggestion that lobsters only require fairly small residual populations to provide 
adequate recruitment and are very robust in sustaining heavy fishing pressure, suggests 
that they may be adapted to withstanding high levels of predation. One could speculate 
on the environmental benefits of extensive harvesting of rock lobster in areas where 
seals are no longer abundant in order to re-establish a healthy ecological balance. 
Because the behavioural effect of predation may be important, it might be more 
appropriate to harvest lobster in ways that mimic seal predation, such as by divers using 
compressed air, rather than with the traditional baited pots. There may be significantly 
different evolutionary pressures exerted on a lobster population by a method of fishing 
that targets the hungry rather than one that targets the slow or incautious or those that 
lose in the competition with their fellows for access to the most secure hiding places. 
The restoration, or at least replacement, of a process that mimics as closely as possible 
the predatory function of seals in rock lobster population ecology, might best be 
achieved by encouraging an increase in the lobster dive fishery. Diving is used to 
capture lobsters by many Tasmanian recreational fishers and is a method of commercial 
fishing for many species of lobster that do not come to baited pots, such as in the Torres 
Strait and the Caribbean. However the idea of promoting increased dive fishing for 
lobster would be poorly received by the rock lobster fishing industry. Feeling is ·strong 
in the pot fishing industry that taking lobster with compressed air should be prohibited. 
Nor is the predatory role of seals on rock lobster populations widely promoted by those 
with an interest in the conservation of seals and an awareness of the political power of 
the fishing industry to counter perceived threats to their commercial interests. 
We can only speculate on many aspects of rock lobster population ecology, which is 
likely to be complex, and involve food web interactions with several predators, 
including seals and octopus (which in tum may interact with each other) and with 
possible competitors for food, such as various species of crab. There has probably been 
considerable impact on the ecology of reef ecosystems that, support lobster populations, 
from fishing and other activities and the reduction in seal numbers from historic levels. 
However, reducing fishing effort to allow stock rebuilding and improved profitability is 
likely to have some ecosystem benefits, as it will entail less use of baitfish and less 
physical disturbance of habitat. 
6.2.10.2 Economic Efficiency 
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Managing the fishery for efficiency in terms of maximising the production of resource 
rent does not necessarily lead to more efficient use of the resource (in a more holistic 
sense) than would occur if the fishery were managed for equal access and rent 
dissipation. The productive capacity of the rock lobster fishery is limited by biological 
constraints. Leaving aside the possibility of increasing the value of this productivity by 
using it in ways that yield greater well-being benefits in addition to its commodity value, 
and assuming the commodity value is the same whether it is harvested by a property 
rights, rent maximising fishery or by an equal access rent dissipating or redistributing 
one, what then is the net benefit to society of greater economic efficiency in terms of 
revenue production? It will not increase the production of wealth, and rent not 
dissipated in wages in a labour-intensive, efficiency-constrained fishery, can instead be 
dissipated in profits and rents in a property rights, revenue appropriating fishery. 
A basic concept of economic theory is that efficiency is maximised when competitive 
forces can operate. Property rights is about preventing competition by enclosing 
resources, and this is what makes the consolidation and appropriation of resource rent 
possible. If one were really concerned about harvesting a sustainable catch of lobster as 
efficiently as possible, it might make sense to open the fishery to competition. There are 
over 8000 licensed recreational fishers each season. They are prevented by law from 
making any economic return from their recreational fishing. If regulations were 
changed to allow them to operate more efficiently, perhaps to use more gear, catch more 
lobsters, and sell them legally, and assuming their costs are offset by the non-material 
benefits they obtain from the enjoyment of fishing, then it may be that society could 
harvest the sustainable total allowable catch of lobster for practically no net cost at all, 
and thereby save the costs currently incurred to run and maintain the commercial lobster 
fleet. 
Society may not be better off economically as a result of managing the fishery for rent 
production where this relies on enclosure, and this may be true even without considering 
the issues of well-being benefits, and of the potential for wealth dissipation from the 
region. A significant economic effect of managing to produce rent is the distribution of 
the wealth produced in the fishery away from people who work in the fishery and away 
from their communities, to the capital based property owners of the fishery and 
ultimately into the pool of global capital. If someone buys into the fishery and borrows 
money from a bank, that money does not necessarily belong to local savers; it is part of 
the global movement of money. Money flows freely from one bank to another across 
national borders from where it is made to where it can earn the highest return, or where 
it is most in demand. Money is borrowed out of the pool of global capital, and the 
interest is paid back into it. This interest is the economic rent from the fishery. If this 
amounts to half the value of the lobster produced, then this is the proportion of the 
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wealth from the resource that is potentially lost from the local community, and, in fact, 
largely from the wider Australian community. 
The same effect occurs even if the money is not borrowed. A long time licence holder, 
who, through reduced constraints on fishing efficiency can obtain increased resource 
rent, may invest the income in a local bank; but from here it goes anywhere in the world 
according to demand. In the public consultation stage of developing the management 
plan for the rock lobster fishery, a frequently expressed concern was the fear that the 
fishery could be taken over by foreign investors (DPIF 1997d: 12). The report conceded 
that investment might be attracted to the fishery if it provided a good return. This 
preoccupation with foreign over local ownership misses the point. In a global economy 
it simply does not matter. Surplus wealth generated from the fishery can go anywhere in 
the world, just as wealth from anywhere in the world can buy control over part of the 
industry. The only wealth from the fishery that can be confidently retained, at least in 
the first instance, is that portion that is "dissipated" in local content fishing costs. 
Economic analysis that discounts these and believes that the profit, rent or surplus 
represents the only valid measure of the economic benefit from the fishery is misguided. 
This economic surplus is the part that may most readily be lost to the community and 
flow into the pool of global capital. 
One might suggest that parochial concern over the flow of wealth out of a region does 
not matter. From a global perspective one could argue that capital accumulated from 
Tasmania's rock lobster fishery, as a result of efficient practices that prevent it being 
dissipated in wages to local fishermen, can provide the economic basis for the creation 
of jobs elsewhere. For example, resource rent gained by licence holders might be used 
to purchase a condominium in Queensland or an automobile manufactured in Germany, 
thereby creating employment for builders in Port Douglas or auto-workers in Stuttgart. 
But would these jobs contribute to sustaining the ecological integrity and the 
productivity of Tasmania's fisheries? It is unlikely that a builder in North Queensland or 
an auto-worker in Germany would see the link of dependency between their own 
economic well-being and the sustained ecological health and productivity of the fishery, 
as clearly as would an artisanal fisherman living in a coastal community in Tasmania in 
direct and close proximity to it. 
While the foregoing argument focuses on concerns about the siphoning of wealth out of 
the community - this may not be as important an issue as the effect of promoting wealth 
inequality within it. The Draft Management Plan for Tasmania's abalone fishery, a 
fishery that produces very high rent for quota holders due to a high product value and 
low production costs, suggests that much of the economic surplus is reinvested locally 
(DPIF 1997b: 66). Perhaps this reinvestment creates jobs and provides a mechanism for 
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wealth accumulated in the fishery to be redistributed back into the community. Where 
capital is used to provide material things, tools or technological aids that create 
employment and production that would otherwise not occur, wealth may be generated 
and some of this may flow through wages into the local community contributing to its 
prosperity. But where investment amounts to nothing more than buying-up local 
resources, productive land for example, it may push up the price and thereby raise or 
sustain the capital value of these resources. This may do little for the economic well-
being of many in the community. Raising the price of land may simply raise the barriers 
of enclosure against the local poor, reducing their options and entrenching their 
dependence on wage labour. This situation may not generate a spirit of conservation in 
a local community. Jealousy and resentment are natural human responses to inequality. 
Local people may perceive that maintaining the health and productivity of the local 
abalone and rock lobster populations, far from contributing to their own economic well-
being, actually sustains the economic mechanisms that disempower and disadvantage 
them. They would have no incentive to protect the resource. Many in the community 
might be better off if the source of surplus wealth that contributed to maintaining 
inequality in the community, to their disadvantage, was no longer productive. It might 
be to their benefit if poaching redistributed the wealth more evenly in the community, or 
if overfishing or environmental deterioration reduced the production of surplus wealth 
from the fishery. The poor may benefit from deterioration in the productivity of the 
fishery, and the capitalised elite, which relies for the maintenance of its power, privilege 
and position on the immediate production of revenue from the fishery, cannot afford to 
compromise that immediate production in the interests of other values or indeed of , . ; 
future production. Such a situation is not conducive to maintaining, throughout the '·' 
community, a commitment to ecologically sustainable resource management. 
Management of Tasmania's rock lobster and other high value fisheries by enclosure 
through limited entry licensing, individual transferable quota and othet property rights 
mechanisms, is not likely to maximise socio-economic benefits from the fishery. It is in 
fact likely to result in inefficient resource use if a holistic measure of efficiency is taken, 
a measure that includes consideration of all costs and benefits, not just financial inputs 
and outputs from the perspective of capital owners. This management approach also 
compromises many other values of ecologically sustainable development. Why then, 
did Tasmania adopt it instead of management based on a commitment to equality of 
access and conservation through efficiency constraint? 
6.3 MAINTAINING THE SOCIAL ORDER 
Leftwich (1983: 200-258) argues that the principal determinant of the way societies use 
resources and control access to them, is the maintenance of the stratification of power; 
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in other words, to maintain inequality. Drummond and Symes (1996: 155) essentially 
make the same claim, that: 
In capitalist societies, 'regulation' has been and remains primarily 
concerned to maintain and control the value of capital and fixed assets and 
to preserve existing power structures within society. 
Schumacher (1973: 59-60) points out that while the poor do not need the rich and may 
in fact be better off without them, the rich need the poor. Their power and privilege 
depend on maintaining an exploitative relationship with the poor, and to maintain power 
over them, the rich need to ensure that the poor remain poor. While it is important for 
the rich to have access to resources in order to maintain their wealth, it is equally critical 
for them to prevent the poor from gaining access to resources because, should they gain 
in wealth, power and independence, they thereby obtain the means to evade exploitation. 
Managing resources to sustain capital is not about managing to maximise the economic 
well-being of the community. It is about maximising the economic power of the 
capitalised elite, maintaining their store of power, the value of capital assets, and their 
flow of power through production of revenue, and this is relative to, and dependent on, 
limiting the economic well-being of the rest of the community. Enclosure is the means 
of preventing the poor from evading exploitation through economic independence 
achieved by gaining access to resources. As long as the monopoly enjoyed by the few 
over capital inputs in productive processes (including fishing) is sufficient to maintain 
their relative advantage, the status quo is unchallenged. But when the economic 
viability of capital intensive fishing is threatened, either by ecological limits, or 
competition from labour intensive and possibly more efficient methods, capital requires 
financial or environmental subsidies or it has to respond with enclosure and the 
establishment of property rights. Monopoly is resorted to when capital cannot compete 
with labour's production costs. The greater the deprivation of the poor, the lower their 
opportunity cost of labour, and the more competitive they become relative to capital, 
thus necessitating enclosure to protect capital interests. 
Boyce (1996) describes how in Tasmania the precedent of maintaining social control 
through exclusion from resources was set in the early years of European settlement. 
Kangaroo meat was of vital importance to the survival of the European set~ements in 
Van Diemens Land. fu the early 1800s the abundance of kangaroo provided for the 
well-being of the settlements but was a threat to the maintenance of social order. Boyce , 
(1996: 42) describes the concern of the administration over the "enormous social 
implications of this free food", and attempts by the establishment to manage the 
situation so that: 
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Kangaroo could remain the equivalent of English game - the exclusive 
property of the privileged classes - through restricting dog ownership and 
keeping demand low. OthelWise, as he rightly foresaw, the basic means of 
survival and source of wealth would not be privately owned, but freely 
available to all, and the whole system of social control and order, the 
foundation of privilege and power, would thus be undermined. 
At first the imperatives for maintaining social order had to be compromised in order to 
provide for of the survival needs of the community in the critical early .years. Boyce 
points out that in the years 1806-1808 most of the population of Hobart were involved 
in hunting to some extent. Convicts were armed and provided with dogs and enjoyed a 
considerable degree of freedom, independence and access to the means of wealth. 
A consequence of this economic freedom, this access to resources, was a scarcity of 
exploitable labour for the development of capital on the land holdings. Commentators 
complained about the general idleness of the population which, sustained by access to 
the bounty of natural resources, did not find itself compelled to work at cultivation of 
the land for the benefit of the higher social orders who had acquired ownership of it 
(Boyce 1996). 
Once the settlement was securely established this threat to social and political order was 
addressed. In 1817 Lieutenant Governor Davey attacked the economic independence of 
Van Demonians by banning commerce in kangaroo meat and ordering_ the destruction of 
dogs. Development of Tasmania's vast grazing lands for sheep and profit was 
encouraged. Enormous land grants were made to wealthy new immigrants in proportion 
to the capital they already possessed, and a period of repression which lasted for several 
decades re-established British Government authority over the land resources and people 
of Tasmania (Boyce 1996). Control over the wealth and resources of Tasmania was 
appropriated by a group of about 500 powerful, privileged, wealthy men and it has been 
retained in relatively few hands to this day (Boyce 1996). It is logical to assume, with 
the support of Leftwich's (1983) analysis of the politics of resource use, that this group 
would ensure that Tasmania's resources continue to be used in ways that perpetuate their 
hold on power. 
In Tasmania enclosure of the valuable rock lobster and abalone fisheries was largely 
achieved with the introduction of limited entry in the late 1960s. Over the following 
decades efficiency creep, through the introduction of new technology, has allowed the 
production of greater amounts of economic surplus from the fishery, resulting in an 
increase in the capital value of licences. Management options presented in 1997 all 
favoured further concessions to efficiency, necessitating tighter regulation, reducing the 
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distribution of wealth to labour and thereby increasing the capital value of the licences 
that provide privileged access to the fishery. 
Tasmania's fisheries are managed for a mix of commercial and recreational purposes. 
The thrust of management has been, and continues to be, to allow increased profit to 
capital by the establishment of property rights and reduced access to the resource by 
ordinary people. Certainly people can buy a recreational licence but this does not allow 
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access in ways that would allow them to gain some of the wealth of the resource. The 
constraints are such that those who take up their right of access through purchase of 
recreational licences can only do so as consumers under economically unviable 
conditions. They may not legally sell their catch and regulations and penalties are 
severe. 
Leftwich (1983), Drummond and Symes (1996) and others have argued that furthering 
the cause of capital is incompatible with ecologically sustainable outcomes. The 
approach to management for profit on the one hand and exclusion on the other, may 
therefore contradict the requirements for ecological sustainability, though it may claim 
moral legitimacy by donning the environmental mantle and using it to obscure what are 
essentially political objectives. Conservation-oriented organisations may unwittingly 
contribute to this process by consenting to what they see as a reasonable compromise, 
the restraint on exploitation of natury by people on the one hand, through exclusion and 
enclosure mechanisms, and acquiescence to the granting of licence for capital and 
privileged individuals to maximise profit in the name of efficiency on the other. 
Putnam (1993) compared democratically functional and dysfunctional regions of 
Italy. He demonstrated clear links between functional democracy and the 
achievement within a society of quality of life parameters, civic values, economic 
prosperity and general well-being, and a corresponding link between civic 
dysfunction_ and vertical power structures, patron-client relationships, and the 
failure of democratic institutions of government. Putnam (1993: 123-157) also 
demonstrated that the traditions of democratic func~onality and civic culture, and 
those of undemocratic, feudal, patron-client cultures could be traced back many 
centuries in his Italian case studies, demonstrating the persistence of established 
power structures and social characteristics over many generations. 
Tasmanian historian, John Young (1995), used Putnam's analysis of the factors involved 
in sustaining a civic society and those that contribute to civic dysfunction to draw a 
comparison between Tasmania and Calabria, a region in Italy that Putnam (1993: 
135,154) described as dysfunctional, characterised by corruption, a lack of civic culture, 
economic failure and, incidentally, a preoccupation with property rights. Hay (1977) 
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noted an absence of civic commitment in Tasmanian politics and a culture characterised 
by corruption and patronage. He noted that behaviour which in other parts of the world 
would be regarded as flagrant corruption was, in Tasmania, regarded as the normal way 
of doing business or conducting public affairs. So entrenched were such practices that 
they were not recognised as wrongdoing by participants, nor did Tasmania's democratic 
institutions function effectively to censure them. 
Young and Hay have demonstrated a history of a culture of clientalism in a number of 
Tasmanian industries, notably the fruit and timber industries, and Young argues that 
managing these resources to serve the interests of privileged monopoly holders has 
contributed to the poor performance of Tasmania's economy, despite the island state's 
abundant resource wealth. Young argued that the lack of a democratically functional, 
civic society has stood in the way of the Tasmanian community managing timber 
resources so as to optimise the production of economic benefits and well-being benefits 
across the wider Tasmanian community. 
Boyce (1996) has described the establishment of feudal-like power structures in 
Tasmanian society during the early years of colonial settlement and the persistence of 
these structures to the present day. As we have seen, Boyce demonstrated the 
preoccupation with maintaining social order that dictated policy regarding wild game 
resources during the early years of settlement in Tasmania, a priority that prevented the 
community from legally enjoying the potential economic benefits that could have 
resulted from a less politically constrained approach. 
Given the foregoing analysis, it would be reasonable to expect contemporary 
management of valuable Tasmanian fisheries resources to follow a similar pattern and 
serve the same sort of political objectives, though perhaps less blatantly, as those that 
influenced regulation of kangaroo resources in the early 1800s. One would expect to 
see the perpetuation of the established pattern of privileged, monopoly control of access 
to valuable resources such as fisheries. Palsson and Helgason (1996: 47) point out the 
feudal characteristics of fisheries managed with individually transferable quota in which 
quota holders have become de facto owners of the resource. Tasmania has implemented 
management based on tractable quota for its high value abalone and rock lobster 
fisheries, which has, with the exception of recreational access provisions, enclosed and 
privatised them. 
This is not a consequence of a Machiavellian conspiracy involving resource managers. 
Resource managers are bound to operate within the framework of established vested 
interests. In a society bound by a feudal pattern of distribution of political power and 
property, maintained by established legal precedents and encultured social expectations, 
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the perpetuation of feudal practices of resource use a,nd distribution is to be expected. 
The development of management regulation of fisheries since European settlement did 
not occur as the result of any particular plan, but by an evolutionary process of adapting 
to changing circumstances, but always constrained by the characteristics, and 
particularly the interests of the power structures, of Tasmanian society. 
It might be argued that the environment is better protected in a feudal backwater than in 
a more affluent society. The lack of economic development and cultural sophistication, 
perhaps due to its socio-political characteristics, is the source of much of Tasmania's 
chafm. as a place to visit or live. Those whose status allows them to enjoy the 
privileges, rather than bear the social and economic burdens of inequality, would likely 
favour the perpetuation of the established social order and patterns of resource use that 
maintain it. There is a subjective element to the issue, but if objectivity is required it 
can be found in consideration of the issue against the defining criteria for ecologically 
sustainable development as previously discussed. 
An obituary for Mancur Olson in The Economist, (Anon. 1998), summarised his 
contribution to economics. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson brought politics 
and economics together. Olson pointed out that special interest groups have an 
advantage over those with a broader interest in the well-being of society as a whole. He 
theorised that over time in any society, vested interest groups, usually with government 
help,. accumulate privileges and monopolies. This distorts economies, which are further 
weakened as more and more resources flow to a management class of lawyers, 
bureaucrats and lobbyists involved in redistributive activities rather than. productive ' 
ones. Economic decline is entrenched as resources are monopolised by a self-serving 
governing class. Catastrophe appears to be the cure for the condition; war or revolution 
(or possibly economic collapse) that sweeps aside the established pressure groups and 
the established social order. Alternatively, Olson theorised, a nation's people could 
avoid the dangers of parochialism if they were recognised and countered with sound 
institutions and policies. Saul (1997: 152,158-195) expresses a similar view, that only 
citizen-based, participatory decision making can avert the economic and social decline 
that corporatiS\ management and the serving of vested interests without regard to the 
public good pr6 uces in society. But as Putnam pointed out, sound institutions and 
policies are a chara teristic of civic, egalitarian societies. These values are undermined 
by concentrated power, so the process is disequilibriating. 
Tasmania's population is de ining due to emigration by people frustrated by the lack of 
economic opportunities. A cargo cult mentality is developing as Government searches 
for economic salvation by attempting to attract tourists, retirees and investors to the 
Net emigration may serve to diffuse the social pressures that might otherwise 
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pose a threat to existing relations of social and economic power, but it drains Tasmania 
of resources and deepens its economic problems. This makes Government more 
desperate for revenue producing outcomes from resource management at the expense of 
social and environmental values, thus perpetuating the downward spiral. The 
introduction of revenue generating management of fisheries is both a cause and a 
consequence of this, and it has implications for the issue of ecological sustainability. 
For example, it may be linked to the Tasmanian Government's preoccupation with 
increasing the extent of aquaculture development in the state, particularly intensive 
salmon production which may not be environmentally (Mace 1997: 18), or economically 
(Folke, Kautsky and Troell 1994) sustainable, and also has significant social impacts 
(Gowen 1991: 39-40). As these and other measures further heighten social tensions and 
general dissatisfaction with government, centralised power comes increasingly under 
threat from democratic process. If vested interests are to be protected, these democratic 
threats must be countered. Changes made to the electoral process by dual consent of the 
major parties in Tasmania in 1998, in which the number of representatives in the Lower 
House was reduced from 35 to 25, have been criticised as a cynical attempt to subvert 
and permanently undermine the democratic processes in order to retain a narrow access 
to power (Peter Hay pers. comm. 1998). Undermining democratic processes may have 
direct implications to sustaining fisheries in Tasmania. It may for example, reduce the 
prospects of establishing a meaningful network of marine reserves in Tasmania, 
arguably the most effective way to protect marine ecosystems and fisheries (Ballantyne 
1997; Watson 1997). Ballantyne (1997) concedes that the establishment of marine · · 
reserves requires functional democratic decision making processes and, one might add, a 
civic cultur~, in order to promote the public interest over the vested interests of the 
fishing industry. All of these environmental, political and economic matters are 
interlinked. fu regard to management of Tasmanian fisheries, management that serves 
stakeholder interests over the interests of the wider public, that reduces employment and 
opportunity and consolidates wealth and power in few hands, does not contribute to 
progress towards the development of an ecologically sustainable Tasmanian society. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
7.1 INCOMPATIBILITY OF CAPITALISM AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
As we have seen, numerous writers have demonstrated the contradictions between the 
imperatives of capitalism and the requirements for a society to achieve a sustainable 
existence. Drummond and Symes (1996) have discussed this in relation to fisheries 
management. They argue that capitalism is not an equilibrating process and that the 
pressures generated by the accumulation imperatives of capitalism are the fundamental 
causes of the failure to manage fisheries sustainably. Recognising that 'regulation' in 
capitalist societies is primarily concerned to "maintain and control the value of capital 
and fixed assets and to preserve existing power structures within society", Drummond 
and Symes point out that the consequences of inherently unsustainable socio-economic 
arrangements can be deferred and the expression of economic dysfunction postponed, 
but usually at the cost of undermining the social and ecological fabric of sustainability 
(Drummond and Symes 1996: 157). The managerial response to crisis is to consider 
only those strategy options that preserve the value of capital and existing patterns of 
social relations. These strategies are legitimised while those that would undermine 
existing power relations are invalidated. This inevitably results in unsustainable 
outcomes "because they necessarily involve the progressively severe exploitation of 
both natural capital and certain segments of society" (Drummond and Symes 1996: 
156). These managerial strategies are 'non-solutions' and Drummond and Symes 
include management by individual transferable quotas and the application of privatised 
property rights to fishery resources in this category, because they involve potentially 
unsustainable social outcomes. 
Management of fisheries according to the principles of equality of access and 
conservation through inefficiency, as advocated in this thesis, unavoidably compromises 
the political imperatives of capitalism. By linking the issues of distribution and 
conservation, and stressing the importance of equality and the idea that; in the long run, 
conservation of resources depends to a great extent on how access to them is distributed, 
the equal-access paradigm contradicts the widely held position among resource 
managers; that conservation is a purely technical matter, that allocation is an entirely 
separate social or political matter, and that the two issues have no bearing on each other. 
This equal-access model might also be seen to contain a political dimension in that it 
advocates equality of access and sharing of resources. It is possible that the 
conservation argument could be used to serve the political goal of gaining access to 
resources by the have-nots in society. 
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The enclosure paradigm for resource management is also essentially political. It is an 
ideology that serves vested interests. As it advocates private ownership and 
management of natural resources as property, it serves the interests of capitalised elites, 
those with the power to secure ownership. The paradigm serves to legitimise the 
practice of resource appropriation by the powerful. In entrenching inequality of access 
to resources it promotes and maintains a wider inequality in the distribution of wealth 
and power. It attempts to legitimise management for inequality by claiming that this is 
the only way to achieve environmental sustainability and therefore serves the common 
good. Once again the conservation issue may be serving a political agenda rather than 
vice versa. 
If the equal-access/efficiency-constraint model for fishery management is compared 
with the model based on property rights and enclosure against the criteria listed in 
chapter 1 as defining and constituting ecologically sustainable fisheries management, 
the equal access model seems preferable. The equal access model is the only one that 
satisfies the criteria of intragenerational equity and arguably best meets the efficiency 
criteria as discussed in chapter 5. If one considers that the generally accepted 
fundamental causes of biological and social fisheries failure are overcapitalisation, 
overuse of damaging harvesting technologies and the accompanying displacement of 
labour, all consequences of too great a tendency to support capitalised vested interests 
against the interests of the common good, then the equal-access/efficiency-constraint 
approach offers solutions, while privatisation, enclosure and management for revenue 
maximisation is only likely to perpetuate the problems. 
However, the enclosure model is the one that serves the vested interests of capital, of 
financial institutions, of government bureaucracies and those who serve in t~em, and of 
the politically influential sector of the current generation of fishermen who benefit from 
the one-off transfer of public wealth into private hands - everyone, in fact, with any 
power to influence management decision making. 
7.2 SUSTAINING CAPITAL 
Fisheries management agencies are generally instruments of the state. Capitalist values 
are integral to the state, which gains the financial resources required for its maintenance 
from the portion of the surplus of economic activity in the society it controls; that it is 
able to appropriate. The "state" as an institution is as dependent for survival and 
maintenance of its power on the production of surplus from economic activity as capital 
is dependent on the production of profit. This is why it is imperative for instruments of 
the state and the individuals who serve in them to manage resources so as to produce 
revenue or financial surplus. They are co-dependent with capital on managing resources 
as accumulation systems, of managing for profit and resource rent. But if managing for 
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capital is incompatible with managing for ecological sustainability, how do resource 
managers serve the former purpose while believing they are serving the latter? By what 
mechanisms do they ignore the contradictions that face them and keep faith in the myths 
that justify the ideology of enclosure and so continue to believe that enclosure 
mechanisms serve the public interest and the values of BSD? 
Capital-serving thinking is maintained by the culture of institutions. Saul (1997: 76-116) 
and Leftwich (1983) point out how effectively divergent views are censored and 
conformity of view developed and maintained within institutions. Individuals either 
adapt their views, consciously or unconsciously, according to the requirements for 
career advancement, or they stagnate or are weeded out of the system. 
Ward and Weeks' (1994) study into the attitudes of employees of a State Fisheries 
agency demonstrated a remarkable consistency in their subjects' views regarding 
conservation and allocation of access to fisheries resources. They (1994: 101) found 
that a group of state-employed fisheries biologists and managers, almost without 
exception, held a common belief that without regulation, fishers "will take what they 
can until they can't take anymore", and; "will fish until the last fish is caught", and; "will 
take every last living one". 
This is remarkable because in the particular oyster fishery that was the focus of the 
study, depletion by over fishing was simply not a factor that significantly affected 
recruitment to the oyster population. Environmental factors that were beyond the control 
of regulators and fishers alike were the primary factors that influenced reproductive 
success, future productivity, and long term sustainability of the fishery. The biologists 
involved in the study were aware that fishing-related depletion did not affect future 
productivity and was not a factor in long term sustainability. Yet, with only one 
exception, they articulated a "tragedy of the commons" paradigm as the framework of 
their understanding of the interaction of human nature and fisheries. Their faith in a 
belief system that was contradicted by their own scientific observation, but sustained by 
the doctrines of their profession, indicates an ideological basis for their views, rather 
than a rational one based on fact, truth and science. 
Their ideology is based on a myth, a subtle misinterpretation of the economic principles 
of sustainable resource management. It is an ideology so widely held that it is 
considered "public knowledge" (Ward and Weeks 1994: 98). It is part of the collective, 
cultural knowledge of fishery managers and is instilled as part of the training of resource 
management professionals. This ideology can justify enclosure on the erroneous 
grounds that it is necessary to provide biological sustainability, and in so doing, 
establishes privileged access to resources. Fisheries managers are often deluding 
93 
themselves when they believe that they are conserving the resource. They may in fact 
merely be managing and policing allocation and access to the wealth of natural 
resources to serve socio/political interests. 
If the first pillar of support for the ideology of enclosure in fisheries management is 
belief in the inevitability of "tragedy of the commons" outcomes if everyone had "open 
access" to them, then the second is the belief that enclosure is necessary to manage 
resources for "economic efficiency" and that t~is particular view of "efficiency" is in the 
public interest. This belief rests on a view of efficiency from the perspective of 
production of revenue, economic surplus or resource rent. However, the view that the 
economic surplus produced from use of fisheries resources is the only net economic 
benefit produced is not valid if a holistic view of efficiency is taken. It does not measure 
the economic well-being benefits to a community, only the potential for one part of the 
community to gain economic advantage over another through the generation and 
appropriation of revenue. 
Few fisheries managers are aware of the full extent of the contradictions of the situation 
in which they operate. Indeed many would insist that their only objective, or guiding 
brief, is to achieve sustainable outcomes from fisheries management, and that they have 
no brief for or interest in serving capital. In this they fail to recognise or acknowledge 
the primary purpose that is served by the way resources are managed. They are unaware 
of the essentially political purpose that is the foremosf goal of resource management. 
This political purpose is so hidden within values that are deeply entrenched in 
individuals and in social institutions that it is .B.erved without questioning its purpose or 
effect. We do not always recognise the political purpose of these values, (that is, their 
function in maintaining established power structures in society), because this purpose is 
generally obscured. The political position behind expressed ideals such as "encouraging 
investment" and protecting stakeholder interests is not always apparent. 
In order to continue to serve the interests of the politically powerful in comfortable 
ignorance of the contradictions between the expressed goals of resource management 
agencies and the actual outcomes of the resource management functions to which they 
contribute, resource managers need only to believe that issues of resource allocation and 
resource conservation are separate; that social and ecological issues are unrelated; and 
that economic efficiency is independent of social questions of allocation. Current trends 
in resource management go further and suggest that there is a regressive correlation 
between social equality and conservation, that the unfairness and inequality that 
inevitably seems to accompany resource enclosure, is unavoidable if conservation and 
economic efficiency is to be achieved. 
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7.3 Is SUSTAINING CAPITAL MORE IMPORTANT THAN ESD 
The social commitment to sustaining the value of capital and capital assets as the 
measure of power and status is deeply entrenched. Many are dependent on the state for 
financial support and security. Government employees and pensioners do not gain a 
living through direct extraction or processing of natural resources. Their incomes are 
dependent on the revenue that governments can extract from more primarily productive 
enterprises. Their interests may seem better served by managing resources for efficiency 
in revenue production rather than for the well-being of participants. Their relative 
positions and privileges in society may seem to be best maintained relative to those of 
workers in the primary producing sectors, if existing inequities are maintained by 
controlling access to resources. They have a vested interest that is served by managing 
through a combination of revenue maximisation and exclusion. 
Nor are they alone. Almost everyone is dependent for financial well-being on sustaining 
the value of financial capital. Ordinary people have savings, pension funds and 
investments of various kinds. They will support measures that sustain the value of their 
capital to provide for their future needs even though such measures disproportionately 
favour the capitalised elites. If the price of equality is the loss of personal economic 
security, it is too high a price to pay. 
But if failing to restrain capital results in wasteful and destructive use of resources it 
will inevitably lead to social and ecological collapse. Economic security will be lost 
from trying too hard to maintain it in a misguided manner and thereby failing to 
understand the real source of economic security, which is a healthy, productive 
environment and a healthy, cohesive society. The recent collapse of the Indonesian 
economy provides an illustration of this. In the economic boom, people may have 
enjoyed the cash benefits of development and accepted the accompanying growth of 
inequality in wealth and power in their society. They may have accepted the destruction 
of their forests and their fisheries. But when the system collapsed, as unsustainable 
systems inevitably must, their money was worth little. Their savings and pensions and 
investments could not buy the food they needed to survive, and their forests which had 
been cut down, their oceans which had been polluted and overfished, and their fields 
which had been turned into golf courses and office buildings, could no longer provide it. 
All are affected but those that benefited most from the growth in inequality may retain 
their relative advantage. They may retain their positions of status and power relative to 
others in the community and relative status may be more important to individuals than 
sustaining environmental well-being for all. As Milton observed in Paradise Lost: 
"Better to reign in Hell, than serve in Heaven"; a sentiment supported by Ardrey's 
observation (1961: 105) that: "Rank must come first in the preoccupation of any social 
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animal, for rank tells all". Status within society takes a higher priority for the individual 
than the well-being of the group as a whole. Where capital is the basis of status, all 
individuals will defend their capital interests first, and where this is incompatible with 
environmental sustainability, then the environment suffers. This is the tragedy of the 
commons. 
But Leopold (1949: 203) observed: 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a 
member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him 
to compete for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him also to 
co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for). 
With regard to ecologically sustainable fisheries, if the common good is to be promoted, 
then the selfish instincts that underlie the service of capital need to be balanced or 
countered by more ethically based mechanisms and strategies for fisheries resource use. 
There are two aspects to eµsuring that there is a place to compete for. One is to ensure 
that the group does not destroy this place themselves by dysfunctional, unsustainable ,. 
practices of resource use. The other is to ensure that their communal place is not taken 
away by others. Both of these eventualities are best countered by a cohesive society 
with a sense of shared interests to protect. 
A different strategy for group success might be postulated, bc;tsed on consuming 
resources and growing as quickly as possible in order to be able to outcompete and t.' 
displace neighbours, and thus assume control over the neighbours' resources. Such a 
strategy is not without precedent, as described by Diamond (1997: 53-57) in relation to 
the conquest of the Chatham Island Moriori people by their Maori cousins in the 1830s. 
The Moriori had been isolated for a thousand years in the Chatham Islands, 500 miles 
from New Zealand's North Island, and had developed an ecologically sustainable 
society. Their waters were abundant with fish and seals and they were not a warlike 
people. As discussed in chapter 2, the Maori culture emphasised warfare and 
cannibalism and intense conflict over depleted resources. When the Maori learned from 
western navigators of the circumstances of the Chatham Islanders, 900 of them obtained 
passage to the islands, which they took possession of from 2000 Moriori inhabitants 
who were then killed and consumed. This example does not serve to promote the cause 
of ecological sustainability. But as Diamond points out, the cause of the Moriori defeat 
had much to do with naivete caused by isolation. 
Few societies live in isolation today. The global community is made up of groups 
within groups. There is a recognised need to extend ethical considerations to a wider 
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global community. Unrestrained capitalism does not have an ethical basis, nor does 
managing resources by enclosure if this allows wasteful use and resource destruction. 
Exclusion of others from resources to allow unrestrained access by some, rather than an 
approach that emphasises mutual self restraint, is equally devoid of an ethical basis. 
Ethnic cleansing and genocide are, after all, only an extension of this approach. 
Managing resources by the equal access approach however, can be effective in 
conserving social and natural resources, and it has a defensible moral basis in which 
ethical consideration is not restricted to a small privileged group but extended to a wider 
community. 
Much of the argument of this thesis may be seen as an unbalanced attack on capitalism, 
and it is conceded that the motivation of capitalism has brought many well-being 
benefits to mankind. These growth imperatives are perhaps simply an extension of the 
competitive growth imperatives that drive the continuing evolution of life on this planet. 
Plants within communities compete for resources. They grow, crowd and overshadow 
their neighbours and attempt to monopolise resources and starve potential competitors, 
because if they do not win in the race for resources, they will be starved themselves. 
The instincts that drive capitalism are too deep seated to be banished. What is needed is 
some balance to curb the progression of the disequilibriating processes of capitalism in 
order to maintain some stability and continuity, some sustaining of particular, desirable 
social and ecological circumstances. Without constraints, capitalism can develop to the 
extremes of crony or feudal capitalism with adverse social, economic and environmental 
consequences. Democracy, which is inextricably linked with equality, is perhaps the 
only mechanism by which society can curb and balance capital's pursuit of self interest. 
In order to promote equality societies need to manage some resources so that they 
contribute to wealth equalisation. Community resources that are managed for 
sustainability and according to the principle of equal access can contribute to wealth 
equalisation. Fisheries are a key resource in this regard because historically they have 
not been so completely subject to enclosure and monopolisation as have many other 
resources. This situation, however, has been changing with the promotion of "property 
rights" management regimes around the world in recent years. 
In many circumstances fisheries managed as "commons" can better provide for the 
social and economic needs of people, the structural economic needs of communities, 
and the environmental requirements for sustainability, than fisheries managed by 
enclosure for profit. If societies are to enjoy the benefits of fisheries as commons they 
need to face up to the challenges of how to retain and manage fisheries sustainably as 
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commons with equalising efficiency restraints, and how to regain commons that have 
been enclosed. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
By their nature most fisheries are natural commons. This factor has been widely viewed 
as an obstacle in the way of achieving a sustainable relationship between fishery 
resources and those who exploit them. We have developed the technology that pro':ides 
the means to exploit fisheries at unsustainable levels, and economic, social and market 
structures that motivate unsustainable practices by rewarding those who participate in 
these activities. As a result, tragedy of the commons explanations for fisheries decline 
and collapse are widely held, and enclosure or privatisation is promoted as the solution. 
This approach is often espoused by industry and government as it entrenches a situation 
of privileged access to resources and· avoids the need to confront established and 
powerful vested interest groups. However it also involves abdication of government 
responsibility to properly manage the resource on behalf of the public, the nominal 
owners. It does not prevent people's interests being compromised, it merely removes 
their rights of opposition. 
There are other flaws to the privatisation approach. For one thing it undermines a 
significant value of ESD - social equity. Dispossessing the majority of the community 
of an interest in the resource can alienate what is potentially the most significant force 
for achieving sustainable outcomes and resource conservation. Indeed, contrary to the 
theory that privatisation will create an incentive for conservation, there are, in practice, 
apparently sound financial arguments for owners of enclosed fisheries to manage them 
,. 
l. 
in ways that are unsustainable but which maximise the economic potential of the <: 
resource, when such factors as risk, spillovers and financial discounting are taken into ·' 
account. 
The real underlying cause of overfishing may not be common access but the emphasis 
on maximising financial returns from the resource for political reasons, and from the 
failure of many other values relating to ESD to carry sufficient weight in the decision 
making process. The emphasis on economic returns to the exclusion of other va).ues 
leads to very inefficient use of our resources. The contribution that fisheries can make 
to the well-being of society cannot be realised as long as the bias in favour of 
commodity and financial value is maintained. We have reached or exceeded the 
maximum sustainable level of commodity production from many of the world's 
fisheries. The only way of increasing the contribution these resources make to 
individual and social well-being is to give greater emphasis to the non-commodity 
contributions they can make. If other values are to be emphasised this may be at the 
expense of the financial efficiency of commodity production as seen from the level of 
the firm, however, with creative management this may result in general and dispersed 
economic benefits to society as a whole. Should tangible economic benefits not 
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eventuate, the intangible contributions that sustainable management can make would 
more than compensate for lost material benefits and lead to a more socially efficient use 
of fishery resources. 
Where successful fisheries exist on the basis of principles of decommodification and 
management for other values more closely reflecting ESD principles, they have often 
evolved by accident as a result of entrenched practices based on values of tradition or 
religion. Once these management systems are established and the economic and social 
benefits recognised, they are often maintained by strong community pressure. 
Recreational fisheries can provide for values associated with maintaining cultural 
traditions, subsistence, maintenance of ecosystem integrity and economic benefits from 
activities such as tourism that are dependent on the health of the fishery. There is often 
a fine line between commercial exploitation and a non-commercial relationship with the 
resource. Opportunities may exist to develop the economic potential of many fisheries 
within the framework of other ESD values. Success in achieving this may often require 
mechanisms to protect the fishery from commodity market forces. Community based 
management and control and the application of a regional economic focus may 
contribute to successes in this regard. Perhaps the most important characteristic of 
recreational fisheries is that they are often managed as "commons" by equal access and 
efficiency constraint. 
Once resources have been privatised it is often very difficult to reclaim them as 
commons. Pitcher (1998) describes three ratchets that obstruct fisheries rebuilding for 
sustainability. They are Odum 's ratchet, relating to the difficulty of reversing ecological 
change, Pauly's ratchet relating to the scientific perception of "normality" in 
ecosystems, and Ludwig 's ratchet which recognises the problem of the need to service 
loans invested in capital fishing assets that can often only be achieved by further 
investment in technology in order to boost efficiency. There is also a fourth 
socio/political ratchet to consider. This relates to the forces of resistance to challenges 
to the established social order. It might be possible to compensate private resource 
owners financially in order to restore fisheries as commons; for example, by paying 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery licence holders the 150 million dollar value of their 
entitlements. If, however, the resource is then given to the public, there would be a 
downward distribution of wealth to those whose limited options would cause them to 
disproportionately benefit from equal access to this newly available resource. This 
would have spillover effects into other areas of the economy, strengthening the position 
of the underclass and be detrimental to the interests of the powerful. There are of course 
occasions when such revolutionary practices are politically acceptable, as in South 
Africa where the new government has attempted to redress past imbalances by 
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reallocating fisheries quota from corporate groups to people from disadvantaged 
communities (du Plessis and De Wet Schutte 1997; Hutton, Cochrane and Pitcher 
1997). 
Paradoxically, the economic collapse of fisheries may contribute to the prospects of 
establishing equal access to them. Once a fishery loses commercial viability it weakens 
the interests committed to retaining private control over it. It may then become 
politically possible for managers to introduce practices which foster conservation and 
other BSD values instead of commodity production. 
People power may also contribute to maintaining or reclaiming fisheries as sustainably 
managed commons. The political power of recreational fishing, which has high 
participation levels, can influence fisheries management, and consumer choice may also 
be able to play a role. It is interesting to note Mace's report (1997: 8) that Greenpeace is 
campaigning aggressively against fisheries management based on private property rights 
in New Zealand and the United States, and that the World Wildlife Fund (Kemf et al., 
cited by Mace 1997: 8) is opposed to management that involves private property rights 
in any fishery. 
Globally, fishery management is at a crisis point. The established theories and practices 
are failing to produce satisfactory outcomes. The politically palatable (capital-serving) 
response of privatisation is not likely to halt fishery decline and it has serious social 
implications. It is also a path incompatible with ESD values. The only alternative, and 
one which offers exciting challenges to the profession, is to explore the possibility of 
achieving BSD outcomes by giving greater emphasis to non-commodity values in 
fishery management planning. This course will not be easy. It represents a major shift 
in the way fishery managers will have to operate. It will also have to confront powerful 
vested interests. The point at which this becomes politically feasible will vary. But 
ethical considerations point to it as the direction that we should take in order to achieve 
ecological sustainability of fisheries with all the values that this term implies. 
101 
REFERENCES 
Aiken, D. and Sinclair, M., 1995; From Capture to Culture: Exploring the Limits of 
Marine Productivity, World Aquaculture, 26 (3), 21-34. 
Anderson, L.G., 1977; The Economics of Fisheries Management; John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore. 
Anon., 1992; Who's Common Future? A Special Issue, The Ecologist, 22, 4, 
July/August 1992. 
Anon., 1996a; Glimmer or Glut, The Economist, 5 October, 44. 
Anon., 1996b; Europe's Fish, Norway's Lessons, The Economist, 19 October, 72. 
Anon., 1998; Mancur Olson (obituary), The Economist, 7 March, 107. 
' Ardrey, R., 1961; African Genesis; Fontana, London. 
Amason, R., 1993; Ocean Fisheries Management: Recent International Developments, 
Marine Policy, September 1993, 334-339. 
Baines G.B.K., 1995; Lessons for Modem Management from the South Pacific, 
Appropriate Technology, 22, 2, 6-8. 
Ballantine, W.J., 1997; Design Principles for Systems of 'No-Take' Marine Reserves; 
paper for workshop on: The Design and Monitoring of Marine Reserves, at Fisheries 
Center, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Feb. 18-20. 
Boyce, J., 1996; Journeying Home: A New Look at the British Invasion of Van 
Diemen's Land, Island, Hobart (Tas.), 66, 38-63. 
Brubaker, E., 1996; Ecological Implications of Property Rights, in B.L. Crowley (ed.), 
Taking Ownership: Property Rights and Fishery Management on the Atlantic Coast, 
Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, Halifax, (NS), 221-251. 
Campbell, D. and Haynes, J., 1990; Resource Rent in Fisheries, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra. 
102 
Campbell, H., 1987; The Economics of the Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery, in S. Bear 
(ed.), Tasmanian Rock Lobster Seminar, 1986, Technical Report 25, Tasmania 
Department of Sea Fisheries, Hobart (Tas.), 29-38. 
Clark, I., 1993; fudividual Transferable Quotas: The New Zealand Experience, Marine 
Policy, September, 340-342. 
Clay, P.M. and McGoodwin, J.R., 1995; Utilizing Social Sciences in Fisheries 
Management, Aquatic Living Resources, 1995, 8, 203-207. 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1991; Ecologically Sustainable Development Working 
Groups; Draft Report - Fisheries, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
Cotgrove, B., 1997; Letter to the Editor, The Australian, 9 October. 
Crean, K. and Symes, D., 1996; Sailing into Calmer Waters, in K. Crean and D. Symes 
(eds), Fisheries Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead (Eng.), 197-
205. 
Cross, D., 1991; FAO and Aquaculture: Ponds and Politics in Africa, The Ecologist, 21, 
2, March/April, 73-76. 
Csavas, I., 1994; World Aquaculture Status and Outlook, INFOFISH International, 
5194, 47-54. 
Davies, A., 1995; The History of the Falmouth Working Boats, self-published, Falmouth 
(Eng.). 
Du Plessis, P.G., and De Wet Schutte, 1997; The Socio-economic Effects and 
Implications of Fishermen's Community Trusts in South Africa, in; Developing and 
Sustaining World Fisheries Resources: The State of the Science and Management, 
Proceedings from the 2nd World Fisheries Congress, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood 
(Vic.), 220-227. 
Diamond, J., 1997; Guns, Germs and Steel: a Short History of Everybody for the Last 
13, OOO Years, Vintage, London. 
Diesendorf, M., 1997; Principles of Ecological Sustainability, in M. Diesendorf and C. 
Hamilton (eds), Human Ecology, Human Economy, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards 
(NSW), 64-97. 
103 
Drummond, I., and Symes, D., 1996; Rethinking Sustainable Fisheries: The Realist 
Paradigm, Sociologia Ruralis, 36, 152-162. 
Dyson, J., 1977; Business in Great Waters, Angus and Robertson, London. 
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPIF), Tasmania, 1997a; Draft Fisheries 
Management Plan and Policy Document for the Rock Lobster Fishery, Department of 
Primary Industry and Fisheries, Hobart (Tas.). 
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPIF), Tasmania, 1997b; Draft Fishery 
Management Plan and Policy Document for the Tasmanian Abalone Fishery, 
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries, Hobart (Tas.). 
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPIF), Tasmania, 1997c; Rock Lobster 
Fishery Policy Document, Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries, Hobart (Tas.). 
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries (DPIF), Tasmania, 1997d; Report on the 
Public Consultation Process Contributing to Development of a M_q,nagement Plan for 
Tasmania's Rock Lobster Fishery, Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries, 
Hobart (Tas.). 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 1993; Marine Fisheries and the Law of the 
Sea: A Decade of Change, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 853. FAO, Rome. 65 pp. 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 1995; The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, FAO, Rome. 
Fisheries (Rock Lobster) Rules 1997, Statutory Rules 1997, No. 146, Government of 
Tasmania, Hobart (Tas.). 
Flannery, T.F., 1994; The Future Eaters - An Ecological History of the Australian 
. Lands and People, Reed, Kew (Vic.). 
Folke, C., Kautsky, N. and Troell, M., 1994; The Cost of Eutrophication from Salmon 
Farming: Implications for Policy, Journal of Environmental Management, 40, 173-182. 
Garcia, S.M. and Newton, C.H., 1994; Responsible Fisheries: An Overview of FAO 
Policy Developments (1945-1994), Marine Pollution Bulletin, 29 (6-12), 528-536. 
104 
,, 
Gordon, H.S., 1954; Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 
Journal of Political Economy, 62, 124-142. 
Gowen, R.J., 1991; Aquaculture and the Environment, in N. De Pauw and J. Joyce 
(eds), European Aquaculture Society Special Publication No. 16, Ghent, (Belg.), 23-48. 
Hardin, G., 1968; The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
Harrison, A.J., 1987a; The Development of Existing Management Rules in the 
Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery, in S. Bear (ed.), Tasmanian Rock Lobster Seminar, 
1986, Technical Report 25, Tasmania Department of Sea Fisheries, Hobart (Tas.), 7-10. 
Harrison, A.J., 1987b; The Effect of Fishing upon the Rock Lobster Stocks and 
Recruitment in the Fishery, in S. Bear (ed.), Tasmanian Rock Lobster Seminar, 1986, 
Technical Report 25, Tasmania Department of Sea Fisheries, Hobart (Tas. ), 11-17. 
Hay, P.R., 1977; Factors Conducive to Political Corruption: The Tasmanian Experience, 
Political Science, 29, 115-130. 
Hersoug, B., 1996; Social Considerations in Fisheries Planning and Management - Real 
Objectives or a Defence of the Status Qua, in K. Crean and D. Symes (eds), Fisheries 
Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead (Eng.), 19-24. 
Hodge, I., 1995; Environmental Economics: Individual Incentives and Public Choices, 
St Martin's Press, New York. 
Hoefnagel, E., 1996; Trade in Fishing Rights in the Netherlands: a Maritime 
Environment Market, in K. Crean and D. Symes (eds), Fisheries Management in Crisis, 
Fishing News Books, Osney Mead (Eng.), 61-70. 
Holmes, B., 1995; Tough Treaty to Police Global Fisheries, New Scientist, 5 August, 4. 
Holmes, B., 1996; Blue Revolutionaries, New Scientist, 7 December, 32-36. 
House of Lords, 1996; Fish Stock Conservation and Management. Report of the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology. HL Paper 25. London, HMSO. 
105 
,, 
' 
Hutton, T., Kevern, L.C. and Pitcher, T.J., 1997: Post-Apartheid Fisheries Management 
Policy in South Africa: The Need for a Change in Management Philosophy; in; 
Developing and Sustaining World Fisheries Resources: The State of the Science and 
Management, Proceedings from the 2nd World Fisheries Congress, CSIRO Publishing, 
Collingwood (Vic.), 228-232. 
Jentoft, S. and Mikalsen, K.H., 1994; Regulating Fjord Fisheries: Folk Management or 
Interest Group Politics, in L. Dyer and J.R. McGoodwin (eds), Folk Management in the 
World's Fisheries: Lessons for Modern Fisheries Management, University Press of 
Colorado, Niwot (Col.), 287-316. 
Kalland, A., 1996; Marine Management in Coastal Japan, in K. Crean and D. Symes 
(eds), Fisheries Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead (Eng.), 71-
86, 
Kemf, E., Sutton, M., and Wilson, A., 1996; Wanted Alive: Marine Fishes in the Wild, 
World Wildlife Fund for Nature, Glartd (Switz.). 
Kennedy, R., 1987; Tagging-Results of Recent Studies, in S. Bear (ed.), Tasmanian 
Rock Lobster Seminar, 1986, Technical Report 25, Tasmania Department of Sea 
Fisheries, Hobart (Tas.), 24-28. 
Kesteven, G.L., 1997; MSY Revisited: A Realistic Approach to Fisheries Management 
and Administration, Marine Policy, 21, 1, 73-82. 
\ 
Leftwich, A., 1983; Redefining Politics: People Resources and Power, Methuen & Co., 
London. 
Leopold, A., 1949; The Land Ethic, A Sand County Almanac: And Scetches Here and 
There, Oxford University Press, London, 201-226. 
Living Marine Resources Management Amendment (Rock Lobster Quota) Act 1997, 
Government of Tasmania, Hobart (Tas.). 
Mace, P.M., 1997; Developing and Sustaining World Fisheries Resources: The State of 
the Science and Management, in; Developing and Sustaining World Fisheries 
Resources: The State of the Science and Management, Proceedings from the 2nd World 
Fisheries Congress, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood (Vic.), 1-20. 
McCully, P., 1991; FAQ and Fisheries Development; The Ecologist, 21, 2, 77-80. 
106 
Macintosh, D.J. and Phillips, M.J., 1992; Environmental Issues in Shrimp Farming, 
Shrimp 92 Hong Kong: Proceedings of the 3rd Global Conference on the Shrimp 
Industry, Hong Kong, 14-16 September 1992, in H. De Saram and T. Singh (eds), 
Infofish, Kuala Lumpur, 118-145. 
Mackenzie, L.D.M., 1993; Sea Fisheries Management: The EC Position, Marine Policy, 
September, 343-346. 
Mc Vay, S., 1966; The Last of the Great Whales, Scientific American, 215 (2) 13. 
Mariussen, A., 1996; Social Objectives as Social Contracts in a Turbulent Economy, in 
K. Crean and D. Symes (eds), Fisheries Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, 
Osney Mead (Eng.), 25-33. 
McGoodwin, J.R., 1990; Crisis in the World's Fisheries: People, Problems, and 
Policies. Stanford University Press, Stanford (Calif.). 
Milton, J., 1968; Paradise Lost & Paradise Regained, C. Ricks (ed.), Signet, New York, 
Book I, Line 263, 54. 
Morrow, H.P.R., 1991; An Economic Analysis of the Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery 
1990/91, Unpublished Report to the Rock Lobster Working Group, Department of 
Primary Industry and Fisheries, Tasmania, Hobart (Tas.). 
Nixon, P., 1997; The Nixon Report - Tasmania into the 2lst Century: Report to the 
Prime Minister of Australia and the Premier of Tasmania, Commonwealth State inquiry 
into the Tasmanian Economy, Commonwealth of Australia, Hobart, (Tas). 
Olver, C.H., Shuter, B.J. and Minns, C.K., 1995; Toward a Definition of Conservation 
Principles for Fisheries Management, Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Sciences, 52, 1584-1594. 
O'Riordan, B., 1996; Aquaculture and Food Security, Appropriate Technology, 23 (2), 
33-35. 
Palsson, G., and Helgason, A., 1996; Property Rights and Practical Knowledge: the 
Icelandic Quota System, in K. Crean and D. Symes (eds), Fisheries Management in 
Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead (Eng.), 45-60. 
107 
Parliament of Tasmania, 1997; Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery. Legislative Council 
Select Committee Report, Hobart (Tas.). 
Patel, T., 1996; Judge Pulls Plug on Polluting Shrimp Farms, New Scientist, 21 
December, 8. 
Pearce, F., 1995; How the Soviet Seas Were Lost, New Scientist, 11November,39-42. 
Pearce, F., 1996; Only Stem Words Can Save World's Fish, New Scientist, 10 February, 
4. 
Phillipson, J., 1996; The Sustainable Development of UK Fisheries: Opportunities for 
Co-management, Sociologia Ruralis, 36, 201-211. 
Pinkerton, E., 1989; Introduction: Attaining Better Fisheries Management through Co-
Management - Prospects, Problems, and Propositions, in E. Pinkerton (ed.), Co-
Operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management 
and Community Development, University of British Columbia Press,, Vancouver, 3-33. 
Pitcher, T.J., 1998; Rebuilding as a New Goal for Fisheries Management: 
Reconstructing the Past to Salvage the Future, in press, Proceedings from the VII 
International Congress of Ecology, Florence, July 19-25. 
Putnam, R.D., 1993; Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton (N.J.). 
Randall, A., 1981; Resource Economics: An Economic Approach to Natural Resource 
and Environmental Policy, Grid Publishing, Columbus (Ohio.). 
Roberts, C.M., 1997; Ecological Advice for the Global Fisheries Crisis, TREE 12 (1), 
35-38. 
Rothschild, B.J., 1983; Achievement of Fisheries Management Goals in the 1980s, in 
B.J. Rothschild (ed.), Global Fisheries: Perspectives for the 1980s, Springer-Verlag, 
New York. 
Saul, J.R., 1997; The Unconscious Civilisation, Penguin, Ringwood, (Vic.). 
Savory, A., 1988; Holistic Resource Management, Island Press, Covello, (Calif.). 
108 
Scott, A.D., 1955; The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, Journal of Political 
Economy, 63, 116-124. 
Seal, M., Allport, C., Johnston, RM., Riddoch, A., Swan, J., Webster, A.G., Belstead, 
C.T. and Swan, E.D., 1883; Royal Commission on the Fisheries of Tasmania, Report of 
the Commissioner. Tasm. Parl. J. and Pap., House ASS. J., XLIII. Government Printer, 
Hobart. 
Schrank, W.E., 1995; Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction: Origins of the Current Crisis in 
Atlantic Canada's Fisheries, Marine Policy, 19, 285-299. 
Schumacher, E.F., 1973; Small is Beaut.iful: A Study of Economics as if People 
Mattered, Sphere, London. 
Sharp, G.D., 1995; It's About Time: New Beginnings and Old Good Ideas in Fisheries 
Science, Fisheries Oceanography, 4, 324-341. 
Smith, A., 1776; The Wealth of Nations. Penguin, Harmondsworth (Eng.). 
Smith, J.T., and Fergusson, D.J., 1969; The Tasmanian Crayfishery - An Economic 
Survey, 1964-65, Economics Section, Tasmania Department of Agriculture, Hobart 
(Tas.). 
Smith, -M.E., 1995; The Nature of Nature: Conflict and Consensus in Fisheries 
Management, Aquatic Living Resources, 8, 209-213. 
Stoffle, B.W., Halmo, D.B., Stoffle, R.W. and Burpee, C.G., 1994; Folk Management 
and Conservation Ethics Among Small-Scale Fishers of Buen Hombre, Dominican 
Republic, in L. Dyer and J.R. McGoodwin (eds), Folk Management in the World's 
Fisheries: Lessons for Modern Fisheries Management, University Press of Colorado, 
Niwot (Col.), 115-138. 
Storey, P., 1998; From Cray Rings to Closure: Aspects of the Tasmanian Fishing 
Industry to Circa 1970, Papers and Proceedings: Tasmanian Historical Research 
Association, 45, 3, 125-143. 
Strahan, R. (ed.), 1983; The Australian Museum Complete Book of Australian 
Mammals, Angus and Robertson, Sydney. 
Symes, D., 1996; Fishing in Troubled Waters, in K. Crean and D. Symes (eds), 
Fisheries Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead (Eng.), 3-16. 
109 
Thomson, D., 1995; Sustaining Livelihoods in Coastal Fisheries, Appropriate 
Technology, 22, 2, 1-4. 
Unkles, B., 1997; The Economic Impact of Recreational Fishing in Victoria, A report 
for Fisheries Victoria, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, prepared by 
the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research, Clifton Hill (Vic.). 
Vestergaard, T., 1996; Social Adaptations to a Fluctuating Resource, in K. Crean and D. 
Symes (eds), Fisheries Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead 
(Eng.), 87-91. 
Ward, W. and Weeks, P., 1994; Resource Managers and Resource Users: Field 
Biologists and Ste~ardship, in L. Dyer and J.R. McGoodwin (eds), Folk Management in 
the World's Fisheries: Lessons for Modern Fisheries Management, University Press of 
Colorado, Niwot (Col.), 91-113. 
Watson, M., 1997; Where Fish May Safely Graze, New Scientist, 15 February, 46. 
Waugh, G., 1984; Fisheries Management; Theoretical Developments and 
Contemporary Applications, Westview Press, Boulder (Col.). 
Williamson, S., Wood, L., and Bradshaw, M., 1998; A Socio-Economic Profile of the 
Rock Lobster Industry in Tasmania and the Effects of a Shift to a Quota Management 
System on Four Port Communities. Prepared for the Department of Primary Industry 
and Fisheries, Tasmania, Unitas Consulting, Hobart (Tas.). 
Wilson; J.A., Acheson, J.M., Metcalfe, M. and Kleban, P., 1994; Chaos, Complexity 
and Community Management of Fisheries, Marine Policy 18, 291-305. 
Wilson, M.A., 1987; Opening Remarks, in S. Bear (ed.), Tasmanian Rock Lobster 
Seminar, 1986, Technical Report 25, Tasmania Department of Sea Fisheries, Hobart 
(Tas.), 4-6. 
Winstanley, R.H., 1973; Rock Lobster Fishing in Tasmania, 1904-1972, Tasmanian 
Fisheries Re~earch, 7, Hobart (Tas.). 
Wise, M., 1996; Regional Concepts in the Development of the Common Fisheries 
Policy: The Case of the Atlantic Arc, in K. Crean and D. Symes (eds), Fisheries 
Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, Osney Mead{Eng.), 141-158. 
110 
World Commission on Environment and Development 1987; Our Common Future, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne (Vic.). 
Young, J., 1995; Back to the Future: Choosing a Meaning from Regional History, 
Tasmanian Historical Studies, 5.1, 1995-6, 114-131. 
111 
PERSONAL COMMUNICATION 
Hay, P. (1998). Reader, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, 
University of Tasmania, Hobart (Tas.). 
112 
